SERBIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

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Institute for Political Studies

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THE LIBERAL CRITIQUES OF DEMOCRACY FROM TOCQUEVILLE TO HERMANN-HOPPE

Abstract

In my article I would like to analyze a tradition created by Alexis de Tocqueville which Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn called "true liberalism." According to this political theory, "liberty" and "equality" do not complement each other but are in fact contradictions. In my lecture I would like to analyze how the words "democracy" and "liberty" were evaluated in the texts of the early liberals, how and why they began to be equated with each other. In this article, I will examine three representatives of this tradition in more detail: James Fitzjames Stephen, Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, and Hans-Hermann Hoppe.

In the modern age – argue the liberal critiques of democracy – the lack of freedom is manifested evidently. Liberty was first eradicated by royal absolutisms and then by successive democratic revolutions. As a result, the vacuum created was replaced by the modern state with Weberian "bureaucratic authority." Modern state bureaucracy overwhelmed all sorts of public bodies, ordinances, provinces and other liberties for the sake of the abstract concept of "liberty." On the one hand, this was done in the name of equality proclaimed on the basis of parliamentary popular sovereignty, and on the other hand it was a product of totalitarianism. of the result these processes in the modern world – while liberty is constant ly being eulogized and has been raised to the rank of an official ideology – there is actually less freedom than in any previous era.

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Keywords: liberty or equality, tyranny of the majority, bureaucratic authority, egalitarianism, hierarchy

The word "democracy", first appeared in ancient Greek political thought, in the city-state of Athens, as a term denoting the *polis* form of government, during the period of classical antiquity.[1] Democracy is one of the most widespread forms of state in the world of today, and the term itself has become a quasi-equivalent of "good governance" and "political freedom." Since the period of the Enlightenment, democracy has been associated with the "rule of the people," the free selection and election of the state's government. At the present time, what seems reasonable, good, or desirable in the world of politics almost automatically tends to be regarded as some sort of democracy: the idea of democracy is clearly in a privileged position. As one of the handbooks of political philosophy, the *Encyclopedia of Political Philosophy* – without any reflection on the original *meaning* of the word –puts it: "[D] emocracy can be understood as a division of power, a restriction of power, and the rule of law" (Millner et al. 1987, 466). The transition from a monarchic to a democratic age, throughout the literature, from high school or even in university textbooks to educational and scholarly articles, is portrayed as a "natural" and benevolent transition from the era of political oppression to the age of freedom, in close connection with a faith in "human progress" – a term also inherited from the period of Enlightenment. The doctrine of popular sovereignty is apparently connected with the notion of the "autonomous man", who freely shapes his own destiny and who does not depend on another sovereignty, be it human or divine.

Despite the frequency of usage of the term, democracy is a rather difficult concept to grasp. As a British American conservative, T. S. Eliot (1939) has already pointed out, "When a term has become so universally sanctified as 'democracy' now is, I begin to wonder whether it means anything, in meaning too many things" (14-15), because democracy is so much embedded in different conceptual frameworks that its actual meaning is often hollowed out.

1) The word comes from *demos*, "common people" and *kratos*, "strength."

Democracy has been subjected to serious critiques throughout history. Apart from Athens and its allies, other Greek states generally did not speak of themselves as democracies, and the Romans of the republican era referred to their own state as a *Res Publica,* carefully distinguishing it from democracy. In classical political thinking, the term democracy was mostly a derogatory term, nearly the equivalent of "mob rule" (*ochlocracy*). This comparison was also emphasized by Plato and Aristotle, – two of the foremost and most prominent philosophers of Greek antiquity – in line with their ill-fated experiences with the politics of the Athenian democracy. According to Plato, democracy is first of all the domination of desires, while Aristotle sees democracy as one of the decadent forms of the state, which represents the rule of the poor over the rich, and differs greatly from the ideal form of state, the *Politeia*. When asked whether "democracy is the least bad political system" the majority of ancient, medieval and early modern political thinkers would have clearly answered in the negative. Like Plato, some openly rejected it, or were sceptical of it, like Hume and Kant, while others such as Tocqueville warned of the dangers of democracy, even though they thought of its coming as inevitable. Further political philosophers who critiqued democracy include Montesquieu, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, James Harrington, Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Nietzsche, and conservative authors as T. S. Eliot, Carl Schmitt, Oswald Spengler and Nicolás Gómez Dávila.

In this article, I would like to discuss a critical reception and evaluation of democracy which can be made from a liberal rather than a conservative point of view. This may not seem to be a self-evident standpoint, because democracy today is closely associated with liberalism.

In general, liberalism can be characterised, according to its most prominent contemporary theorists and adherents, as a political philosophy based on the principles of liberty *and* equality. Liberalism is a system of political thought that fosters and strengthens democracy. The goal of liberalism is freedom, which can best be achieved in a democracy (with *equality*), so there is basically no conflict between freedom and equality – the two mutually reinforce each other. Gray (1995), one of the most important contemporary theorists of liberalism, distinguishes liberalism from other political ideologies as being "individualist, egalitarian, meliorist and universalist" (12). According to Gray, individualism protects the primacy of the *individuum* over the collective will of the whole, as the egalitarian element assures the same moral value and situation for all individuals, while meliorism affirms the ability of successive generations to develop their socio-political institutions, and the universalist element affirms human non-moral unity, marginalizing local cultural differences.

In Dunn's interpretation (1993), liberalism is "political rationalism, hostility to autocracy, cultural distaste for conservatism and for tradition in general, tolerance, and [...] individualism" (33). Perhaps the most significant theorist of liberalism in the 20th century was John Rawls, whose *A Theory of Justice* is primarily an attempt at the philosophical justification of equality. This work, which has provoked fierce controversy, admiration and criticism since its publication in 1971, has become a much-cited reference for modern liberalism.

However, a closer inspection of the ideological history of liberalism reveals that the relationship and sympathy between liberalism and democracy may not be as unambiguous as it appears at first glance.

As John Skorupsky (2003, 116-137) writes:

It is conventional to talk of the "liberal democracies" of the West. This phrase suggests an assumption – that democracy is one of liberalism's fundamental tenets; the assumption now seems, by and large, to be taken for granted. Historically, however, liberals had grave reservations about democracy. In Europe, these reservations emerged particularly clearly soon after the French Revolution, in the form of a conflict between two ideals of the new order: that of liberals and that of a democratic, radical, or Jacobin opposition; in America, they were raised already in the Federalist papers. […] Insofar as liberals have concluded that their favored political order is threatened under democracy, they have often reached for remedies that limit it.

According to Julius Evola (1968, 253–55), a fierce critique of liberalism:

We can seek the roots of liberalism in England, and we can say that the beginnings of liberalism were feudalistic and aristocratic: we must refer to the local nobility who were proud of the privileges and freedoms from the Crown. Then, with the rise of bourgeoisie, liberalism took the Whig wing of the parliament, which faced the Conservatives, the Tories.

It can be argued – in agreement with the two above mentioned authors – that the classical liberal's notion of order and freedom does not necessarily involve an inevitable reinforcement of democracy. Classical liberals feared that democracy could become a tyranny, because it kept alive the possibility of majoritarian despotism. They had further concerns about whether high aesthetic and intellectual values can be preserved under a democracy, and many have argued that democracy will inevitably lead to a flattening and deterioration of culture.

Most classical liberals rejected the doctrine that the will of the people is the sole source of political legitimacy. In John Stuart Mill's words ("Pledges 2", in. *Collected Works*, 502. cited in Scorupsky 2003, 116-137):

We know that the will of the people, even of the numerical majority, must in the end be supreme, for as Burke says, it would be monstrous that any power should exist capable of permanently defying it: but in spite of that, the test of what is right in politics is not the will of the people, but the good of the people, and our object is, not to compel but to persuade the people to impose, for the sake of their own good, some restraints on the immediate and unlimited exercise of their own will.[2]

The "tyranny of the majority" is a well-known phrase in political philosophy, which originated from Alexis de Tocqueville. Tocqueville was – despite his famous book on American democracy – clearly not a democrat, and yet he was a very ardent supporter of liberty. "I have a passionate love for liberty, law, and respect for rights […]I am neither of the revolutionary party nor of the conservative. [...] Liberty is my foremost passion." He wrote also, commenting on the "social state" of Americans: "[B]ut, one also finds in the human heart a depraved taste for equality, which

2) Cited by Skorupsky. ibid. p. 123.

impels the weak to want to bring the strong down to their level, and which reduces men to preferring equality in servitude to inequality in freedom" (Tocqueville 1835/2000, 52).

In *The Old Regime and the Revolution*, Tocqueville argued that what the revolution did not overthrow but "refine" is an activity he called "soft despotism" or "tutelage by the government", while it seemed to him more and more doubtful whether democracy would lead to greater freedom or would lead humanity to a more real existence. Tocqueville conjectured that in the absence of an aristocracy the virtuous citizenship diminishes, and society will be in danger of becoming too rationalistic and pragmatic, losing its soul and becoming materialistic and insect-like. As he wrote:

It will always be a subject of regret that the French nobility was destroyed and uprooted instead of being subjected to the control of the laws. The error deprived the nation of a portion of its substance, and dealt liberty a wound that will never heal. The nobility had been the first class in the kingdom, and had enjoyed undisputed greatness for so many centuries, that it had acquired a high-mindedness, a self-reliance, a sense of responsibility, which rendered it the most solid portion of the social frame. Virile itself, it imparted virility to the other classes of society. Its extirpation weakened its very assailants. It can never be wholly restored—can never revive of itself; it may regain the titles and estates of its ancestors, but their spirit, never (Tocqueville 1856, 64).

Tocqueville was not the only classical liberal who openly criticized democracy. There was a type of liberalism in the 19th century which can be called "elitist liberalism." This form of liberalism emerged in the second half of the 19th century, responding mainly to the disturbing tendencies of the political revolutions of the so-called "liberal" (and increasingly socialist) revolutions of the 1830s, and 1840s. The group of such liberals in England, who are now mostly forgotten to the wider public, included figures such as W. H. Lecky, who regarded democracy with noble simplicity as "legalized robbery", James Fitzjames Stephen, who attacked the social liberalism of John Stuart Mill, or Henry Maine, who talked about the pitfalls of "people's government" and the manipulation of the masses. These authors, some of them active politicians, were already in the 19th century suspicious of the increasing intervention of the state into private life, as with Disraeli's efforts to establish "Tory democracy" in the United Kingdom. Undoubtedly, this kind of liberalism did not enjoy enormous popularity on the parliamentary benches or in the election-booklets, but several of them figured among the major theoretical works collected in *The predominant ideas of the 19th century* ("A 19. század uralkodó eszméi") by Baron Joseph Eötvös, a Hungarian statesman and writer, which earned the praise of such prominent political thinkers as Lord Acton, and which was, according to the *The Cambridge Modern History*, "the most important work on political philosophy in Hungarian literature" (Yolland, 1909, 421-431).

One of the most important of these figures was Fitzjames Stephen. His most well-known and influential work was *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity* (1873), an elaboration of Fitzjames Stephen's own political philosophy, which can be seen as a riposte to John Stuart *Mill's On Liberty* (1859). According to Stephen, the democratic creed of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," is the most important political-ideological tenet of modern times, a legacy of the rationalist and anti-religious philosophy of the French Enlightenment and revolution, which is replacing the transcendence-oriented values of the Christian European civilization with simple, mundane and high-sounding promises, directed at the uneducated masses. According to Stephen, neither the masses nor the ideologues who promoted these ideas can be said to have scrutinized too deeply exactly what kind of freedom they are talking about, or with whom they would enjoy equality and fraternity. The creed becomes a dangerous and demagogic political slogan, by which the demolition of virtually all things old and traditional can be justified, regardless of how much they harmonise with human nature. Every hierarchy and every established social relationship that has been operating for centuries can be destroyed, the power of every state can be weakened and, last but not least, every religion can be undermined. (According to Stephen, religion is the foundation of any orderly society.) John Stuart Mill, who is, in Stephen's eyes, the most eloquent contemporary representative of this popular creed, believed that there is no longer any need for coercion in the world of politics because it fits into an earlier state of society in which the "right of the stronger" was decisive, but with historical progress and man's evident socio-intellectual evolution, it will now be possible to gradually get rid of all discriminatory and hierarchical situations (Stephen 1873/1993, 70-81).

According to Stephen, Mill's anthropology is superficial and overly optimistic, and there is no basis for drawing far-reaching conclusions from what he calls "progress." Moreover, the basic premise of Mill's later works is in stark contrast to any theological system that expresses systematic morality. The naively optimistic notion that humans will be wiser, morally superior, or more intelligent through spontaneous evolution is a mere illusion, as the events of the present do not justify such optimism, and historical experience does not suggest that the state and society can be sustained without coercion (Stephen 1873/1993, 20-21).

If people want to live in organized societies where there is any possibility of "reasonable freedom", they need some kind of compulsion – which in Stephen's interpretation should not merely be physical compulsion but a more subtle one – for example, the moral compulsion of the public could be prevention of possible crime as well as religion – specifically the fear of damnation – which is, according to Stephen, – the best antidote to committing a crime.

The well-arranged condition of the modern states does not stem from the fact that force is no longer employed or that the "right of the stronger" has been abandoned, (as Mill assumes), but on the contrary: the state has now become such an irresistible apparatus, that any effective resistance to it would be impossible for individuals:

A criminal may overpower an isolated policeman just as a pigmy might with his whole weight hold down the last joint of the little finger of a giant's left hand, if the hand were in a suitable position; but deliberate individual resistance to the law of the land for mere private advantage is in these days an impossibility which no one ever thinks of attempting. Force not only reigns, but in most matters it reigns without dispute, but it does not follow that it has ceased to exist (Stephen 1873/1993, 113).

According to Stephen, the power-relations between people have not changed in the way Mill hoped for. The form of dependence has indeed changed: status-based hierarchy has been replaced by the practice of treaties, but the contracting parties are not and cannot be equals. While the feudal conditions afforded the weak and the poor a degree of protection, the modern dependence renders the weaker party almost completely vulnerable.

I doubt much whether the power of particular persons over their neighbours has ever in any age of the world been so well defined and so easily and safely exerted as it is at present. If in old times a slave was inattentive, his master might no doubt have him maimed or put to death or flogged; but he had to consider that in doing so he was damaging his own property, that when the slave had been flogged he would still continue to be his slave; and that the flogging might make him mischievous or revengeful, and so forth. If a modern servant misconducts himself, he can be turned out of the house on the spot, and another can be hired as easily as you would call a cab (Stephen 1873/1993, 116).

Although Stephen was a critic of the French Revolution and was not explicitly sympathetic to the optimistic views of his era regarding "historical progress", he himself was not a conservative but a defender of the older tradition of English liberalism. He stood for election in 1873 not for the Conservative, but for the Liberal Party. (Stephen 1873/1993, 13). As he wrote:

I do not object to the practice of modern Liberals. Under great difficulties they have contrived to bring about highly creditable results, but their theories have presented those defects which are inseparable from the theories of a weak and unpopular party making its way towards power (Stephen 1873/1993, 60).

Stephen greatly appreciated "well-arranged freedom" and was a staunch believer in parliamentarianism, but he was explicitly averse to democracy and frightened by its seemingly unstoppable expansion. He feared, – not without justification – that if the right to vote were gradually and continuously extended,[3] the process would increasingly lead to proletarianization and the spread of socialist ideas. He feared that the parliamentary rule of the educated elites, rooted in the ancient soil of England, would be lost forever in favour of the political cunning of petty demagogues

3) The two English Reform Bills of 1832 and 1867, were followed by and the third, Representation of the People Act in 1884 which also gave voting rights to „proletarians."

who constantly refer to “the people.” Thus, Stephen also formulates the classic Tocquevillian dilemma of “liberty or equality.” Regarding the freedom as a value, he emphasized that freedom or liberty cannot mean the same in all ages, under all circumstances and for all people, and cannot exist in the absence of order, which requires a strong government, governing on the basis of sound moral principles.

Stephen argued that even if universal suffrage came to be realised, the criterion of political equality, advanced by its activists, would not be achieved. Political power always changes its form, but not its nature.

The result of cutting it up into little bits is simply that the man who can sweep the greatest number of them into one heap will govern the rest. The strongest man in some form or other will always rule (Stephen 1873/1993, 118).

According to Stephen, in the modern form of democracy, the real rulers are the “wire pullers” and their circle who are as equal to the voters as the ministers and generals of the monarchy are equal to the subjects of a king. Thus, in his view, in the democratic system, only the principle of legitimacy changes, but this change does not result essentially in anything new, or specifically in better governance. What was particularly troubling to Stephen concerns democracy or political equality, accompanied by a reference to freedom. In his view the separation of powers and freedom are two completely different things. With the introduction of democracy, all that the “manipulators” have to do is to move the ignorant masses according to primitive desires – as we have seen, Stephen does not believe at all in the progressive “enlightenment” of mankind and the improvement of human nature through modern education – and thus democracy and “democratic faith” could lead to cultural decline, materialism and vulgarity (Stephen 1873/1993, 118).

The problem of the “Tyranny of majority” is also one of the main ideas of one of the 20th century’s “classical or right liberal” catholic political theorists, Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, who was also an ideological adherent of Tocqueville. He dealt with this problem extensively and in great detail in his works such as *Leftism*, *Liberty or Equality*, or *The Menace of the Herd.*

Kuehnelt-Leddihn's main preoccupation, throughout his life, was the radical critique of the idea of equality and, in a narrower sense, the criticism of liberal democracy and "totalitarian democracy."[4] In this vein, he never considered himself a conservative, but spoke of himself explicitly as a liberal. He emphasized that his liberalism is "right-wing liberalism," and that such liberalism is also the definition of "true liberalism." He believed that, originally, liberalism was the heir to the aristocratic ideal of freedom and the Christian philosophy of history, which emphasize the reality of the Person. According to him, liberalism was originally associated with the aristocratic spirit of freedom and generosity. (Latin: *liberalitas*) The heyday of this original form of liberalism was the 19th century. By the second half of the 20th century, Kuehnelt-Leddihn, liberalism had become perverted, and modern, "left-wing liberalism" is largely a counterfeit of the original idea, fallaciously claiming the "liberal" notion for itself . The reason for the change, which began as early as John Stuart Mill, is first and foremost the penetration of idea of equality into liberalism, which is, according to Kuehnelt-Leddihn, the greatest and most insidious threat to freedom.

Kuehnelt-Leddihn prefers to describe his own political-ideological position as "right-wing liberal" or even "arch-liberal of the extreme right", elsewhere: "catholic, extreme-right liberal" (*katholischen rechtsradikalen*) (Oblinger 2009, 39). Although the terms "liberal" and "democratic" are nowadays closely associated with each other and regarded as almost inseparable, in his view, the roots of liberalism (like the roots of the parliamentary system) are not democratic but aristocratic, because freedom and independence, the most important values of liberalism, are not democratic but undeniably aristocratic virtues. Kuehnelt-Leddihn was keen to point out that "true liberalism" embodies all that a true conservative should also be enthusiastic about. He spoke of a liberalism that is Catholic and monarchical, and which rejects materialism and hedonism. He insisted that what his liberalism represents is opposed to the general representation of liberalism in the world, which he said was often mistaken, distorted and simplistic.

In the contemporary world, Kuehnelt-Leddihn argues, the lack of freedom is manifestly evident. The earlier hierarchies were

4) An original phrase of Jacob Talmon.

eradicated by the royal absolutisms and then by successive democratic revolutions. As a result, the emerging vacuum was replaced not by liberty but by "bureaucratic authority" in the Weberian sense. The bureaucracy of modern states overwhelmed all public bodies, ordinances, provinces, and other liberties. On the one hand, this was done in the name of equality, proclaimed on the basis of popular parliamentary sovereignty, and on the other hand, by anti-hierarchic, levelling totalitarianism, although these two tendencies are by no means independent of each other. As a fruit of these processes in the modern world, while eulogizing freedom and raising it to the rank of the official ideology, there is actually less freedom than in any previous era.

As Kuehnelt-Leddihn claims:

In the last 200 years the exploitation of envy, its mobilization among the masses, coupled with the denigration of individuals, but more frequently of classes, races, nations or religious communities has been the very key to political success. The history of the Western World since the end of the eighteenth century cannot be written without this fact constantly in mind (Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1974, 18).

He suggests that two tendencies are present in human nature, which can also be seen in political theory: one is the desire of merging with others (*identitarianism*) and the other is the opposite desire "to be different" (*diversitarianism*). These are basic elements and tendencies of human existence, both necessary for life. According to his theory, in the course of modern history, the tendency towards *identitarianism* is becoming increasingly marked, while the tendency of *diversitarianism* is fading, a trend which can be observed in many fields.

According to Kuehnelt-Leddihn, this tendency is deeply rooted in a *misinterpretation* of a Christian tenet: the "equality of all souls before God" – because if everyone was equal before God *literally*, it would not make sense to talk about the creation of individual souls. "Ultimate equality" is a spiritual possibility that can be achieved through a *conscious effort*, and hence is not an actual reality. Kuehnelt-Leddihn claims that this misinterpretation was also made by various heretical groups of medieval times, such as in the Reformation, which "secularized the cloister" and made "monasticism obligatory" by abolishing it. By this, he is suggesting that the strict rules of the Catholic cloister were transfigured into the "asceticism" of protestant discipline and work ethics. The "hard-working man" became the ideal, and this also invoked the notion of "unnecessary classes" such as the clergy because they did not accumulate material wealth, which was increasingly seen by the Protestants as God's reward. What they forgot, however, was that the discipline and the uniformity of the cloister were prescribed for a conscious effort that was purely spiritual in nature, and was independent of politics, and that, above all else, entering the cloister was voluntary.

This process clearly exhibits a tendency towards "equalization" – if everyone is doing fundamentally "the same" there will be earthly happiness, while secular satisfaction is the sign of the Grace of God. Protestantism was followed by Deism and the increasingly secular world-view of the era of the French Enlightenment. It is to this period that we can trace back the origins of the modern democracies. For Kuehnelt-Leddihn the French Revolution was itself an attempt to create a democratic utopia based on the design of total equality – and the results can clearly be seen in the dictatorship of Robespierre, who wanted to demolish steeples because they towered above the other buildings (Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1974, 15-21). The subsequent centuries saw various forms of utopian egalitarianism, with two main tendencies – the "totalitarian" and the "democratic" form – although in fact all democracy is inherently totalitarian, and all totalitarianism is democratic by nature.

Kuehnelt-Leddihn takes democracy in its "literal" meaning: this means the *kratos* (power) of the *demos*, which means primarily that the origin of power is from the people and the people can govern themselves through this power. This concept assumes that all the actors of the political community are equal, and that there are no qualitative differences between them, consequently the decision of the majority is the sole criterion for political decision-making. The problem with that mechanism is the same as with modern political ideologies in general: this method is blind to the *real* qualitative differences in the world and the differences between people, such as intelligence, discretion, knowledge, and competence, and because of this blindness, it sacrifices quality on the altar of quantity. This mechanism is, to Kuehnelt-Leddihn, inherently totalitarian, and hostile to liberty because in a "full" democracy, there is no limitation on the *in abstracto* power of the majority. The majority is the absolute theoretical sovereign, and it can do everything because it is the source of all law. Democracy is a utopia, as it is based on the assumption that the majority is wise. Nevertheless, Kuehnelt-Leddihn stresses, experience shows that the majority is not wise but can be easily manipulated. This could be seen, for example, in the case of National Socialism, which is, in Kuehnelt-Leddihn's view, clearly a populistic, plebeian ideology with democratic roots. He maintains that Hitler was an "*Archdemocrat*" who used the popularity and the power of the popular will to take power, and who was neither "aristocratic" nor "antidemocratic." According to his *Leftism*, in the seemingly opposing currents of modern political movements, we can only see various *versions* of democratic utopianism, so there is no *essential* difference between the ultimate goal of any of these political currents. All sought to *homogenize* society and all strove to create a *uniform*, monotonous world of "ants", in which there are no more individuals, just screws in the socio-political mechanism.

The modern city – writes Kuehnelt-Leddihn in *The Menace of the Herd* – has an overcomplicated structure of technology, requiring an infinite number of laws, regulations, restrictions and controls, which often deeply intervene in the private sphere of the individual (Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1943, 81).

In Kuehnelt-Leddihn's view, these are necessary constraints that must be endured for the illusion of progress: virtually everything has to be registered, licensed and so on, so the price of liberation by technological advancement has to be paid by restrictions in other spheres of life. The more technical devices a modern employee possesses, the more dependent he is, as he becomes subservient to these means (Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1943, 80-85).

According to Kuehnelt-Leddihn, in the highly technicised modern world, there is a variety of types of tyranny and slavery: the "tyranny of the clock" over everybody, slavery to material prestige and the tyranny of "successful competition" over the bourgeoisie, wage-slavery over the worker, and school-slavery over the children (Kuehnelt-Leddhin 1943, 137). All this transforms the modern *metropolis* into an "inhuman bee-hive" that is totally subordinate to the constraints of industrialised labour and its cruel and soulless mechanism. For example, for a modern employee (whether he be a "white-collar" intellectual or a physical worker) it is simply impossible to arrange his own time scheme in the way that a worker in pre-technical era could. He lives in fear of redundancy and the constant threat of unemployment and "the lack of independence is almost on his face" (Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1943, 85).

A classical liberal-based critique of democracy can be also found in what is known as "Right-libertarian" political thought. Right-libertarianism is characterized by the strict priority given to liberty, with the need to maximize the realm of individual freedom and minimize the scope of public authority. Unlike Kuehnelt-Leddihn, however, Right-Libertarians, are proponents of "pure capitalism", as they also underline that total equality is impossible and not even desirable. In their view, in a free market, some will do better than others, some will have more, others less, and as a result of competition, a natural elite will emerge. They also emphasize that most democratic governments have an elite but typically deny it or try to interpret it as being only temporary. Libertarians accept that some will succeed, some will do better and so there will always be inequality in any free society.

A prominent contemporary libertarian, who has consistently espoused these ideas is the economist Hans-Hermann Hoppe. In his book *Democracy: The God that Failed*, (Hoppe, 2007) Hoppe examines modern democracy's failures which include, in Hoppe's view, rising unemployment rates, expanding public debt, and insolvent social security systems.

Hoppe deals with the era of transition from monarchy to democracy (between the French Revolution and the end of World War I), and compares it to the failure and fall of "eastern soviet-style" socialism, with the search for an ideal social and political system, the "natural order", which could be an alternative. He categorizes democracy as "publicly-owned government", and compares it with monarchy, a "privately owned government", concluding that the latter is more advantageous, although he identifies deficiencies in both monarchy and democracy. His preferred structure of civilization is "the natural order" (some kind of *natural aristocracy*)

–a system devoid of both taxation and coercive monopoly (Hoppe 2007, 45-77).

This means that while in a monarchy, the monarch has a monopoly on expropriation, he only makes limited use of it, because he has to be forward-looking, which hinders the exercise of this right. If monarchs were unbridled in exploiting their subjects, they would have no way of encouraging them to produce, for they would think that their efforts to produce were in vain if they were deprived of the fruits of their labour. If, on the other hand, this monopoly is exercised within reasonable limits, production, as it is recycled by its subjects, will increase the king's ownership of an ever-expanding economy. As he writes:

[I]t is in his interest to draw – parasitically – on a growing, increasingly productive and prosperous nongovernment economy, as this would – always and without any effort on his part – also increase his own wealth and prosperity (Hoppe 2007, 19).

Hoppe adds historical evidence to support his views, investigating the traditional monarchies of the Middle Ages. In the Middle Ages, the "government" was small, taxes were intermittent to non-existent, spending was low, war debt was about the only kind of debt there was and even wars themselves were fought in a limited fashion by monarchs who had specific objectives and who did not wish to waste their armies, which were expensive to train, equip and maintain. As he writes, on the "progress" from monarchy to democracy:

In contrast to the internal and external moderation of a monarchy, a democratic (publicly owned) government implies increased excess, and the transition from a world of kings to one of democratically-elected presidents must be expected to lead to a systematic increase in the intensity and extension of government power and a significantly strengthened tendency toward decivilization (Hoppe 2007, 261).

The short-term interests of the elected leaders of the so-called "welfare states" of our time are to maximize their revenue. Hoppe compares taxes to crimes committed by criminals, because they violate the right to private property. The only difference, to Hoppe is that, unlike criminals, the state has a right to theft from which we cannot protect ourselves (Hoppe 2007, 87).

This right is, of course, exercised by the (for short time) elected leaders, which is why democracy is far more exploitative than monarchy, in contrast to the widely accepted and propagated view of history. In this regard, Hoppe also rejects the notion that in history, human societies undergo an uninterrupted upward linear development, saying that democracy cannot be the end of history, and describes the decline of the monarchy and the transition to democracy as a process of "decivilisation" (Hoppe, 2007, 1-45). From his point of view, this fact is not alleviated even if we consider other aspects than just economic factors. According to Hoppe, democrats like to present themselves as humanists, but, as he points out, the bloodiest wars and the most terrible genocides have taken place after the fall of the great historical monarchies, after 1918. However, a return to the monarchy is impossible, because a monarchical power can never be accepted by the people, and thus "we cannot return to the feudal past or the time of the American Revolution" (Hoppe, 2007, 1-45).

Therefore, as an alternative to these two systems, monarchy and democracy, he proposes a social system which he calls the "natural order." This new social order would not be based on exploitation but on "private property, production and voluntary exchange" (Hoppe, 2007, 71). Just as in any other age and period, some kind of elite, a "nobility" will there be also formed, so this natural order will produce outstanding talents whose knowledge and wealth will pass from father to son. Because the common people would look up to this "nobility", they would put jurisdiction in their hands, which they would view as "privately produced public good", and as persons of natural authority, they would fulfil this role free of charge.

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As we have seen, the "liberal critiques of democracy" assailed the principle of democratic egalitarianism, from the point of the autonomy and freedom of the *individuum*. They criticised the modern world and the modern state not from an obviously conservative point of view, but – as Kuehnelt-Leddihn put it, – from the ideological standpoint of "true liberalism" or "right-liberalism."

There is no doubt that the liberalism which the liberal critiques of democracy tried to represent is very different from the liberalism of other authors who generally call themselves liberal, not to mention the "everyday" meaning of this term. It seems that what the "liberal" critics of democracy call liberalism, especially in today's context, is unlikely to be attractive to liberal parties or individuals.

Of course, the defenders of "left-liberalism" or "social-liberalism" could point out that the true nature of liberalism may also be the subject of contradictory opinions, just like the nature of "true democracy" or "true conservatism." Recalling Hoppe's view, while his preferred system is a kind of aristocracy a critic could retort that there is no guarantee that the new elite would be "liberal" and exercise power in a non-oppressive way.

Even though these theories have imperfections and deficiencies, they still represent a significant critique of the ideological "democratism" – an overrating of democracy very common today, when there is a tendency to idealize this word and the often vague concept it represents, which could easily lead to the incoherent and weak aspects of the world's most wide-spread political regime being overlooked.

From a conservative point of view a more serious critique could be made – especially of Hoppe – that he has narrowly examined the state, solely on the basis of economic aspects, while a nuanced judgement of a form of state or a system of political arrangements cannot be made solely on its relation to private property. Without a reference to transcendence, or values outside of material interests, the system, which Hoppe has characterised as ideal, can easily sink into mere materialism. Because his approach is purely economic, the theory precludes a more elaborate theory of the state, omitting to analyse sovereignty and the state itself, as a "Platonic" idea, or even to define the state's essence. With its lack of any metaphysics or value theory, conservatives could accuse his analysis of being simple and materialistic, which of course is unacceptable to them.

A similar critique could also be applied to Stephen and Kuehnelt-Leddihn. Contrary to Hoppe's materialist/secularist starting point, both Stephen and Kuehnelt-Leddihn approached the problem on a Christian (Protestant and Catholic) basis, although neither of them placed much emphasis on the relationship of the idea of state to transcendence. While Kuehnelt-Leddihn emphasizes in one place that the good ruler must be "*leitourgós Teoú*, God's helper" (Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1952, 169), in general they paid little real attention to clarifying those aspects of the state which were not merely negative. This is, of course, in accordance with the liberal tradition for which the state, even at best, is just a necessary evil. Although Kuehnelt-Leddihn and Stephen were, similar to Hoppe, both in favour of monarchy as opposed to democracy, they did not stress that a king, according to his original functions, and according to the pre-enlightenment theory of kingship, is also a "priestly" character, or point out the definite correlations of kingship with a supernatural order. They did not emphasize that for *non-modern* man, for pre-*Entzauberung* individuals, transcendence was a reality, and indeed more of a "reality" than earthly existence and philosophical materialism, for whom attributing ultimate existence to the principle of "matter" was nearly non-existent. The state itself was far from being seen as a purely economic and political organization. It was also a representation of an immanent manifestation of the transcendent order. This was the case for most non-modern state theories, as set out, for example, in Dante's *De Monarchia*. For Dante, the ruler does not represent society but the state. The state is embodied in the ruler, who acts as a restraining and "shaping" force that organizes the dispersing forces of society that, in the absence of an impact from above, would collide with each other. The meaning of the state (Latin: *status*) is therefore associated with "stopping": it is a force that represents a solid and unchanging axis as a symbol of God, that restrains and intervenes when necessary.

Plato asserted that the leaders of society must know the "form of the Good" which means that the philosopher-kings who appear in his State return to the "cave" — that is, to society — only in order to bring the whole of society out of the "cave's" darkness into the light. In this sense, the philosopher-king cannot be a tyrant, precisely because if the truth, which is unchanging, can be known, then the knower of that truth can only be just, so it is legitimate to place the supreme power in his hands. As can be deduced from the teachings of the early platonic dialogues, knowing the good is the same as “becoming good.” The Platonist justification of power was undoubtedly related to a strong recognition and affirmation of a principle beyond the material world, beyond the affairs of economy and society —a supernatural order. As such, the essence and justification of power can be found not in itself but in a higher sphere of reality. The Platonic “form of the Good” directly manifests a supernatural order, which is the divine law of the universe and allows no “progress” no “democracy” and no “equality” and which is hierarchical and aristocratic, and of which the physically manifested world is on the one hand a “shadow” and on the other a reflection. Thus, everything which can lead to Good, the source of existence, is in essence also good.

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THE INFLUENCE OF POPULISM ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION[**]

Abstract

The article assesses the impact of populism on the functioning of non-state actors in the European Union.The main aim of this paper is to verify whether populism has had an impact on the functioning of non-state actors in the European Union. The article focuses onthe non-state actors involved in European and country-level lobbying. The article also attempts to determine the place of non-state actors within the institutional system of the European Union in the context of the rise of populism in European Member States. In addition to its theoretical dimensions, the paper offers a practical approach to the functioning of non-state actors against the backdrop of populism, which has been developing in recent years in the European Union. This rising populism has had a significant impact on sectoral and non-sectoral non-state actors in eachof the member states of the European Union.

Keywords: non-state-actors, interest groups, lobbying, populism, law of the European Union, decision-making processes in the European Union.

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A variety of interests clash in every institutional system. These interests are represented by variousactors, including non-state actors (stakeholders). Until now, the main research areas regarding non-state actors have involved analysis of the functioning of stakeholders within different political systems, whether inter alia at global, European (EU) or national levels. In addition, researchers have analyzed individual interest groups rather than examining independent phenomena such as i.a. increase of populism in Europe. Among the key research issues investigated by different scholars were: the structured, organizational relations between these actors and EU institutions, investigating how state actors and non-state actors affect the strength of interaction and relations between them. A number of studies have assessed the drivers of particular collaborative attempts to influence public policy. (e.g. Brunell 2005, De Bruycker 2016, Fraussen and Halpin 2018, Heaney 2010 Klüver 2018, Marshall 2015, Otjes and Rasmussen 2017, Wessels, 2004, Wonka, 2017). Some of the few researchers who have recently undertaken studies of the relationship between interest groups and populist parties are Joost Berkhout, Marcel Hanegraaff and Patrick Statsch (Berkhout, Hanegraaff, Statsch 2019, 1-12). Moreover, the phenomenon of the relationship itself between lobbying and the influence of oligarchy and populism was already covered in 2004 and 2006 by Filipe R. Campante and Francisco H. G. Ferreira (Campante, Ferreira 2004, 1-33; Campante, Ferreira 2007, 993-1021). In view of the above, my aim is to analyze the impact of populism on the functioning of non-state actors in Europe in terms of theoretical and practical approaches.

Literature in the social sciences includes many definitions which attempt to capture the concept of populism (Latin: *populus = people)* - a political phenomenon in which a range of attitudes and positions refer to the idea and will of the "people", often juxtaposing them against the will and interests of the "elite". As defined by many scholars the terminology of populism has become a disputed term used to refer to a variety of movements and beliefs (Canovan 1981, 3; Canovan 1982, 544; Akkerman 2003, 148; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 2; Anselmi 2018, 5; Hawkins & Kaltwasser 2019, 3). For example, Cas Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser suggested that "populism always involves a critique of the establishment and an adulation of the common people" (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2017,

5) An interesting approach presented by Carlos de la Torre was to define populism as "a Manichean discourse that divides politics and society as the struggle between two irreconcilable and antagonistic camps: the people and the oligarchy or the power block" (De la Torre 2017, 195). Ben Stanley presented populism itself as a product of "an antagonistic relationship" between "the people" and "the elite", which is "latent wherever the possibility occurs for the emergence of such a dichotomy" (Stanley 2008, 96). Populism can also be defined as a socio-political trend, including an increase in certain beliefs and behaviors. The characteristic features of the populist approach are, among others references to the stereotype of the people, which are mainly associated with simple people, i.e. those who are poor or exploited. Moreover, the peculiarities of populism are the inclusion of the people not only through the prism of social categories, but also in other aspects, i.e. religious or national (Politologia, przewodnik encyklopedyczny 2008, 161). In the 21st century, the term populism is used in a slightly different way. Currently, the term has a more pejorative meaning, which also defines the behavior of a politician (decision-maker) appealing to the feelings of ordinary people, who seeks support for unenlightened opinions in such cases where people lack knowledge on a given topic in order to make the right decision (Scruton 2002, 291-292). According to the above, "elite" is a category of people in the highest rank in the social hierarchy, in some respects distinguished from the general public. The elites often have a major impact on power and the shaping of attitudes and ideas in society. So generally speaking, this type of elite can be defined as a part of non-state actors in some kind of specific form. Elites try to pursue their interest much more than the rest of the groups in society.

Based on the paradigm of neo-functional theory, I would like to formulate the following **hypothesis**: the impact of populism on the development of non-state actors in the European Union is heterogeneous, as populism mainly forces the development of those non-state actors whose activities are in line with the decisions taken by the governing bodies correlated with the expectations of the will of society. The development of other non-state actors is possible only in this sector in the case of which specificity of this groups is correlated with the political action taken by the governing bodies. **The variable dependents** affecting the development of non-state actors during the populist period will be: the period of functioning of populism, the change in public preferences, the approach of governments to the preferences of certain social groups. **The independent variables** affecting the development of non-state actors during populist rule will be: emergency and unpredictable situations (states of emergency, e.g. economic crises or pandemic) that affect public preferences, crises, term of officeof individual bodies and decision-makers.

In order to verify this hypothesis, my goal is to examine the impact of populism for different types of activity by non-state actors. I would like to present a theoretical concept of non-state actors in the time of populist governance in different EU member states. This scope results from the analysis of the decision-making process in each member state of the European Union from 2015, in which populist governance has a considerable impact on the development of different non-state actors. This article examines the influence of populism on the functioning of non-state actors in Europe. It considers the following research questions: Do all non-state-actors interact equally with populist parties and decision makers? What is the impact of populist governments on the development of non-state actors in Europe? And does populism moderate the effects of power and ideological proximity between the different non state actors?

The theory of neo-functionalism mentioned above provides the foundation for the analysis of non-state actors in the institutional system of the European Union (Haas 1958, Haas 1964, 37; Rosamond 2000, 50; Niemann, Schmitter 2009, 45; Kurczewska 2008, 8). As underlined by Arne Niemann and Philippe Schmitter, neo-functionalism stands out for several reasons – both in terms of its sophistication, ambitions and research allure, as well as because of the extensive criticism it has provoked (Niemann, Schmitter 2009, 45). Until the 1990s, those in favour of neo-functionalism claimed that the process of integration on the transnational level and the expansion of the competence of authorities were a result of a long stage of economic cooperation. They also argued that cooperation in one area makes cooperation in related areas inevitable (Kurczewska 2011, 25). Haas named this process the spill-over mechanism, which may be explained as a formula of permanent expansion, with the main actors participating in the integration processes within the European Union being its institutions, the elites and the non-state actors under study here (Haas 1958; Haas 1964, 230). Some of the basic theses advanced by neo-functionalists underline that the integration process is a result of interactions between non-state actors, political parties, transnational institutions and the governments of the Member States (Konopacki 1998, 107). Neo-functional theory suggests that non-state actors perform a vital function in how the integration process is shaped, and in uniting Europe (Kurczewska 2011, 26). According to Haas, neo-functional theory assumes that a state functions like a team in which there are various interests represented by specific non-state actors (Haas 1964, 37), while the main aim of non-state actors and elites is to articulate their interests and to have them achieved through their political activity (Haas 1964, 230).

A key instrument of non-state actors is the lobbying tool that is used to influence decision-makers at the EU level. The importance of lobbying itself has long been widely known and used to influence political, legislative decisions in various areas of activity (Krueger 1974, 291-303). In promoting publicity policy, the European Commission has introduced a definition of non-state actors (interest groups) and lobbying tools to support a 'transparency initiative'. The European Commission, like many researchers defining non-state actors apply the term interchangeably with other terms like stakeholders, business organizations, lobby groups, pressure groups, etc. (Giuliani 1991; Matyja 2000, 10; Graniszewski, Piątkowski 2004, 9; Sroka 2000, 34; Grelle 1988, 8; Cassidy 1999, 9). This is due to the fact that different terms are commonly used for non-state actors and linguistic diversity sometimes prevents the wording of this terminology from being translated precisely. According to the European Commission, each definition refers to one aspect of the activities of stakeholders [KOM(2008) 323 wersja ostateczna, 4][1]. According to the Commission, this defi-

1) More broadly: point 1.2 of the Communication from the European Commission – transparency initiative, rules on relations with interest representatives (register and code of conduct): This applies to social partners (employers organisations and trade unions) who carry out activities consisting in the representation of interest groups beyond the scope of social dialogue. This also applies to associations of public authorities of a private or mixed (public-private) structure involving public authorities if they carry out activities covered by that definition.

nition was created to illustrate the activities of these non-state actors,'(...) the aim of which is to influence policy-making processes and decision-making (...)"[COM(2002) 704 final; COM(2006) 194 wersja ostateczna, 5; KOM(2007) 127 wersja ostateczna, 3; KOM(2008) 323 wersja ostateczna, 3]. It should be emphasized that the definition of the European Commission is broad enough to assign it to various entities representing advocacy interests at national, European and international level, such as: "associations operating in all sectors of social and economic life, private companies, law firms, public affairs consultancies, but also NGOs and expert teams – so-called 'social and economic associations', think-tanks" (Czub 2012, 23-24). On the European level, individual non-state actors influence the decision-making process of the European Union (EU) and its decision-makers, i.e. the various EU institutions and their advisory bodies (European Economic and Social Committee – EESC). A similar situation is the case with non-state actors lobbying in individual EU Member States. The international organization, which is the European Union, highlights the wide range of interests clashing from different areas of both sectoral and non-sectoral areas. This position highlights the scale of the lobbying of non-state actors in the European Union, showing that the interests that are promoted by stakeholders are an important factor in the impact of its development as a whole as well as of individual Member States. Therefore, the change in policy as a result of populist governance has a significant impact on the functioning of such a large number of individual non-state actors at both EU and national level. The result is that the decision-making process of the EU and its individual Member States is heavily 'overwhelmed' by the overabundance of these actors and, as Jeremy Richardson points out, this also has an impact on the confusion at EU level institutions (Richardson 2006, 3-30). Taking into account this intensity of lobbying for decision-makers and the increase in populism, it can have a significant impact on the relationship between national governments and non-state actors. At the same time, this situation highlights the problem of excessive lobbying and shows the scale of the interest of lobbyists in particular areas (Dühr, Colomb, Nadin 2010, 130). The European Union consists of 27 Member States, which have an impact on the number of activated non-state actors interested in lobbying the EU on specific issues (areas) related to EU law. In addition, other interests between the EU institutions, regional and national governments of the Member States and international actors, such as the United States (US) and the People's Republic of China (PRC), also clash in the EU. For this reason, EU institutions have a rather difficult task in finding the most favorable compromise solutions that satisfy all the stakeholders mentioned above in the event of a growing wave of populism (Richardson 2006, 4-9). At the same time, this situation highlights the scale of a strong lobby at European Union level and points to the weightings of the analysis related to the functioning of non-state actors in view of the growing wave of populism in the various Member States of the European Union (e.g. Hungary, Poland, Italy, France, United Kingdom). Since 2015, it has been quite clear that populist governments have been developing, which have largely "favored" the actions of those non-state actors whose activity is correlated with the policies of individual populist governments.

In September 2019, a debate was held organized by the Konfederacja Lewiatan[2] in cooperation with BusinessEurope[3] and city of Sopot, which focused on the growing wave of populism in Europe (Konfederacja Lewiatan 2019). The participants and panelists in this debate came to constructive conclusions. One of the key and paradoxical conclusions of experts, researchers and politicians in the debate was to say that "populism is a danger that can be directed in the right direction". In addition, Helmut K. Anheier of the Hertie School of Governance stated that "populism occurs

2) Konfederacja Lewiatan the most influential Polish business organization representing the interests of employers in Poland and the European Union. Lewiatan is seeking competitive business conditions. It cares for sustainable economic growth, better law, healthy competition, employment growth and strengthening of social capital. Lewiatan is representing business. It brings together over 4,100 companies employing a total of over 1 million people. Lewiatan is a member of the Social Dialogue Council (RDS). As the only representative organization of Polish employers, it has a representative office in Brussels and belongs to BusinessEurope - the largest European organization representing the interests of entrepreneurs and employers towards the European Commission, the European Parliament and other EU institutions.

3) BusinessEurope is the leading advocate for growth and competitiveness at European level, standing up for companies across the continent and campaigning on the issues that most influence their performance. A recognised social partner, BusinessEurope lobby for all-sized enterprises in 35 European countries whose national business federations are its direct members.

when dialogue is not conducted and emotion simplifies complex issues", and Karolina Borońska-Hryniewiecka Centrum Studiów Europejskich i Polityki Porównawczej added that the development of populism is influenced by such actions when „decisions on the common effects are made by unelected bodies, such as, for example, the development of the European Central Bank" (Konfederacja Lewiatan 2019). Populism uses simple catchy slogans that are easily digestible and which in certain situations can contribute to more negative actions felt only in the future. Hard, constructive conclusions and the position mentioned above by the Konfederację Lewiatan and BusinessEurope show a change in the direction of non-state actors in the face of a growing wave of populism. It is interesting that the debate not only denied the currently defined populism (see above), but also pointed to the positive elements of itas a danger that can be turned in the right direction and can do a lot of good. The problem in this situation is that European policymakers have used or exploited populism to maintain or gain power (Hungary, Poland, France, Italy or the United Kingdom), and non-state actors are forced to change attitudes and lobby national and EU decision-makers (e.g. in Poland: elections to the Sejm or The United Kingdom – Brexit, Italy: elections to the Parliament or France: elections to the National Assembly). Gaining power and maintaining it is one of the main objectives of political parties. Non-state actors are similarto political parties. The key issue, however, is that they make decisions without holding real office and do not actively participate in presidential, parliamentary or local elections [4] (Berkhout, Hanegraaff, Statsch2019, 1-2; Czub 2012,24; BBC 2009). Accordingly, populist parties win voters unconventionally, referring to the right solutions, slogans and will of the people. In the case of non-state actors, as defined above, such a course of action in order to achieve their desired effects is impossible because non-state actors represent certain interests which are not always correlated with the policies pursued by the partiesexploiting populism for their activities (see table 1.1.).

4) Admittedly, there were instances of putting up their candidates in elections (the American group Pro-Live Alliance or the English lobbying group Libertas, which participated in elections to the European Parliament in June 2009), but these are the few cases. Unlike political factions, non-state actors only have influence over individual policies in their field of interest.

Table 1.1 Comparative study of models of non-state actors in the time of growing populism in Europe.

Characteristics	Pluralist model	Populist model
Number of interest groups with access to the political system	Many non-state actors (process stable/ increasing)	Limited number of non-state actors (process stable/decreasing: only some of the policy areas, e.g. employment policy)
Type of participation	Regulated	Regulated (with limitations)
Type of association	Voluntary	Voluntary
Type of organisational structure	Hierarchically organised, decentralised, minimum of bureaucracy	Hierarchically organised, centralised, bureaucracy
Integration with the political system	Free, voluntary	Semi-free
Representation of social and economic groups	Several organisations represent the same professional groups (e.g. economic non-state-actors, etc.)	Few organisations represent the same professional groups (e.g. social non-state actors, etc.)
Involvement of the state	None, neutral participation	High, active participation
Examples of interest groups	BUSIENSSEUROPE (EU)	NSZZ Solidarność (PL)

Source: own compilation based on materials and interviews conducted during a study visit in EU institutions in December 2015 and own analysed of growing populism governance in European Countries form 2015 (France, Great Britain5, Hungary, Italy, Poland, etc.)

As we can see above, populism is not conducive to the development of individual non-state actors. However, it has an impact

5) Following Great Britain's referendum in June 2016, in which 52% voted to leave and 48% voted to remain in the EU, the British government formally announced the country's withdrawal in March 2017 (beginning the Brexit process). Parliament ratified the withdrawal agreement, and Great Britain left the EU on 31 January 2020.

on the development of non-state actors whose course of action is in line with the populist governments of the Member States of the European Union (Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Poland, etc.). Moreover, the lack of free competition on the part of non-state actors can lead to the elimination of some of them, and this in turn can affect the quality of decisions taken by decision-makers. Beside of this the lack of substantive consultation with the environment represented by individual non-state actors will not have a positive impact on the created or amended law at both national and European level. Populism is therefore not an adequate solution that will have a positive impact on the development of some non-state actors whose actions will not be correlated with the direction of development of Member States of the European Union promoting populist values (business, consulting groups, trade unions). On the other hand, accidental decisions made correlated with the line propagated by individual non-state actors will have an impact on their development marginally and in a way that is not profound.

According to BusinessEurope, the world is changing very rapidly and profoundly as global alliances shift and populism rises. BusinessEurope explains that globally "we are witnessing is not just another era of change but a change of era". In this case all non-state actors (especially those representing the business sector) "…want to be part of the solution and ensure that Europe can shape this new era according to its values" (BusinessEurope 2018). Today, with the rise of populism, the European business community has presented its Ambition for the European Union in 2030. In this paper BussinessEurope set out what is needed to create the right conditions to enhance competitiveness and enable business to play its role in society (BusinessEurope Press Releases 2018, 1-9). Besides this, President of BusinessEurope Pierre Gattaz said: "In view of the European elections, the business community has a strong responsibility to speak up, explain why the European Union is so important for people's future and to say what needs to be done to ensure that things are going in the right direction. Companies are the backbone of Europe's economic stability and people's prosperity. Entrepreneurs invest, create jobs and make the economy grow. The private sector accounts for 80% of all jobs in the EU; companies in the EU invested almost €200 billion in research and development in 2016; in 2015, companies spent more than €50 billion on vocational training in the EU. Business is committed to transforming the economic, social, technological, and environmental challenges we are facing into opportunities, and to defending our European way of life. Let's together build an EU we can be proud of. The business ambition for Europe in 2030 is to build a European Union with opportunities for all." (BusinessEurope Press Releases 2018, 1-9). Such a conclusion underlines that non-state actors such as BusinessEurope do not intend to passively look at the actions of populist parties; on the contrary, they want to fight against the growing wave of populism in Europe. Populism in this case (the business area), has very negatively affected its functioning, favoring only those interest groups that positively support specific political actions promoting populist action - the so-called "Voice of people's will". The apparent trend towards a growing wave of populism has not had a positive impact on business liberalization and balanced country development and the development of individual non-state actors with an impact on economic issues.It has had a significant contribution to the development of populist parties and their pursuit of power and the development of those non-state actors whose portfolio and activities are highly correlated and relevant to the current situation in a country or in Europe (e.g. social policy, climate policy, environmental policy, energy policy or others).Therefore, actors who lobby for certain policies correlated with the actions of populist parties and certain policy-makers will develop much faster in times of populism than those stakeholders whose specifics are different and are not correlated with the actions of populist decision-makers (Akkerman 2012). However, it is important to look at the fact that non-state actors represent their members, which has an impact on lobbying when they are discussed or themselves addressing matters related to their portfolio and defending the interests of their members (Flöthe and Rasmussen, 2018). Therefore, the growing wave of populism has an impact on the functioning of non-state actors in diverse dimensions, because such actors representing social or environmental issues (so-called topical issues) are increasingly perceived as less comfortable and incompatible with the slogans of populist decision-makers. Populism is so dangerous that it can affect some non-state actors to stop functioning due to the lack of demand for their services (the so called: sectoral deficit). Therefore, some non-state actors will strengthen their position in relation to those who will no longer be present. Another problem is that individual non-state actors will be forced to modify their activities, including lobbying forms of influence over populist decision-makers in order to achieve specific and intended results.

In conclusion, the rise of populism can be important for the development and functioning of non-state actors. It can therefore have a very negative impact on the development of individual non-state actors whose actions and interests are not aligned with those of a growing wave of populist decision-makers. Furthermore, the possible persistence of populist decision-makers may have such an impact that some non-state actors may disappear and will no longer be able to affect decision-making processes in individual countries of the European Union or directly in the European Union. The phenomenon of growing populism is not only a threat to the functioning of non-state actors in the EU, but also a threat to the economic system of individual European countries and the European Union as a whole.

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MEDIA USE AND HAPPINESS IN SERBIA**

Abstract

The Annual Attitude Examination Survey consisting of 366 questions was deployed on nationally representative sample in Serbia to get 2608 responses on the Oxford Happiness Inventory and Multiple Lickert scale questions concerning attitudes, fears, media use and closeness of different social categories to the participants. Research results confirm all hypotheses. Quantity of television use is negatively correlated to happiness. As for the quality of newspapers use, those consuming contents such as culture, sports and IT are happier than others. When looking at television use, individuals that prefer programs such as cartoons, culture, music, fashion, science, IT and sports are happier than others. This is the first research examining relationship of happiness and quality of media use. Future research should encompass data from online social networks in order to see how positive and negative emotions of media users are related to media content they are exposed to.

Keywords: Happiness, Media Use, Television, Newspaper, Serbia

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INTRODUCTION

Different inquiries have been dealing with personality, socio-economic and demographic variables as indicators of happiness (subjective well-being). One of the main findings is that quality relationships are connected with happier and healthier lives (Vaillant 2003). On the other hand, literature on relationship between media use and happiness is scarce. Also, happiness has not been the topic of previous research inquiries in Serbia.

Negative social well-being is positively associated with levels of uses of media that are essentially about interpersonal interaction such as phone and online communication, as well as uses of media that are not, like video, music, and reading (Pea et al. 2012, 327–36). Authors find video use, media multitasking is particularly strongly associated with negative social well-being indicators. On the other hand, they find face-to-face communication strongly associated with positive social well-being.

High overall electronic media use such as television, video games, computers and telephone is associated with poorer behavior, health status and health-related quality of life. Researchers find a favorable association between computer use and psychological distress, whereas high video game use was associated with poorer health status, health-related quality of life, global health, and depression (Mathers et al. 2009, 307–14).

Both older and newer media such as television, music, movies, magazines, the Internet, cell phones and social networking contribute to aggressive behavior, disordered eating, distorted ideas about relationships, earlier sexual behavior, as well as underage drinking and tobacco and drug use (Brown and Bobkowski 2011, 95–113). They also conclude that some of the early fears such as cyber-bullying media addiction and sexual predators may not be as problematic as initially thought, but can be problematic for those already at high risk.

Older people enjoy watching TV more and spend more time in front of a television set than young adults, while greater TV use is related to lower life satisfaction (Depp et al. 2010, 173–178).

Interestingly, the effect of income on life satisfaction is significantly smaller for heavy television viewers than for occasional viewers (Bruni and Stanca 2006, 209–225). Researchers conclude that increasing role of television viewing in modern society raises material aspirations, but at the same time contributes to offset the effect of higher income on personal happiness. The effect of higher income on happiness is offset by lower consumption of relational goods, with television playing a significant role in explaining under consumption of relationality (Bruni and Stanca 2008, 506–528).

On the other hand, researchers conclude that blogging may improve new mothers' well-being, as they feel more connected to the world outside their home through the Internet (McDaniel, Coyne and Holmes 2011, 1509–1517).

Lonely individuals are likely to develop strong compulsive Internet use behavior harming significant activities such as work, school, or significant relationships instead of relieving their original problems (Kim, LaRose and Peng 2009, 451–5). Researchers conclude Internet use isolate individuals from healthy social activities and lead them into more loneliness.

Although time spent on-line is not associated with daily well-being, the closeness of instant message communication partners was associated with daily social anxiety and loneliness in school (Gross, Juvonen, and Gable 2002, 75–90).

Gaming and entertainment usage of Internet is found to predict perceived social support, introversion and happiness, while use of the Internet for mischief-related activities such as downloading without payment, fraud and snooping is associated with lower levels of happiness and social support (Mitchell et al. 2011, 1857–1861).

Research suggests that increased levels of electronic media use predicted poorer well-being outcomes, while the likelihood of adverse outcomes in children ranged from a 1.2- to 2.0-increase for emotional problems and poorer family functioning for each additional hour of television viewing or e-game/computer use depending on the outcome examined (Hinkley et al. 2014, 485–92). Researchers conclude that higher levels of early childhood media use are associated with children being at risk for poorer outcomes with some indicators of happiness.

While estimating a microeconomic life satisfaction function researchers find little support for the claim that television viewing, in general, has a negative impact on individual happiness (Kataria and Regner 2011, 53–58).

Finally, another research shows that media addiction increases with those who use media for fun, level of media addiction increases with users of new media and more interactive and less practical online applications such as social networks and chat are more addictive (Bojić and Marie 2017, 33–48). When looking into nature of new and old media addiction may be related to number of senses grabbed by media and media features, such as live broadcasting and interactivity.

There has been no research inquiry into relationship of specific television and newspaper contents and happiness. Therefore, these aspects of relationship between media and happiness will be explored by the following research questions and hypotheses.

Question 1. What is the relationship between quantity of media use and happiness?

Hypothesis 1. Quantity of TV use will be positively correlated with happiness.

Question 2. What is the relationship between quality of television and newspapers use and happiness?

Hypothesis 2. Preference of the following content in newspaper will be positively correlated with happiness: Culture: film, theater, literature; Basketball; Popular science, new discoveries, scientific findings, etc.; Tech programs focusing on mobile phone technology; and Tech programs focusing on IT in general.

Hypothesis 3. Preference of the following content on television will be positively correlated with happiness: Children programs; Culture: film, theater, literature; Music - classic, jazz, rock, pop…; Fashion programs; Basketball; Popular science, new discoveries, scientific findings, etc.; and Tech programs focusing on mobile phone technology.

METHODS

Subjects

TNS Medium Gallup Belgrade conducted The Attitude Examination Survey by - Public Opinion in November of 2009. Sections of this survey are Attitudes and Statements, Daily Activities, Emotions and Values, Satisfaction, Media, Relationship with Others, Society, and Politics, Demographics and Household.

As a part of their Media Analytics course students of the Faculty for Culture and Media had an assignment to conduct interviews with citizens. Out of those asked to be interviewed 75% responded positively. Duration of an average interview was 25 min. The interviewing had been done in cities such as Novi Sad, Belgrade, and Nis and in villages as well. Students provided 2966 interview inputs. After primary consideration, multistage random sample of 2608 subjects was valid. General Serbian population older than 15 years of age was represented by this sample.

Procedure and Measurements

Formation of the sample is done in three steps: first, sample points are randomly chosen from the lists of voting stations. Statistical database of voting points is used as a source for selection, which is conducted randomly (Branković, 2014). Each sample point received ten random respondents. Survey participants were chosen randomly and systematically.

Questionnaires/scales were deployed to gather data for the investigation. Confidentiality of the investigation was assured for each survey participant. They received a booklet with questionnaires, which they were asked to complete

Age, gender, marital status, levels of income and education were recorded for each of survey participants. Oxford Happiness Inventory (Argyle, Martin, and Crossland 1989, 189–247) was completed by Participants. Attitudes, fears, media use, and closeness were accessed by employing Multiple Lickert scale self-report inventory questions.

Analytical procedures

Statistical software was used to perform the analysis of data. Calculation of Pearson correlations was done to examine significance and strength of relationships. Following this, relationships were examined in more details by using multiple regressions, therefore providing final conclusions.

Survey questions

List of questions used in the survey is presented below given the fact that happiness measurements were brought into relationship with answers to survey questions that indicate certain aspects of personality.

Quantity of media use

Question A2 is: how much time in the past 24 hours have you spent in the following activities (express this in minutes; if you haven't had certain activity write zero): 1. watching TV: 2. listening to radio; 3. reading newspapers; 4. speaking on mobile phone, including texting; 5. talking on stable phone; 6. speaking face to face with other people and 7. Using Internet (e-mail and messaging apps).

Quality of television and newspapers use – preference of content

Question M3 is: Media contents that can be consumed through TV and in newspapers are listed in the following table. Please grade how much each of these thematic media programs is attractive to you. Provide grades for each of them on scale from 1 to 5, in which 1 means content is repulsive to you, while 5 means it is attractive to you – answer separately for TV and for newspaper contents. Listed are segments for grading by survey participants in terms of television and newspapers use: 1. Politics – foreign affairs; 2. Politics – internal issues; 3. Economics, business, startup, and entrepreneurship; 4. Social issues; 5. Discovering unknown details about important events from recent and distant history; 6. Criminal; 7. Football; 8. Basketball; 9. Tennis; 10. Other kinds of sport (boxing, handball, volleyball, water polo…); 11. Travel programs about various destinations, countries and cultures and similar; 12. Celebrity reports from different events, concerts, parties, etc.; 13. Porn – sex; 14. Humor (caricatures, jokes, anecdotes about celebrities); 15. Celebrity gossip; 16. Mysteries and paranormal activities; 17. Popular science, new discoveries, scientific findings, etc.; 18. Religious topics; 19. Automobiles; 20. Tech programs focusing on IT in general; 21. Tech programs focusing on mobile phone technology; 22. Health; 23. Culture: film, theater, literature; and 24. Ads.

Quality of television use - preference of content

Question M3 is: Media contents that can be consumed through TV and in newspapers are listed in the following table. Please grade how much each of these thematic media programs is attractive to you. Provide grades for each of them on scale from 1 to 5, in which 1 means content is repulsive to you, while 5 means it is attractive to you – answer separately for TV and for newspaper contents. Listed are segments for grading by survey participants in terms of television use: 25. Domestic series; 26. Latin series; 27. Comedy series, etc.; 28. Domestic films; 29. Foreign films: action, criminal; 30. Foreign films: dramas, romantic comedies; 31. News; 32. Political talk programs; 33. Show programs such as talk shows and quizzes; 34. Fashion programs; 35. Sports broadcasts and other sportsprograms; 36. Educational programs; 37. Children programs; 38. Reality show programs; 39. Music (classic, jazz, rock, pop…); 40. Music (country music); and 41. Folk music.

RESULTS

Quantity of media use

Significant positive correlation of weak strength has been found between feeling of happiness (OHI) and A2/1 in relation of quantity of TV use ($r=-.160$, $p<.000$, $n=2406$).

Correlations have not been found between feeling of happiness (OHI) and the following variables: A2/2 in relation to the "listening to the radio", A2/3 in relation to the "reading newspapers", A2/4 in relation to the "speaking on a mobile phone, including texting", A2/5 in relation to the "talking on stable phone", A2/6 in relation to the "speaking face to face with other people" and A2/7 in relation to the "using Internet (e-mail and messaging apps)".

Quality of newspapers use – preference of content

Significant positive correlations of weak strength have been found between feeling of happiness (OHI) and the following variables: M3/23/N in relation to the "Culture: film, theater, literature" (r=.158, p<.000, n=2404), M3/8/N in relation to the "Basketball" (r=.118,p<.000, p=2405), M3/17/N in relation to the "Popular science, new discoveries, scientific findings etc." (r=.116, p<.000, n=2403), M3/21/N in relation to the "Tech programs focusing on mobile phone technology" (r=.107, p<.000, n=2404) and M3/20/N in relation to the "Tech programs focusing on IT in general" (r=.106, p<.000, n=2404). Answers on questions relating to quality of newspapers use are presented on Figure 1.

Figure. 1. Feeling of happiness (OHI) is correlated to different kinds of newspaper use. Survey answers on OHI, M3/8/N, M3/17/N, M3/20/N, M3/21/N and M3/23/N are presented as stacked line graph in which number of answers is presented on Y axis, while answers (1 to 5) are presented on X axis.



Source: Processed by the author

Correlations have not been found between the feeling of happiness (OHI) and the following variables: M3/1/N in relation to the “Politics – foreign affairs”, M3/2/N in relation to the “Politics – internal issues”, M3/3/N in relation to the “Economics, business, startup and entrepreneurship”, M3/4/N in relation to the “Social issues”, M3/5/N in relation to the “Discovering unknown details about important events from recent and distant history”, M3/6/N in relation to the “Criminal”, M3/7/N in relation to the “Football”, M3/9/N in relation to the “Tennis”, M3/10/N in relation to the “Other kinds of sport (boxing, handball, volleyball, water polo…)”, M3/11/N in relation to the “Travel programs about various destinations, countries and cultures and similar”, M3/12/N in relation to the “Celebrity reports from different events, concerts, parties etc.”, M3/13/N in relation to the “Porn – sex”, M3/14/N in relation to the “Humor (caricatures, jokes, anecdotes about celebrities)”, M3/15/N in relation to the “Celebrity gossip”, M3/16/N in relation to the “Mysteries and paranormal activities”, M3/18/N in relation to the “Religious topics”, M3/19/N in relation to the “Automobiles”, M3/22/N in relation to the “Health” and M3/24/N in relation to the “Ads”.

Quality of television use - preference of content

Significant positive correlations of weak strength have been found between feeling of happiness (OHI) and the following variables: M3/37/T in relation to the “Children programs” (r=.172, p= <.000, n=2406), M3/23/T in relation to the “Culture: film, theater, literature” (r=.153, p<.000, n=2406), M3/39/T in relation to the “Music - classic, jazz, rock, pop…” (r=.148, p<.000, n=2406), M3/34/T in relation to the “Fashion programs” (r=.123, p<.000, n=2406), M3/8/T “Basketball” (r=.117, p<.000, n=2405), M3/17/T in relation to the “Popular science, new discoveries, scientific findings etc.” (r=.107, p<.000, n=2404) and M3/21/T in relation to the “Tech programs focusing on mobile phone technology” (r=.104, p<.000, n=2405). Answers on questions relating to quality of television use and happiness are presented on Figure 2.

Figure. 2. Feeling of happiness (OHI) is correlated to certain kinds of television use (M3). Survey answers on OHI, M3/8/T/T, M3/17/T, M3/21/T, M3/23/T, M3/34/T, M3/37/T and M3/39/T are presented as stacked line graph in which number of answers is presented on Y axis, while answers (1 to 5) are presented on X axis.



Source: Processed by the author

Correlations have not been found between the feeling of happiness (OHI) and the following variables: M3/25/T in relation to the "Domestic series; M3/26/T Latin series", M3/27/T in relation to the "Comedy series, etc.; M3/28/T Domestic films", M3/29/T in relation to the "Foreign films: action, criminal", M3/30/T in relation to the "Foreign films: dramas, romantic comedies", M3/31/T in relation to the "News", M3/32/T in relation to the "Political talk programs", M3/33/T in relation to the "Show programs such as talk shows and quizzes", M3/35/T in relation to the "Sports broadcasts and other sports programs", M3/36/T in relation to the "Educational programs", M3/38/T in relation to the "Reality show programs", M3/40/T in relation to the "Music (country music)" and M3/41/T in relation to the "Folk music".

DISCUSSION

All hypotheses of this inquiry are confirmed. It may be possible to conclude that unhappy individuals tend to watch TV the most. TV provides information and entertainment, among other functions (Frey and Benesch 2008, 413–424). However, excessive consumption of television can lead to some negative effects, which are easily overseen. One these effects may be lack of time spent with family and friends. Individuals that watch lots of TV tend to have less social contacts and poorer relationships. This may be one of the reasons for negative correlation of TV consumption and happiness.

As for quality of television and newspapers use, those consuming contents such as culture, sport and IT are happier than others. The main reason why people who follow these types of contents may be generally happier is because of the content itself. Information Technology related contents can be about practical information related to work activities. Sport is mostly related to healthy physical activities. Finally, culture contents are based on creativity and imagination. These issues are generally "brighter ones", when compared to others in media. They are related to less negative news, while having more positive connotation. Issues in culture, sport and IT are often related to notions such as achievement and success.

On the other hand, research has also shown lack of correlations between happiness and topics such as politics, crime and social issues. According to anecdotal evidence, media tend to put an emphasis on negative news. Individuals that are already in depressive states may prefer to consume negative news. Other group of intensive TV consumers may be simply more susceptible to this kind of content because of some personal traits. In other words, those individuals that are already less happy and more susceptible and information-hungry than others may be attracted to negative media content. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that consumption of media content makes individuals more unhappy. On the other side, there are scientific indications that negative content can provoke spree of negative emotions. Media may be engraving different forms of fear making their consumers constantly feel anxious and always concerned for themselves and others. This notion needs further scientific exploration, but basically this would mean that although people start intensive media use because they are already in negative mood or personally susceptible for negative information, media consumption may increase levels of negative emotions. Negativity bias implies that negative content has a much greater impact on a person's condition than neutral or positive. There are already some research results related to the theory of negativity bias implicating that negative emotions that spread via social media contribute to the rise of negative emotions in a society (Rozin and Royzman, 2001).

When looking at the television only, those that consume thematic programs such as cartoons, culture, music, fashion, science, IT and sports are happier than others. Similar to explanation related to newspapers, reason for this may be that these contents are relaxing and designed in such a way to free people from stress and daily concerns. Also, there are indications that humoristic undertone of certain programs contributes to its popularity. Scholars in the field of political communication have confirmed that humor has been significantly understudied in communication studies, given the fact that it can have enormous effects on electorate and a society as a whole (Boukes, 2019). Therefore, humorous and satirical TV shows should be explored in relation happiness and media use.

Contribution of this research may be in examination of the relationship between happiness and specific media contents, highlighting what happier people love to watch and read.

At the same time, adequate research inquiry of social media posts should be conducted in order to see how media contents affect positive and negative emotions as well as other psychometric parameters of exposed social media users.

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A CASE STUDY OF REPORTING OF NEWSPAPER BH DANI DURING THE WAR IN BOSNIA

Abstract

The key idea of this article is to present a case study of reporting of newspaper BH Dani that were battling the dominant ethno-nationalist style of reporting. Methodologically speaking, this project uses content analysis and the process of developing and grouping the ideas is very important. War in Bosnia is the societal and political context of this research. A number of key authors that theorized the idea of propaganda and media influence on thinking and attitudes as well as persuasion is introduced to the reader in the first part of the article. The case study goes on to show how articles in BH Dani explored cases of intolerance of Bosnian government and war forces, their war atrocities and displayed writings where the war situation is presented objectively. The article is then concluded with the recapitulation of key ideas and also its contribution to knowledge is discussed.

Keywords: journalism, BH Dani, reporting, investigation, ethno-nationalism, case study

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BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR THE PROJECT

Our key idea in this article is to demonstrate that during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) there were in existence media outlets that were independent, investigative and that represented a countervailing power to the mainstream ethno-nationalist reporting. Newspaper *BH Dani* [Days], formerly known as *Naši dani* [Our Days], were maintained by Senad Pećanin, who was editor-in-chief of this publication from 1992 to 2010. This journal was a part of the independent reporting scene in Bosnia. It was founded on 3rd September 1992 by Senad Pećanin, then editor in chief. It's print run was 25 000. It is said, half in jest and half in earnest, that the genuine print run was 100 000 because, for the purpose of saving funding, 4 persons read each copy of the newspaper. It is often seen as an anti-Muslim publication, because it criticizes Arab volunteers in the Civil War in former Yugoslavia. In addition to this many analysts see at as more heavily critical over the issue of corruption. Some of the notable journalists were Semezdin Mehmedinović, Aleksandar Hemon, Miljenko Jergović, Marko Vešović and Željko Cvijanović (Anon, 2018). Pećanin describes the informal operational structure of the paper: "For the operation of *BH Dani* I brought together some of my friends and associates. The key problem in the running of this newspaper was financing" (Pećanin, personal communication, 24th August 2018). Journalists used their own means of funding to make the newspaper operate, as it was rarely backed by state authorities. In our interview Senad Pećanin clarified that the print run depended on the quantity of oil needed for the electricity aggregate that they could afford.[1] *Dani*

1) "We paid oil 35 German marks per liter. I do recall that once a massive shortage of oil occurred even in the gray market and even funding was of no assistance. We had an issue ready to be printed, but given that we had no electric current, we had to secure oil for aggregate. An associate of the newspapers came to assist, professor of Franciscan theology by vocation in Sarajevo, brother Ljubo Lucić. We agreed to make an effort in the dawn, while the police hour was in force, so that I came before the church of St. Ante, knocked the door twice, left the barrel, evaporated and returned in half an hour. So it was: half an hour later, I collected a full barrel, 20 liters of oil and Dani were printed the same day. Brother Ljubo and other brethren, nuns were freezing without electric current, heating, water: and instead of turning the aggregate on and warming up a little bit in the winter, brother Ljubo stole the whole barrel and Dani were printed the same day" (Pećanin, personal communication, 24th August 2018).

were sold in Tito street during breaks in the war conflict: the total print run, between 3 to 6 thousand copies, would be sold in a matter of hours. Inhabitants would make wallpapers from the copies of this newspaper, and they would stick it to the walls of their rooms.

The context of the operation of this publication had been war torn Yugoslavia. In spite of economic and political problems, intensification of international conflicts and the new socio-structural crisis of reproduction of societal relations of state socialism during the 1980s, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had looked in the eyes of the Western politicians and the media as a state that had been best positioned-in comparison with other states of the socialist bloc-joining the queue for societal transformation and entering the process of enlargement of 'United Europe'. French newspaper *Libération* of 4th April 1991, predicts that "it is clear that European community wants a stable Yugoslavia as member".

Western countries have attentively monitored the speed and results of economic reforms that the government of Yugoslavia had achieved. The Federal Government got full support, among many, of France for the effort and direction of changes. The then prime minister Ante Marković had visited France in 1991, where socialist president François Mitterrand accepted him cordially, assuring him that Yugoslavia can count on French assistance in conducting social reforms and "maintenance of stability of state through respect for minorities". Mitterrand added: "We wish to see the success of your efforts and we will assist. We cannot be indifferent to what is happening in this part of Europe. We will do everything to contribute to your success" (*Le Monde*, 25th of May 1991).

Stability and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, as an expression of promoting its interests, had been the position that, during the beginning of the last decade of the last century, had been upheld by creditors from international funds. So, International Monetary Fund (IMF), with the debtor logic of easier control over centralized state, gave a condition to the government of Ante Marković, before giving the new loan, to enforce voting on 11 amendments across republics that would be a guarantee of austerity and would be applied without exception in all parts of the unified state. Hence, it looked as all the conditions had been fulfilled for peaceful and successful transformation of the 'communist Yugoslavia'.

Nonetheless, shortly thereafter, destructive and unstoppable war was being waged across former Yugoslavia. Multidimensional, social, economic, political, cultural, moral crisis and crisis of thought produced the destruction of old and creation of new values and norms and was embodied in war. Of course, Yugoslavia had not been either the first or the last state that witnessed the destiny of disintegration in Europe, but its destruction surprised many, and the causes and effects of this process are a matter of controversy. The Bosnian conflict was the bloodiest and most brutal of all the Yugoslav civil wars. According to the most important data hitherto published, published by *Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo* (IDC), the total number of murdered is 100 000, including warriors and civilians (40-55 000 civilians) and this number comprises 65,8% Bosniaks[2], 25.6% Serbs and 8.01% Croats. On the other, Bosniaks amounted to 83.3% of the total number of victims (Bakić, 2014 : 544-573). The Siege of Sarajevo was the longest siege of a capital city in the history of modern warfare. A total of 14 385 people were killed during the siege, including 5 445 civilians (Results of the Research on Human Losses in 91-95; Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo, 2007).

Nationalist Bosnian *Party of Democratic Action* (SDA) of Alija Izetbegović was handicapped in relation with other two nationalist parties the victors of the first elections in BiH. Namely, the *Serb Democratic Party* (SDS) of Radovan Karadžić, relied on Slobodan Milošević, Serbia and the *Yugoslav People's Army* (JNA), whilst *Croatian Democratic Union* (HDZ) on Tuđman, Croatia and Catholic Church. "This is the exact reason, and not because the Bosniak nationalism was less malign then Serbian and Croatian, The Party of Democratic Action was not the deciding force that had thrown Bosnia into the civil war" (Pećanin, personal communication, 24th August 2018). Nonetheless, very quickly, this party relinquished the principle of free constitution of state, accepting the principle of ethno-nationalist community, which was the scheme for the ethnic division and coming bloody catastrophe. Very quickly practical and active symbiosis of SDA with Islamic

2) The sharp distinction between Bosnians, denoting all inhabitants of the state regardless of ethnicity and confession, and Bosniaks, reserved to Muslims, should be introduced here.

community occurred, while religious radicalization of Muslims in BiH was used for Bosniak nationalism.

The next section looks briefly at the outline of methodology for this project.

BRIEF OUTLINE OF METHODOLOGY

We analyzed the archive of BH Dani from 1992 to 1995 and did a semi-structured interview with Senad Pećanin, then editor in chief of this publication. Methodologically speaking, it uses archival research. This project should best be likened to qualitative content analysis. Qualitative content analysis is an effort to systematically describe and analyze qualitative data. The key issue it to fit the data into a scheme or a frame. This method implies coding and selecting the material. This may also involve eliminating superfluous material (Schreier, 2012: 170). Within the context of interpretive social science and historical analysis, this research technique has been used for ‘finding out’ motivation and hidden agenda of some organizations by qualitatively and analyzing the frequency and use of words such as ‘traitor’, ‘war monger’, and so on and by so doing researching motivation.

When it comes to qualitative content analysis, an interesting example may be found in an insightful volume *Scientific popular and informative texts,* edited by Vuk Milatović. Luj Adamič criticized the regime of 6th January dictatorship back in 1929, established by king Alexander Karadjordjević. His scripture ‘Natives return’ is an essay of a writer reporting from diaspora, and his analysis was written with the aid of material such as newspapers and other media information (Milatović 2008). Although not explicitly stated, this might easily have been titled qualitative content analysis. Milić (1996) also argues convincingly that qualitative analysis was a method for throwing light on Nazi policy by reading documents such as newspapers and media outputs. Linked to this, this will be a research technique used herein. Several Serbian social science researchers have written about the benefits of content analysis as a methodological tool in the social sciences (cf. Fajgelj, 2005; Gredelj, 1986; Grubačić, 2006; Ilić, 2016; Kaljević, 1972).

In addition to this, the second methodological procedure employed in this research is interviewing – one of the most frequently used data collection methods in contemporary sociological research (Milic, 1996: 387). Semi-structured interview is a mode of interview in which the researcher leads the respondent to communicate numerous, detailed and quality information on the subjects related to the research, with very little influence, and therefore with guarantees of absence of bias in the direction of good scientificity. Moreover, interviews conducted with several respondents can be conducted in a systematic manner that also contributes to good scientificity. The absence of bias and the systematic character are possible despite the fact that, seen from the outside and in particular by the respondent, the interview appears to be conducted as a conversation (Romelaer, 2005: 101).

The next section looks briefly at the milieu of this particular research and this is the image of War torn Bosnia.

HOW MEDIA HAVE PREPARED THE WAR CONFLICT IN BOSNIA?

An interesting working paper gives a clear message that modern era has brought the stronger influence of mass media on human psyche. Influencing thinking and attitudes has become a key technique. There is often a slanted view of reality (Vukajlović and Ćosić, 2 n.d.). Senad Pećanin, editor of BH Dani, has clearly pointed out that “the *Party of Democratic Action* had clearly influenced thinking with its propaganda“ (Pećanin, personal communication, 24th August 2017).

Mihajlo Marković, late Serbian philosopher, calls on Carl Schmitt, the controversial German lawyer and political philosopher, who argued strongly that it is the essence of political action the division on partisans and enemies, whereby ‘the fight goes on until the enemy is ultimately destroyed’ (Marković, 1965: 14). In addition to this political battle is distinguished by not paying attention to any moral principles and is ‘merciless’ (*Ibidem*). This ‘theoretical architecture’, can be a useful analytical tool to help us explain us how merciless and immoral was the struggle between Serbs and Muslims. This was the context in which the Newspaper

BH Dani operated and they worked as *Deus ex machina*, trying to add some objectivity to the context that was stained by national pathos. Each position in social theory need to be backed by theoretical architecture, before analyzing empirical material, and ultimately returning to theory.

Bertrand Russel expounded the same view of political conflict and its 'immorality' and 'intrinsically' slanted view in *Power: A Radical notion* (Marković, 1965: 14). Copious citation of the political authors cited above can assist us in understanding the milieu within which journalists of BH Dani operated. Indeed, these journalists were genuine 'trailblazers' in that they were trying to develop a new idea of journalism within an increasingly discouraging context.

Chomsky (2003: 5) scores on this point effectively that no government can be developed without having the people under it as the "confused herd of passive observers". Within his intellectual syllogism, the American linguist and political writer often uses the notion of "manufacturing consent" when describing the perpetuation of government. Importantly, this is achieved with the aid of the putative "expert sources". Agential aid to work through this process is obtained from cultural managers. Chomsky should be congratulated for observing that media often have the role to be economical with the truth. In developed democracies, the people is most effectively controlled with the control of sources. Some media are used only by the well-to-do classes like high quality newspapers (Posavec, 2003). Media product will always reflect the partisan political interest of those who sell it. Posavec also uses to notion of "illiterate and boring non-experts" to denote those to whom propaganda is directed.

Propaganda can have a particularly powerful effect when it is supported by intellectuals and when there is no countervailing power to it (…) The role of propaganda in a democracy is the role of scourge in a totalitarian system (Chomsky, 2003). Manipulation of the media should be avoided at all costs (Vukajlović and Ćosić, 4 n.d.). Truth and objectivity will not prevail in such cases at the cost of patriotism (*Ibidem*). Proponents of the media have actively sought to foment the spirit of conflict within the former Yugoslav state. Psychological factor is equally important in the war context as military. Media have prepared for the war by facilitating the development of mythically founded nationalism. Croatian national television has become the key tool of the new nationalist government. Scapegoating of Croats and blaming of Serbs for internal problems in Croatia have become a daily practice. The accompanying photos of bodies torn apart have been an essential part of this partisan journalism. The sources are very rarely listed and in such cases the authors are anonymized (Perković, 2015). This was the *locus* where we can play the activity of newspaper BH dani within the media scene at that time.

Sonja Biserko (2002), president of the Helsinki Committee Serbia, puts forward the argument that the media have been the propaganda Service of the regime during the Civil War in former Yugoslavia. Indeed, journalists have had social and political mission. Media space had been regulated by the Law on Information (1978). Each state had its own Radio and Television, publisher and so on. These media echoed the political climate of each state. The media have not only been nationally orientated, by acting as precipitating factor for the development of the War conflict. With the death of Tito and liberalization, some of the media have taken a different turn with their objective reporting. Instrumentalization of the media has taken place in such a climate.

The key political idea was resolving the Serbian national question. The importance of media in preparing for the war was in the identification of the crisis and identifying its main agents and actions. *Politika* has been the strongest agent in strengthening this agenda. This newspaper was publishing falsified accounts with a view to bashing political opponents. Some media have been instrumental in creating the downfall of the Yugoslav Federation. Historical revisionism, fomenting the spirit of conflict and ethnic stereotypes have been part of the daily routine. Particular attention had been paid to Serbian diaspora living in Bosnia and Croatia. For example, dehumanization of the enemy and self-victimization had been one of the key propaganda techniques of nationalist media manipulation in Serbia. Academician Matija Bećković referred to Serbs in Bosnia as “remnants of the slaughtered people“.

In some instances, propaganda has a key role in conducting war (Vertovšek and Andrić, 2015 : 970). Key author that backs up with evidence this stream of thinking is Marshall McLuhan. Newspapers are sometimes key medium for the transmission, since they can present tables, graphs and comparative analyses. War propaganda is more directed towards the enemy. Propaganda must have an effect on the policy-making of the enemy (*Ibidem*). Propaganda always has the aim to promote the 'hidden agenda'. Media pollsters[3] confirm this central storyline by arguing forcefully that only 20% of the survey participants believe that media are objective, only 30% believe that these raise what could appropriately be labeled as 'essential' topics, and when it comes to the desired future profession for their offspring, only 4% circle the term journalist (Šajkaš, 2007: 6). This certainly backs up with evidence the main argument.

Media technology have enabled reporting on the war conflict in real time (…) Journalists impact the formation of the public opinion with their style of reporting. The public image depends on what the journalist have reported, omitted and interpreted (Čerina, 2012). The time for reporting on war has shortened substantially. Croatian writer highlights control over information as an important component, claiming that whoever establishes control over information will prevail in the war (…) Media war is a very important characteristic of war in general and the journalists have an important role to play. It is the commitment of every journalist to adhere to the precepts of war ethics. The law, morals, good taste, truthfulness, and accuracy are some of the key characteristics of war ethics (*Ibidem* : 102-103). These characteristics have clearly been sidelined during the war in Bosnia.

Omission, magnifying, and blowing out of proportion are particularly unwanted techniques from the point of view of ethics within journalism. Reporting on war can be viewed as a show, as a specific kind of reality show (*Ibidem* : 103). Some studies highlight that the topic of the influence of media on the war conflict has been under-investigated (…) Communist heritage has played an important role in this process (Šajkaš, 2007: 1). Dukić (2013) puts forward the argument, in an interesting text on an Internet portal, that the key strategy during the Yugoslav civil war has been

3) Media pollsters are those that conduct surveys of the public opinion, like marketing agencies or those researching voting behavior.

belittling of the political and war opponents. In addition to these, she lists absurd arguments used in propaganda that bracelets were made of human fingers to give vent to the aggression.

The role of media acting as a precipitating factor for the development of war conflict in former Yugoslavia needs to be thoroughly examined by researchers (Šajkaš, 2007: 2). Demonization of the 'other' has been one of the key roles of the media (…) Inventing news has been one of the key activities during the war conflict (*Ibidem*). The media in Bosnia have perpetuated this picture. Instinctive images of war reporting are available more than ever (Čerina, 2012 : 106). In some situations the military has control over the available information. Ethics of journalists highlights that, with a view to safeguarding human dignity, it is necessary to avoid posting pictures of wounded and injured (*Ibidem,* 2012: 109). Some media in Bosnia have gone even further, since they have posted pictures of wounded in hospitals, pictures of graveyards and even obituaries, as well as families in grief, shedding tears over the death of their beloved, thus preparing a level field for the aggressive conflict.

The only exemplary models of journalism in BiH were the journalists of media in Sarajevo. With *BH Dani*, there were *Oslobođenje* and *Večernji list*, and some journalists that worked in *RTV Sarajevo*. What separated Sarajevo and other parts of BIH under control of Army of BIH under the control of Radovan Karadžić (Leader of Bosnian Serbs) and Mate Boban (Leader of Bosnian Croats) were brave media: these key media were not supporting the cause of nationalism. This is recognized in the world and due to this circumstance Sarajevo had become the symbol of the battle for Freedom. On the other, there were media that worked for Alija Izetbegović: "The least scrupulous were newspapers ran by the Bosniak regime: *Voice of Muslims* and *Lilly*, and then *Bošnjački avaz*. There were filled with nationalism, religious indoctrination and heavy, dangerous attack on those Bosnians that opposed the ruling military and religious hierarchy" (Paćanin, personal communication, 24th August 2018). The profession of journalists has a prominently social role (…) Critically oriented intellectual needs to inform himself from various sources (Čerina, 2012). This section has argued that media have worked purposefully to prepare the playing field for the War in Bosnia.

The central storyline of this essay is that newspapers *BH Dani* have turned out as objective reporters on the war conflict in Bosnia within the climate of biased and partisan anti-Serb media in war torn Bosnia, whilst maintaining some of the partisan and biased element in their operation. This is confirmed by excerpts of contents of these newspapers and some direct quotations from the archive that we have researched. Propaganda had been powerful in Bosnian media. An interesting source (Anon, 2017) rightly argues that the methods they used to deceive the readers/viewers have been particularly powerful. In addition to this, John Sray has authored a book titled "Selling Bosnian propaganda to Americans: buyers beware", which additionally depicts the misconceptions and lack of the integrity of those employed in the then mainstream media.

Independent media have played a crucial role in throwing light on the war conflict (Šajkaš, 2007 : 6). State controlled media continually backed the discourse of the genocidal tendencies of Chetniks (*Ibidem :* 3). Vague memory reports of eye witnesses and truth explained mythically have been the only sources of truth (…) Normal techniques used have been scapegoating, blowing out of proportion and the sense of martyrdom and victimization (Šajkaš, 2007 : 4). 'Public intellectuals' and other key figures have been used to maintain this agenda. The media have prepared the public opinion for the war by running documentaries with a view to dissolving 'brotherhood and unity' and developing the feeling of conflict among the ethnic groups (…) B92 have developed a playing field for the conflict by running videos of slaughter of Serbs during the war action *Storm* (sr. Oluja) (Šajkaš, 2007 : 5). BH Dani have presented a countervailing power in some instances to this trend.

To back up with evidence the central storyline of this research article, Šajkaš gives the convincing argument in his interesting research paper that magazine *BH Dani,* have raised the issue of murders committed during the conflict by the BiH Army, murder of Croatian civilians or the lamentable destiny of the Serbians during the siege of Sarajevo. These media also investigated the criminal past of some of the Bosnian war heroes (Šajkaš, 2007 : 3). There have clearly been attempts to create some sort of investigative journalism in a climate of anti-Serb sentiment.

An insightful article in *BH Dani* debunks the myth of the well-intentioned BiH government during the War by saying that the old in Bosnia could well be defined as an underclass[4] with characteristics of extreme poverty (...) Politics of the war is criticized vehemently because of the effect on the vulnerable and the old (Duraković, 1993 : 58). In some instances, *BH Dani* reported on economy. To back up with evidence this stream of thinking, Senad Pećanin, then editor of BiH Dani, confirmed that administrative hurdles existed for the unhindered operation of this newspaper: “Our journalists were the only ones in Bosnia who were having trouble getting accreditation for Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina“ (Pećanin, personal communication, 24th August 2018).

In the edition of *BH Dani* for 1995, and the archive that we researched, there are reports of the members of the BH Army that were reportedly stealing, plundering and operating under the influence of drugs (Hrasnica, 1995 : 7). One of the tasks of this newspaper had been ‘uncovering’ unpleasant truths.

BH Dani in some instances depict Serbs as cooperative. Indeed, some of the research articles in this newspaper argue convincingly that the War Conflict is nearing its end and that some of the Serbian leaders, even Milošević, wish to contribute to the end of the struggle (BH Dani, 1993: 19). The position of these media is sometimes those of independent and investigative observers.

Hypocrisy of the Bosnian Government is criticized in instances where they spend aid from Western financial institutions on ill-defined purposes (BH Dani, 1993). They divert funds where these could have easily been spent on humanitarian aid. There is a Catch 22 situation where aid is used according to the principle ’something for nothing’. This interesting article in the newspaper that is exposed to critical investigation accuses Bosnian government and politicians for embezzlement of funds obtained from aid agencies. Conception and planning is lacking and commoners cannot influence the politicians to change their scheme. Bosnian state and its intellectuals are distinguished by lack of professionalism and political astuteness (Čamo, 1993: 41).

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4) Underclass is a term from political sociology and denotes those that are extremely poor, coterminous with lumpenproletariat.

In some instances, this newspaper made the Government of Bosnia somehow take criticism. An interesting source cites a trustworthy opinion poll that paints a grim picture of the policy of Alija Izetbegović. Namely, as many as 26% of the population think that his policy has been bad, 11% regard it as catastrophic, whilst 42% argue that it has been realistic. Grouped together, it means that 37 percent regard his policy as bad. Pie charts are used to depict this statistics. Criticism of Bosnian authorities is weaving through this writing. The work of Sefer Halilović has been more heavily criticized with over 50% of negative answers. In some instances this publication shows Serbs as being willing to cooperate and negotiate (Anon, 1993 : 10).

Senad Pećanin, should be congratulated for observing that Alija Izetbegović could hardly be depicted as an astute politician and his short sighted policy worked against the political interest of Bosnians. Bosnian government somehow wants to deceive its inhabitants. His policy is calling into question the very survival of Bosnian Muslims (Pećanin, 1993*a*: 21). Rade Trbojević is cited as one of the rare examples of those who practiced 'objective' journalism during the Siege of Sarajevo. Most of other journalists were tasked only with the demonization of Chetniks. His family was under threat because of these efforts. In this particular case, professional curiosity prevailed over fear (...) Lack of professionalism of regime journalists is exposed to critical scrutiny (Zaimović, 1993 : 30).

Machiavellianism and short-sightedness, as well as the desire of power is made explicit in an interview with Fikret Abdić, a Bosnian politician (...) Mistakes of Bosnian politicians are exposed to the readers and are embodied in deaths and persecutions of innocent civilians (...) Politicians are surrounded by cronies and relatives and their lack of ability for self-criticism is conspicuous (...) Refusal of Ejup Ganić to negotiate corroborates this argument (...) During the siege of Sarajevo, the lack of empathy and human dignity were apparent to an intelligent observer (Jurišić, 1993).

Poverty is also increasing substantially. Moreover, politicians should be blamed for this state-of-affairs and especially for their mismanagement of funds (...) There is a sharp dichotomous distinction on military and civil sector. Bribery is widespread as an option (Hafner 1993: 50). Some analyses depict Bosnian authorities as 'subservient', serving the interests of Western politicians (...) This interesting article heavily criticizes Bosnian Muslims that are trying to create an Islamic state in Bosnia (...) Bosnian politicians were putting forward an agenda that has been 'childlike', naively believing the promises of Western politicians (...) This analysis warns that Bosnian authorities should be blamed for the present warlike state of affairs in this former Yugoslav state (Mehmedović, 1993: 22). An analysis goes in depth by arguing persuasively that some Bosnian soldiers transgressed the rules of their profession on many occasions, committed many unlawful acts and were prosecuted on Courts in the country (Hrasnica, 1993: 27).

What is more, during the siege of Sarajevo, Bosnian authorities have shown scorn and contempt and have displayed very little political maturity. Serbs have been depicted as peasants. In many aspects Bosnian politicians have been answerable for some of the crimes committed during the war (...) This analyst argues forcefully that Bosnian authorities have been traitors of their own people (Lovrenović, 1993 : 32). Predrag Lucić puts forward the argument that the storyline according to which the relations between Croats and Muslims, the war allies, is intrinsically ideological. The war strategy of Bosnian authorities is short-sighted in many aspects (Lucić 1993: 54-55). This analyst also argues convincingly that Bosnian media in many aspects conduct an ideological policy and that many politicians are massively hypocritical, while the journalists supporting them are distinguished by sheer sycophancy (*Ibidem*).

Senad Pećanin criticizes Bosnian government by saying that they spread the mentality of the victim and expected to take advantage of this policy (...) Pećanin argues convincingly that the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina has murdered and prosecuted innocent Croatian civilians and any normal human being with interest of Bosnia at heart cannot stand these developments with equanimity (...) There is a genuine *Golgotha* at the blocked city of Sarajevo (...) Izetbegović is distinguished by conceit and panic fear of losing power (Pećanin, 1993*b*).

Finally, some of the points in this paper is also to show instances where *BH Dani* backed up the mainstream national reporting.

The reporting of *BH Dani* is somehow ambivalent. In some instances it presents information that can be interpreted as the demonization of Serbs, throwing negative light on their crucial historical eras. The central storyline is that Serbs are seen as primitive. The text goes on to a make an argument, giving views of Serbian nationalist writer Dobrica Ćosić. “Serbs have entered the new epoch without their cities, houses and belongings, as those raising cattle, working in agriculture and within the military service, without university and professional philosophers as illiterate and gifted only with common sense. City, this cradle of culture, money and politics the majority of the Serbian people will get acquainted with and erect only towards the end of the nineteenth century” (Ćosić, 1992). Serbs are thus presented as backward and underdeveloped from the point of view of demographics.

Some analysts also argue convincingly that Serbs are seen as traitors in some of the media of that time. One issue of *BH Dani* cites Mirza Delibašić, a former basketball player, who was quoted as saying that he remained to live in Sarajevo, the capital city of Bosnia, while his family have left. He makes a clear anthropological distinction on ‘ourselves’ and ‘others’ that is to say between Bosniaks and Serbs as war mongers. In addition to this, he was quoted as saying that Bosnians are clearly seen as emerging moral victors in this War because they are adepts of virtue and love, rather than War. What is more, there is in existence another powerful emotion and that is contempt. Delibašić adds to this stream of thinking by arguing persuasively that Bosniaks will be filled with contempt towards their political and military opponents, the Serbs, towards the end of the War Conflict.

Within this ‘intellectual syllogism’ Bosniaks will feel love and this is a powerful emotion that will prevail over hatred that is quintessential of their War opponents. Expressed as a mathematical relation, and to put this point more strongly, this means that Bosniaks will emerge as 100% victors at the end of the War conflict. This ‘stream of thinking’ is interlinked with patriarchy. Indeed, this ex basketball player argues convincingly that his wife is a Bosnian and his kid is a Bosnian. The feeling of ‘conceit’ and ‘contempt’ is clearly expressed by calling Serbs ‘traitors’ and this is a powerful emotion within the War rhetoric. Indeed, this player turned analyst argues strongly that the Bosniaks' feeling of love will surely prevail over the putative traitors, Serbs. This message of universal love is concluded by saying that Bosniaks are so generous that they love even Serbs and Croats (BH Dani, 17. 12. 1992). In addition to this there is demonization of Serbs in some instances (Lovrenović, 1994). These considerations in the newspapers are aggravated by the pictures of the War Torn Bosnia and also pictures of wounded Bosnians in the hospitals in Sarajevo.

The next section will conclude briefly the considerations given in this essay.

CONCLUSIONS

Antinationalist position of *BH Dani* in the war context from 1992 to 1995 had many problems. The media that were under control of *Party of Democratic Action* the journalists were stigmatized as Chetniks, Ustashe, communists, traitors, enemies of Islam etc. BH Dani were the only medium that openly wrote about crimes of the Army of BIH over ethnic Serbs and Croats that remained to live in Sarajevo. They were very critical of the state apparatus and military structures and inefficiency in the investigation of crimes. They were criticizing heavily, Bosnian nationalism, Islamic radicalism, military and state incompetence, robbery and war profiteering, nepotism and the discrimination of minorities. "We thought it was our professional and human duty and I am sure we did it right. We thought that that we need to 'clean in front of our doors'. Although there was sufficient reason to do this. Focusing on Serb and Croat crimes, was easy and represented and easy way to deal with problems. This was not the type of journalism we were looking to perform" (Pećanin, personal communication, 24th August 2018).

We have seen from some of our research that the basic hypotheses outlined in this research project have been confirmed. The biased nature of some of these writings is confirmed by the 'punchy' and strong language and there are also many attempts to pigeonhole and 'shoehorn' the data so that this could fit a preconceived scheme, so that critical research is lacking in some instances. *BH Dani* somehow represented 'reality check' to the unobjective reporting of the media at that time and made a clear attempt for ethical, investigative journalism. Having said that, as analysts, we need to bear in mind the difficulty of objective reporting in a time of strong political pressure during the siege of Sarajevo. “Within our editorial board we had no difficulty in performing during the Siege of Sarajevo, in remaining journalists and at the same time Croats, Bosnians, Jews, Slovenians. To put it simply, it was normal and the only possible way to deal with the issue. It was not a difficult task at all. “ (Pećanin, personal communication, 24th August 2018). Hence the need to give more credit to the efforts of those involved in composition of publications such as *BH Dani*. In addition to this, this short research project should add to the existing body of knowledge about this topic and inform further research and investigation on this issue.

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FIRST EXIT POLL IN SERBIA: THE CASE OF VOŽDOVAC

Abstract

In this paper we will present the results and analysis of the first exit poll that has been done in Serbia, or more precisely, in Belgrade municipality of Voždovac. During election day of the 2020 Serbian parliamentary election, we collected data from 2969 respondents in 40 voting spots. We applied number of statistical and data collection procedures in order to improve precision of predication. The collected data provided the evidence of a very accurate prediction. Beside the prediction of election results, we collected demographic data, as well as data of the timing of the making the decision to vote. Therefore, for the explorative purposes we present that data in the paper. We found significant differences among demographic categories regarding party/electoral list preferences. Additionally, we identify different patterns between SNS and Šapić voters, i.e. we found that SNS voters mostly decided to vote for this list a long time ago, while Šapić voters mostly decided to vote for this electoral list a few days before the elections. In conclusion, we discuss the possible reasons of such pattern.

Keywords: Exit poll, Voting, Pattern of voting

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INTRODUCTION

Exit polls are conducted on election day. In front of the polling stations, the pollsters use the questionnaires to ask the voters for whom they voted. (Tadić, 2010). These surveys are immediately sent to a central location where there are people who add them to the statistical database for continuous analysis. Technologies vary, and the transmission of query results is via a regular phone, a mobile phone - usually in the form of text messages or via the Internet. To have a successful data transfer, it has to be done accurately and fast. Projections about the results are usually made during the day. The analysts usually predict exit surveys using previously developed statistical models. They also have access to information obtained on election day, through actual field team reports, as well as information obtained prior to the election. (Scheuren, Alvei, 2008).

It is assumed that voters will circle the same on the ballot as at the polling station. After the closing of the polling stations, the estimates of the results based on the survey are published, and the main goal of the survey commissioners (non-governmental organizations or television stations) is to find out the estimates of the election results as soon as possible. Up until now - almost always - if the sampling is done properly, it shows that surveys give good result estimates. When simulating the sample randomness, interviewers try to examine different types of people or they overcome that by counting. Simulations are a good indicator of the direction in which one should investigate and theoretically justify what is claimed. Sometimes in practice those theoretical models can be a complex way of getting good results, which is why we have to rely on the information obtained by simulating those models. (Tadić, 2010).

This research is so popular thanks to television channels, where you can find out election results after the polls close, which gives political scientists an opportunity to comment, whereas live analysis on election night guarantees high ratings. The idea for this type of survey was first born in the United States, where it developed the most. The creation and development of the survey methodology was attributed to Warren Mitofski. (Kozłowski, 2012). The first election day survey was conducted in 1940 in Denver, and the first survey in the form in which we have it today, that is, on a large scale and most often at the request of the media, was conducted in 1967 for CBS (Levy, 1983). The first (although unsuccessful) exit polls were conducted by George Gallup, and then the mail survey (also unsuccessful) was conducted by the Literari Digest, during the 1936 election, which predicted that Alf Landon would defeat Franklin Roosevelt. The problems also arose in the 1948 election year, even though better methods were used. It was not until the 1960s that television networks paid more attention to them. (Scheuren, Alvey, 2008).

The exit poll is specific and yet the most accurate, because it does not include all people who have the right to vote, but only those people who actually vote – then, here we do not have the problem of identifying possible voters as is the case of pre-election polls. The questions in the exit poll refer to facts, not to intentions that may differ from the actual election decisions. This issue is of particular importance especially in the case of a change in political preferences a few days before the election (late swing). (Kozłowski, 2012) The exit poll is clearer and more receptive to respondents and it is assumed that fewer people will refuse it than some other types of pre-election polls (say pre-election polls by telephone).

The goal of the exit poll is not only to predict the election result. This type of research brings a lot of important information about the division of votes in different socio-demographic structures, changes in political preferences with regards to previous elections, motives for choosing a particular party or candidate, motives for choosing voting time, etc. This information allows for a detailed analysis of the results and it can be used until the next elections due to the fact that current policy research, mostly from the above, does not provide such detailed data with maximum accuracy. The most accurate data on the demographic composition of the electorate were derived from exit polls. The components of measurement error in research should be well calculated and researchers make significant effort to reduce or control them. (McDonald, 2007). In less consolidated democracies, exit polls indirectly perform the function of election legitimacy, i.e. whether there is a big difference between the results of the polls and the official election results. (Kozłowski, 2012).

The academic literature on exit surveys focuses on two areas, methodology and the human factor. In general, the methodology of exit surveys also consists of two components: proper sampling techniques and logistical convenience included in conducting the exit survey. Exit surveys should be arranged in a random sample. However, the demographic structure, urban-rural structure, etc. should be considered here as well. Sometimes a more precise value will be obtained when it is mathematically calculated which respondent fills in the survey, and not randomly, though some criticize this method. Other times, the issue is with the types and techniques of voting, say via the internet or the mail as is the case in Oregon, therefore it is difficult to conduct an exit poll. In addition to the discussion on sampling, there are also practical ones related to the relationship between respondents and interviewers. Human interactions will produce certain biases in any scientific experiment, and the social context may be different as well as the likelihood of answering sensitive questions honestly. (Barreto, Guerra, Marks, Nuño, Woods, 2006).

The controversial part of exit polls is whether to publish the results before the polls close. The (un) intentional effect of the exit poll will be if the televisions would announce the winner of the election during the day and thus influence the (de) motivation of potential voters to go to the polls. This issue is mainly addressed to the United States, where there is no legal ban on publishing poll results before all polling stations close. (Cole, 2003). In November 2000, exit polls in Florida declared that Al Gore had won the presidential election. As a result, many television broadcasters declared Gore the winner of Florida, a key state to win the 2000 election. Just hours later, they were denied the right results and George W. Bush was the winner. As a result of the erroneous exit poll, the media and interviewers reviewed and re-analysed the methodology used in 2000 to better prepare for 2004. (Barreto, Guerra, Marks, Nuño, Woods, 2006). That is why it is best not to forecast and present data when there is no complete information or the race is very close, therefore the winner should not be announced during the night. (Scheuren, Alvey, 2008).

MAKING A DECISION WHEN TO VOTE

In many Western democracies, voters have begun to delay their voting decisions. More and more voters make their decision during the last weeks before the election, many of them even just in the last few days, if not on election day itself. (Schmitt-Beck, 2005). The first difficulty in understanding voters who decide late is to determine exactly how many voters decide late - in the last minute. Brox and Giamo define the late decision-making as the decision for whom to vote during the two weeks before the election, including election day. (Brox, Giammo, 2009). In every pre-election survey, a significant number of respondents state that they have not yet developed clear preferences for whom to vote. Even a few months before the election, there might be 20% or more undecided voters. For example, at the Italian elections, 15 days before the 2006 general elections, about 10% of respondents did not decide when they would vote if the elections were held the next day. In addition, the data show that the majority of undecided respondents make a decision only a few days before the voting, and even on election day itself. In all election polls we can find out the socio-demographic characteristics of undecided voters, but less is known about the decision itself and the processes that lead them to vote for one or the other candidate. (Arcuri, Castelli, Galdi, Zogmaister, Amadori, 2008.).

Schmitt-Beck argues that by comparing voters who made decisions at different stages of the election process, we can identify systematic differences in two dimensions: political involvement and cross-pressure. Researchers concluded that voter indecision is due to a lack of political voter participation; therefore it is difficult for them to make a voting decision, while cross-pressures hampered their ability to choose one party or candidate over another, even if they were motivated to make such a decision. He adds that voters who made a decision during the campaign can also be called floating / unsteady voters who were indifferent to politics and led a more or less apolitical life. In addition, they were not particularly interested in the elections and were not very interested in their results. For such voters, a low level of political interest, political knowledge and understanding is typical, and no will to obtain information through the mass media or other political sources. The decisions that voters ultimately made to the researchers seemed accidental and could not be explained by the usual factors that determine elective behaviour. According to this author, electoral behaviour has an essentially dualistic nature. On one hand, there are voters who have a developed party identification, who are very careful and take care of all information and are therefore well informed, but usually use them to confirm their existing preferences. On the other hand, there are apolitical floating / unsteady voters who lack guidelines for political predispositions, and also political information that would allow them to make a meaningful election decision. (Schmitt-Beck, 2005).

Brox and Giamo say there are two possible explanations for late voter decisions, on one hand, it is possible that voters who are late in deciding will give up voting because they do not have enough information about candidates or parties. These are, for example, contextual factors (economy factors, war and peace, keeping the exchange rate in relation to the dynamics of change, etc.), lack of party identification, knowledge of candidates, etc. One other reason for late decision-making could be that people who have little or no interest in politics wait to learn more about candidates or parties until election day forces them to make a final decision. Another possibility is that late voters prolong their decision because they feel they do not know enough about the candidates, but unlike the former, these late voters probably paid attention to the campaign, they know the candidates and their party affiliation, topics and personal qualities and are still delaying the decision until the last moment. These late-deciding voters follow the entire campaign, gathering as much information as possible before election day. They therefore believe that there are two groups of voters: those who are not interested in the campaign, who for some reason decide to participate at the last minute and therefore have to decide who to vote for just before election day, and those voters who are interested in the campaign and who will try to gather as much information as possible before electing a preferred presidential candidate or party. They also add that these two groups of voters differ in terms of socio-demographic structure, and attitudes, as well as the factors that influence their decision. (Brox, Giammo, 2009).

There are significant disagreements regarding demographics, attitudes, and behavioural characteristics among late voters. Demographically speaking, Gopoian and Hadjiharalambous are of the view that voters who decide later are usually younger than voters who decide earlier in the campaign. They also argue that higher social status (race and education) is occasionally correlated with late decision-making, however, opposed by Chafee, Choe, Whitney and Goldman, who say voters with above-average income and education levels chose earlier than others. Regarding the political attitudes, there is more agreement on the characteristics of late-deciding voters. Voters who make late decisions have weaker party identification of parties, see fewer differences between parties, have less interest in politics, and care little about election outcome. (Brox, Giammo, 2009).

Opponents of the claim that late-deciding voters have become more numerous and that their decisions are increasingly determining election results are Irwin and Holsteyn. They are of the opinion that it is a myth or a misunderstanding, and that all voices are equally important. The basis of the myth is probably the belief of politicians and the media and they are engaged in public opinion polls. Throughout the election campaign, the results of such assumptions are election polls. They say that the pre-election polls are only a picture of the current situation, not a prediction of the results, so if late deciding voters give their votes differently from those who knew for a long time when they will vote, surprises can occur and it seems that they can determine the outcome. The authors argue that much time and years have passed and that a factually unsubstantiated pessimistic view still prevails: a last-minute decision is often a wave of decisions by voters who care little and know little. (Irwin & Holsteyn, 2018).

ABOUT THE EXIT POLL IN MUNICIPALITY OF VOŽDOVAC

An exit poll in Voždovac has been done during the election day. In this municipality there is a total 90 polling stations with 161 256 registered voters. Among these polling stations, we randomly chose 40 of them with a total number of 73 379 voters. For each selected polling station we had two interviewers, and additionally, we had one coordinator per five polling stations. Interviewers were carefully selected, and they passed a one day training. Regardless of many negative expectations, we did not have any problems during election day, i.e. interviewers regularly collected data with almost no problem at all. Sampling procedure has been set as systematic random sampling, since this is the procedure which guarantees counting based on dynamics of the timing of voting. The instrument for the research was rather simple. Beside their voting behaviour, we asked about basic demographics, as well as the main question for this paper, and this is 'when did you decide for whom would you vote. In Graph 1 we present our sample consisting of 2969 observations.

Therefore, the exit poll was organized in front of forty polling stations on a representative sample in the municipality of Voždovac. Two pollsters were in front of the polling station and one of them distributed the questionnaires, while the other had a transparent backpack on his back so as to ensure the data anonymity when inserting the questionnaires. The pollsters were in front of the polling stations before they were open, at the prescribed distance of 50 meters. At the very beginning, they had problems with some polling board members until their tasks were clarified, and the Republic Election Commission confirmed the possibility of their presence. After resolving the misunderstanding and explaining the purpose of the exit poll, the pollsters started working.

According to the established methodological code, they approached the voters after they left the polls. The majority of people wanted to cooperate after they got familiar with the survey purpose. Likewise, the pollsters noted the number of voters who refused to fill in the questionnaire. The citizens were genuinely interested, but the oldest and the youngest voters were the ones most interested. The pollsters did not have any problems or incidents at the polling stations. We had six mobile teams with two members each, which collected filled out questionnaires by car every two hours according to the established route and subsequently brought them to the office where six coordinators entered data into the program.

DATA, RESULTS AND ACCURACY OF POLLING: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

First in graph 1 we present demographics of the respondents. Since we had limited space and time to collect the data, we collected only the main characteristics from the respondents. It is to be seen that the sample is slightly skewed toward more educated, and female.

Graph 1. Exit poll demographics



As far as the accuracy of the exit poll is concerned, in graph 2 we present the results of the elections and the results of the exit poll. All in all, the average error of prediction is 0,56%, which could be treated as more than reasonable. If we speak about specific electoral lists, for four of them the election result was more or less then the confidence intervals predicted (Table 1). However, it can be seen that these are lists with small number of voters, as well as that the prediction is not 'too far' from the limits of the confidence interval.

Graph 2 Accuracy of prediction



Table 1 The accuracy of prediction with 95% confidence intervals

	Election results	Exit poll	Standard error 95% confidence	From	To
Александар Вучић – За нашу децу.	58,8	58,8	1,8	57,0	60,6
ИВИЦА ДАЧИЋ – „Социјалистичка партија Србије (СПС), Јединствена	10,0	9,6	1,1	8,5	10,6
Савез за Вождовац	1,4*	2,5	0,6	1,9	3,1
Др ВОЈИСЛАВ ШЕШЕЉ-СРПСКА РАДИКАЛНА СТРАНКА	2,1*	3,3	0,7	2,7	4,0
АЛЕКСАНДАР ШАПИЋ – ПОБЕДА ЗА ВОЖДОВАЦ	9,5*	8,4	1,0	7,4	9,4
ЗА КРАЉЕВИНУ СРБИЈУ, ЗА НАШ ВОЖДОВАЦ	2,8	2,0	0,5	1,5	2,6
МЕТЛА 2020 – ДСС	4,8*	3,8	0,7	3,1	4,5
ХРАБРО – Милица Ђурђевић Стаменковски – Српска странка Заветниц	2,1	2,0	0,5	1,5	2,5
Група грађана СРПСКА ДЕСНИЦА ЗА ДОМАЋИНСКИ ВОЖДОВАЦ – Проф.др Не	0,6	0,6	0,3	0,3	0,9
„СУВЕРЕНИСТИ“	3,3	3,5	0,7	2,8	4,2
ДОБРО ЗА ВОЖДОВАЦ	1,0	1,0	0,4	0,6	1,3
invallid ballots	3,6	4,4	0,8	3,7	5,2

* Value is above or below 95% confidence intervals

VOTING FOR THE LISTS AND DEMOGRAPHICS

In Graph 3 we present the distribution of votes for male and female voters. It is to note some significant differences regarding gender distribution. The main difference is that women voted significantly more for the SNS electoral list than men. For the SRS electoral list, we observe the opposite pattern, as well as for the electoral lists HRABRO and Suverenisti. Other electoral lists are pretty much balanced in this regards.

Graph 3 Voting for electoral lists and gender distribution



We observe in Graph 4 the age distribution and voting for the parties/ electoral lists. First, we identify clear linear relationship regarding voting for the SNS electoral list and age, i.e. the older the voters are, the more likely it is that they will vote for this electoral list. It can be seen that more than ¾ of voters of the SNS party are people older than 55 years, while 'only' 43,5% younger than 35 voted for this electoral list, respectively. It is to be concluded that older population too much extent more prefer ruling party. On the other hand, we can see completely the opposite linear pattern for the voters of the Šapić electoral list. Namely, the younger they are, the more likely it is they will vote for this electoral list. The same can be observed for the electoral list 'Suverenisti', while for other electoral lists, we have a pretty much balanced distribution.

Graph 4 Age distribution and voting for parties/lists



Graph 5 Education and voting for electoral lists/parties



Finally, regarding demographics and voting, in Graph 5 we present percentage distribution of education for each party/ electoral list. Again, there is a clear linear relationship for the SNS voters, i.e. the less educated the voters are, the more likely it is they will vote for SNS. Again, for the electoral lists of Šapić and Suverenisti we observe a completely different linear pattern, meaning that the more educated voters are, the more likely it is they will vote for these two lists. Other parties have a mostly balanced distribution of education of their voters.

DECISION TO VOTE AND VOTING FOR THE PARTIES/LISTS

One of the most interesting findings of the exit poll research that has been done is the issue of decision making, or more precisely, the answer to the question when they decided to vote for a certain party/ electoral list. We provide the distribution of this variable in Graph 6. It can be seen that most of the voters decided for whom they would vote a long time ago, while around 15% of the voters decided that during the campaign, and almost the same number made a decision a few days before the elections, respectively.

Graph 6 When did you decide for whom to vote.



In graph 7 we observe demographics and decision to vote. First, we note that there is no significant difference between men and women in this regard ($X^2(2)=1.029$, $p=0.598$). For the other two variables the differences are significant according to Chi-square test. Although in each demographic category most of the voters decided a long time ago for whom to vote, we observe that the less educated the voters are, the more likely it is that they decided a long time ago. We observe the same linear pattern regarding age distribution, namely, the older they are, the more likely it is that they decided a long time ago.

Graph 7 Decision to vote and demographics



Graph 8 Decision to vote and party/list



One of the most interesting data based on our sample of voters is the relation between the decision to vote and voting for a specific party/ electoral list (Graph 8). We observe that most of the voters of the SNS electoral list decided to vote for that electoral list a long time ago, while for the Šapić electoral list, most of the voters decided to vote for that electoral list during the last month of the campaign, or just a few days before the elections, in particular. This finding deserves more attention in future research.

CONCLUSION

First, apart from usual argument that it is not possible due to cultural reasons to realize an exit poll in Serbia, it has been proved that this is not the case. We did not find any particular problem during the collection data process that proves the thesis false. Second, it is clear that relatively simple sampling procedures provide more than reasonably accurate predictions. Third, a lot of effort must be put in organizing the collection data process, since this is the greatest challenge of all. Fourth, we provide the evidence of very different distribution of votes across different demographics.

Fifth, and for the future research most relevant, we found that voting for certain lists is heavily correlated with the time when the decision was made for whom they will vote . It seems that the voters decided to vote for the ruling party a long time ago, while for the other lists their decision can be attributed to the effect of campaigning.

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Review article

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REFLEXIVITY IN THE STUDY OF WARFARE: IS THERE ADDED VALUE FOR THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS? [**]

Abstract

The article examines whether reflectivist approach to epistemology in the study of warfare can amend some weaknesses of the rationalist/positivist canon of mainstream International Relations (IR) theories. The author argues for the existence of a new epistemic situation for the IR researcher: an ontological transformation of the military profession in post-industrial societies that has created a sacralised civic duty to fight in war. The research of warfare is becoming more focused on the individual – who is either a reluctant combatant or a civilian victimised by military operations, but protected by international norms. The author hypothesises that the advantages of reflectivist epistemological viewpoint – embracing standpoint epistemology, situated knowledge, the concept of embodiment, Cynthia Enloe's claim that "the international is the personal" – may provide a plausible alternative path in the quest for an answer to the question of how we learn about warfare as the central problem of international relations. The analysis shows how reflectivism encourages researchers to identify new, previously

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"hidden" or marginalised questions and thus expand the scope of inquiry of mainstream IR. The author concludes that, when it comes to the study of warfare in the early twenty-first century, the largest contribution of reflectivist approach to epistemology of IR is in overcoming the shortcomings of the traditionally rigid mainstream epistemological framework of the discipline, providing the grounds for future counter-hegemonic actions.

Keywords: reflectivism, reflexivity, epistemology, standpoint epistemology, situated knowledge, war, warfare, international relations, victimisation, embodiment.

THE PHENOMENON OF WARFARE AND THE POSITIVIST CANON OF THE IR MAINSTREAM

Systematic intellectual efforts to understand the nature of the ancient warfare can be traced back to at least the fifth century BCE, first appearing in ancient Chinese military thought. For political and pragmatic reasons, this tradition sought to provide general principles and rules for the optimal use of armed forces (Van Creveld 2000, 20–36). Centuries of philosophical debates and scientific interest for war and military organisation as a foundational social institution evolved in tandem with the advance of social sciences as modern scientific disciplines. As is usual in the case of studying a multi-layered and ever-present social phenomena, scientific debates over time crystalised around different, even opposing views of certain structural characteristics of war, such as causes and specific elements that differentiate it from other forms of violence. Nevertheless, there seems to be consensus that the ontology of warfare can be subsumed under the question: who is conducting the war? Numerous anthropological findings see war as a planned and organised armed conflict of political units, that is, as a social relation at whose core are political collectives which decide to impose their will by force on other, similar collectives (Otterbein 1985, 3; cf. Otterbein 2009). For the purposes of this text, we will adopt the view by James Dodd, a phenomenologist of violence who problematises war as organised violence, that measures the ability of one sovereign political entity to reconstitute relations with other sovereign collectives under more favourable conditions for its interests (2009, 135–137).

The scientific description and explanation of the phenomenon of war – being one of the basic forms of relations among states and a means of achieving foreign policy objectives – has been a pillar of the IR disciplinary mainstream for the last century or so. IR disciplinary mainstream sees sovereign states as the leading, if not the only actors relevant for analysis of the reality of international relations (see Aron 2017; Waltz 2001; Waltz 1979). War is therefore considered a social phenomenon that can be properly understood and scientifically explained on the level of system/structure. This is the epistemological cornerstone in the analysis by the Realist school of IR, drawing on the positivist paradigm that social phenomena and processes can be explained by use of the same methods as those used for natural world, and that facts can be clearly differentiated from values (Neufeld 1995, 32–38; Spegele 1996, 22–50; Elman 2007, 11–20; Lišanin 2017).

According to this rationalist position, states act as rational actors endowed with instrumental reason in a given (and unchangeable) environment (Smith 1996, 21–23). In studying war, (neo) realists start with the assumption about the unchangeable, anarchic nature of the "primordial state" of international relations. They give ontological primacy to so-called high-level politics over the actions of commoners. Given that the primary task of the state is the preservation and improvement of national interests, war is a permissible and desirable foreign policy tool, which means that the decisions regarding war is exclusively a matter of sovereign power. Still, as it draws only on observation, strict empiricism reveals only a narrow segment of reality, since certain causes of social phenomena and process are not discoverable by mere observation. Even if taken as a valid source of knowledge, observation is not "uncluttered" by interference from previous theoretical and conceptual choices made in designing particular research. Concepts are impossible to abstract from the process of description of what has been seen or experienced, as they provide the scientific terminology to describe the object of study. Being the result of previous rational scientific procedure, they cannot be reduced to mere empirical observation.

"FIXING" THE POSITIVIST CANON: REFLEXIVITY

The post-positivist epistemological turn – with reflexivity as its metatheoretical "axis" – has emerged as an attempt to remove the methodological weaknesses from the mainstream IR theory. These methodological weaknesses are the result of explaining the behaviour of states with tools adopted from the natural sciences and economics – causality, hypothesis-testing through models and verifiability of research results through multiple repetition (see Neufeld 1993). The main objection from the reflectivist theorists of IR concerns the ease of political misuse of positivist "seriousness" of the realist epistemological position that stems from its unambiguously immense social influence and a seductive note attributed to its universality and timelessness (Booth 2007, 32–34).

The discipline of epistemology examines ways of knowing the world around us, that is, attempts to answer the question of how we establish the truth of what we consider knowledge, the grounds on which we claim we know "something", as well as what distinguishes "true" knowledge from mere belief or guessing. Therefore, it is not surprising that the discipline of IR has evolved in the midst of internal tensions between advocates of positivism and post-positivist (reflectivist/critical) approach to epistemology, specifically over what research questions can be considered legitimate part of the discipline or whether the standards of this legitimacy are absolute or relative (Ferguson 2015, 3–12; Kovačević 2017, 198–202).

The struggle for credibility of each epistemological approach can hardly be reduced to dull intellectual arguing by "autistic" scholars in an academic setting. Steve Smith (1996, 13) reminds researchers that once IR theories become accepted in political debates as common sense – even despite their highly formal language – they are a powerful factor in formulating policy agenda in world politics, because the theories distinguish questions which can be spoken about reasonably from those which cannot. Thus, according to Smith, determining the area in which sound judgments on political matters can be made is actually an act of great political potential and power, and can consequently impact the quality of life for millions across the globe. Theorising about world events is at once an intellectual endeavour and political reality; the epistemological approach offers not only the way we know something, but how it could rendered (in)visible to the researcher's eye (Chen & Cho 2016, 245). Therefore, the choice of epistemological perspective on a research problem selected from the reality of international relations becomes essential for foreign policy practice – potentially predetermining the possibilities of action, and has global emancipatory and ethical implications.

Realist IR theories accept the changes in state behaviour in the world arena, but are less interested in them than in the changes occurring within states, such as novel understandings of collective identity or interpreting the content of national interest (see Wendt 1999). For reflectivist epistemologists, the production of knowledge is always socially and historically mediated. For instance, Robert Cox (1981) maintains that the producers of knowledge are always inextricable from their context, identity and interests at play, making it impossible to have a researcher neutral towards her subject of study. For this reason, reflectivist theorists of IR choose a position of critical distance. The idea of achieving a certain degree of critical distance is mitigated by the position that distance from the context researched or observed, that is, an emotional distance required from researchers and subjects of the research, is only possible to a relative degree, and is never absolute (Damasio 2006, 237–238). Positivism excludes emotions from the research procedure, as they allegedly subvert the accuracy of empirical data; on the other hand, in so doing, it loses sight that equally to reason, emotions have a substantive function in the lives of people.

A more comprehensive answer about theorising international relations follows the original meaning of the Ancient Greek *theorein*, an activity of concentrated observation permeated with participation in what is being observed. War is not merely an abstract, elitist and bureaucratic tool of foreign policy conceived in "corridors of power", but an ancient social practice shaped by the interaction of people organised into political communities. Since knowledge is also a matter of socially-determined cognitive paradigms, a reflectivist worldview struggles to acquire scientific authority as intellectual grounds for desired social change (Neufeld 1993, 68–69). Analysis focused only on official documents and activities of the state and its representatives is simply insufficient for a scientific explanation of war as an essential pattern of the state behaviour in international relations. The reflectivist epistemological approach seeks also to study how the participants of an activity, looking to overcome the simplified view of soldiers as cogs in the state's war machine, are initiated always anew by nationalist passion and fear of the enemy (Waltz 2001, 179). As people act according to goals set by personal/group interests, that is, according to the meanings these goals have for them, so the scientific explanation of war should consider the person-centred epistemological approach of individuals caught in the maelstrom of social interaction that war creates. IR research does include a degree of individual analysis, but most often as psychological profiles, ideological beliefs, the role of political or military leaders and other high-ranked state and military officials in decision making process.

Marginalising or completely excluding commoners as participants or victims of armed conflict from research can hardly be expected to arrive at comprehensive description, not to mention deeper layers of scientific explanation of warfare. It is not only a matter of disciplinary weaknesses of a "rump" paradigm of war as a political and social phenomenon, but also about the indirect but long-term consequences of the social implications of such representation. A negative idea of human nature, as aggressive and bellicose, seeking domination and hierarchy, is not only one of the grounding premises of the realist view of world politics, but has become "common sense" in political practice and public opinion. Such views are easily exploited for purposes of creating an atmosphere of conflict among countries, which can only be resolved through military operations, making them seem inevitable and worthwhile regardless of cost or human suffering – i.e. breakout of war is "normal" because it is the natural state (Crawford 2011, 171–172).

For the reflectivist epistemological perspective, such oversimplified understanding of human nature rooted in biological determinism is wrong and dangerous, in particular because it is mined by political elites as a kind of pseudoscientific basis for delivering political positions that stoke mistrust and fear of the Other. The reflectivist approach seeks to deconstruct unresolved tensions in the study of the reality of international relations – in particular those affected by the dialectical relation between the production of knowledge and social context – and examine weaknesses while looking for alternatives (Hamati-Ataya 2018, 17). In that context, the label of reflexivity also includes and emphasises theoretical insight into the researcher and their social positionality, as well as the resulting consequences to the social order – so-called situated knowledge (Jackson 2011, 199–200). To that end, according to Hamati-Ataya (2018, 28–29), reflexivity as a practice of position-taking is built into the very epistemological order of the IR discipline; while the absence of position-taking undermines our reflexive awareness and corrodes the demystifying role of social sciences.

HOW REFLECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT MAY COMPLETE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF WARFARE

Patterns of violent behaviour are imperceptibly woven into social practice and transmitted across generations through socialisation. The embeddedness of violence in collective memory, which we partially use in learning and acting in the world, is to an extent the result of internalisation of ideals of a political community interspersed in narratives of supremacy of noble ideals over the horror of experienced, direct combat. Still, as is common with ideals, the brutality of war easily dispels idealised images soldiers initially carry with them into battle. After carefully studying the facts of military operations and listening to hundreds of testimonies of soldiers wounded in the American Civil War, the famous American poet and journalist Walt Whitman noted lucidly that the true face of war will never appear in books (quoted in Fussell 1989, 290). It is little surprise then that for a long time there were no sources about the personal experiences of ordinary soldiers or indeed how they understood the role of wartime events in their lives (both before and after the war). Analysing individual experiences of war, as described in narratives of ordinary soldiers who participated directly in combat, as well as war as a social construct within Western culture, Yuval Noah Harari (2008) arrived at the insight that since the Enlightenment and Romanticism – specifically, the 1860s – war has begun to be valued and interpreted through a perspective of being the ultimate life experience. In the period after the First World War, the reading public was flooded with war memoires and novels, the first such books to examine war experiences from the point of view of generally accepted ideals of masculinity and moral ambivalence. This was a consequence of a greater number of mobilised men who supported a war that turned out to be far longer and bloodier than anyone was able to imagine it would be (see Bruley 2005).

Participants in armed struggle who personally experienced extreme war, interpreted it as the cornerstone of maturing and personal development, that is, learning fundamental truths about oneself and the world (Harari 2008, 160–196). Sacralised notions of the experience of war as a necessary personal formative element in the production of citizens or political socialisation seems today to have been dealt a blow in most post-industrial societies. Korać (2019) argues that in the so-called post-heroic age – marked by conflict as an industrialised activity that protects imperial corporate interests of post-industrial powers – the ideal of the citizen-warrior whose holy duty is to defend the homeland has been undermined by the ontological nature of the professional military. Military service in the early twenty-first century is just another commercial activity carried out in the labour market, suffering a drop in interest, entirely at the mercy of supply and demand, focused on avoiding loss as much as on the goal of the greatest possible military efficiency (Korać 2019, 22–28). The collapse of the citizen-warrior ideal can be partially linked to the current process of redefinition of democracy and the contemporary idea of the citizen: better educated and more politically active, they are also more egoistical and disinterested in the common good than ever in history (Stojadinović 2020).

Reflectivist scholars have developed a body of disciplinary knowledge dialectically, which allows for overcoming the clash between subjective meaning contained in experience and internalised meanings accepted on the level of society as a whole. For that reason, in this paper, I hypothesise that the ontological turn taking place in the early twenty-first century, in which warfare is changing from holy civic duty to a commercialised profession, inevitably places before the researcher of warfare the concept of the individual (as either participant or victim). In search for an answer to how we may learn about war as a phenomenon that falls into the disciplinary realm of IR, I will test the claim that reflectivist epistemology satisfactorily complements the weaknesses of the positivist canon. It does so by taking into consideration the obvious split between subjective meanings contained in lived individual experience of war and the internalised meanings ascribed to fighting as ideal and duty, accepted by a member of a political community through socialisation.

Within the IR discipline, reflectivist epistemology is most developed in the work of feminist theorists, for which reason I will examine validity of the departing premise through the part of this body of work focused on warfare. As opposed to the theoretical mainstream that measures scientific advancement by how well the set questions are answered, feminist epistemology measures the adequacy of each research undertaking by which questions have been posed, and even more importantly, which have not (see Yadav 2018, 374–381). The starting point of any research study is the ontology of social relations that recognises the existential embeddedness of the individual in a hierarchical social setting, shaped by inequality of political, economic and social structures. Therefore, reflexivist research of states' actions in the international arena moves from the level of the individual – whose lives are bound within the given states as either military duty or conflict victims – and seeks to establish whether and in what way the dialectical relations of power/subjugation can announce the direction for emancipation through systematic explanation of practical wisdom of the oppressed (Ackerly & True 2006, 241–260). Instead of narrowing the disciplinary epistemological focus to interactions among bearers of power, privileged by the existing order, the reflectivist point of view allows for an understanding of how marginalised groups and collectives have come to be on the edge of the theoretical mainstream researcher's "field of visibility" (Jackson 2011, 184–185). Avoiding the epistemological blind spot of dominant grand narratives – rooted in the privileged social background of the researcher, usually bound up in the establishment, or political and military interests – is only possible by directing the research undertaking towards the central question: whose knowledge are we actually speaking of when we study war? Consequently, the focus shifts from knowledge produced by state institutions, which is to say leading political and military actors, to learning about the structures and processes that create social marginality through war.

Standpoint epistemology reveals problems faced when, in seeking to justify the superiority of their knowledge perspective for the particular object of study (or greater objectivity of their findings), the researcher claims proximity to the object, usually a marginalised social group (see Harding 1991, 119–133). Donna Haraway (1988, 581) insists that the idea of objective knowledge is embodied in situated/positional knowledge, with the acknowledgment that the learning self is always multidimensional and aware of its limits. According to Haraway, situated or positional knowledge, although imperfect, surpasses the false promise of the "all-seeing eye" of contemporary positivist knowledge armed with advanced technology. Although technology allows for deeper and more distant observations of the material world, at the same time, it creates a sort of rhetoric of power disassociated from social responsibility for how we have come to learn about reality (Haraway 1988, 586). The production of our scientific knowledge as situated refers to the acknowledgment of the view that knowledge maintains specific conditions in which it is produced, including on some levels the social identity and position of the one producing it (Hoffman 2001, 59).

For the study of war and IR in general, standpoint epistemology is interested not in reaching scientific knowledge of difference among individual perspectives of the object of research study, but how to achieve scientific knowledge through deliberation and discussion between researchers and human subjects on questions, values and discourses that reveal a group perspective regarding that object of research study (Weldon 2006, 64–68). Given that knowledge is produced by communities or social groups, and not individuals, the application of epistemic principles of positionality in research practice means that acquired knowledge is a collective "product", which includes and condenses even opposing views of the object of research study. In that manner, knowledge can better be considered "negotiated" than acquired by observation or theoretical reflection. We can say that standpoint epistemology includes the reconceptualisation of the individual, value and truth, starting from three basic premises: 1) the learning subject is not situated outside social relations; rather, they constitute the learning subject; 2) political values are an inherent aspect of knowledge, and as such are epistemologically significant; and 3) knowledge does not objectively mirror the outside world, but is constituted by social practices (Campbell 2004, 14–16).

We have thus opened an alternative route in the search for answers to the question of how researchers can formulate and assess the scientific validity of statements about the reality of war. The significance of standpoint epistemology in the study of war is in its potential to overcome epistemic limitations issuing from the masculinist, white and Western character of the positivist mainstream in studying international relations. Standpoint epistemology does so by giving primacy to social embeddedness far outside political and military power circles that decide whether and how military operations will be undertaken. Standpoint epistemology presents a direct challenge to traditional rationalist and empiricist epistemological assumptions about the irrelevance of the researcher's identity in conducting research and obtaining findings. The status of researchers within the structures of social/political power presents the basic benchmark of legitimacy of the precondition for acquiring scientific knowledge. The researcher must possess a developed consciousness of their personal standpoint and subjective dimension of the lived experience of the interlocutor, while at the same time being keenly aware of the power dynamics that permeate the relation with human subjects (Stanley & Wise 1990, 23). For this reason, certain researchers include a self-reflexive aspect in the description of the findings and research dynamics. An intellectual autobiographical note confirms credibility of the researcher as an authority on a specific topic, the validity of their previous scientific results and arguments, that is, the warrant for their research on a given research problem.

It is reasonable to assume that a research project aimed at explaining all phenomenological levels of a specific armed conflict will not be approached in the same theoretical manner or studied using the same methodology, nor will yield equal findings and conclusions. Additional differences can emerge if the researcher belongs to the political elite (thus having a privileged position) compared to coming from a layer of society that suffered direct destructive effects of combat operations. In the first case, it would be expected for the research procedure to include only empirical data, such as official narratives contained in statements by state actors and official documents about the designs and conduct of military operations (and that only when they become declassified). Such information is often biased because it is shaped to legitimise decisions of those in power or because it simply ignores the level of the individual. Kevin Dunn argues that the leading American and Western European thought on IR is to a large extent a product of a small community of socially privileged white theorists whose privileged position actively shapes the ways in which this discipline is constructed, reproduced, taught/studied and practiced (2008, 53–54). He goes on to claim that the establishment of particular historical experiences and cultural values of privileged members of the American and Western European scholar community as an epistemic norm for the rest of the world is not a matter of harmless "scholasticism". Dunn's claims have a twofold impact on the field of epistemology: 1) revealing the power of privileged scholars to define parameters of what is normal in the empirical world of IR, and 2) exposing their inability to construct difference (Dunn 2008, 55). He warns that the theoretical position on difference interpreted as a complete absence of common characteristics opens all too easily the possibility of conquest and elimination of Others from the face of the Earth. These insights are particularly important for the reflectivist researcher of warfare looking at how it has changed in the twenty-first century, yet still seeking to avoid the neoliberal ideological sediments regarding democratic peace gifted by the U.S. and its allies to rogue/outlaw states and uncooperative political regimes.

In the second case, the epistemological position of the researcher will be additionally directed at lived experience of victimised or marginalised groups in war, above all soldiers and civil populations (the elderly, women, children, but also wounded and disabled veterans). We have here an epistemological perspective directly or indirectly tied to the outcomes of decisions of the political and military leaders, which indicates difference, sometimes even opposition to the empirical and narrative reality of war. It would appear that the greatest obstacle to researching warfare comes from the lack of recognition of the complex interaction between individual lived experience and the socially accepted narrative that filters that experience through collective moral norms and notions of heroism. Individual lived experience – whether of a soldier or civilian – gets absorbed into collective memory not as factual presentation of war events, but to fit social norms. Elshtain (1987) is right when remind researchers that they must pay particular attention to the experiences excluded from collective memory or are simply marginalised in narratives. Standpoint epistemology is at pain to point out the danger in the disciplinary mainstreams tendency to reject empirical data from discursively mediated lived experience of marginalised groups in war, with the explanation that hermeneutic, narrative, dialogic and contextual forms of knowledge are inherently inferior, due to their supposed particularity that disqualifies them from abstraction or scientific synthesis (Hansen 2010, 22).

The epistemological turn towards researching phenomena and processes on the micro level – instead on the macro level (actions by states and their institutions) typical for the disciplinary mainstream – also allows bringing together quantitative and secondary sources of information with qualitative and primary sources. This avoids the tendency of mainstream researchers to analyse a "world without people", that is, of abstract and bodiless political subjects. In her book *Bananas, Beaches and Base*, Cynthia Enloe (1990) advances the thesis that the international is personal and the personal is international: social relations cannot be divided into the arbitrary binaries of politics (state, world events) and non-politics (intimate relations, the home, family). Rather, both planes are cornerstones of the production of knowledge about the international arena, including war. Taking the individual as the relevant unit of analysis, the reflectivist approach in feminist epistemology brings the research to the level of the home and human body, in an effort to include knowledge of how the war directly impacts the lived experience far behind the front lines. Such a perspective allows for the complex phenomenology of warfare to be revealed through personal interpretation within the political and social meanings of the body and how these meanings manifest in the international arena. Feminist epistemology examines the body as plural, and historically and culturally mediated. Thus, the concept and politics of the body are important analytic tools for the reflectivist perspective on war as a lived, individual experience.

In decent societies, where democratic legitimation of war and effective protection for human rights are considered universal standards (Margalit 1996), the epistemic principles that allow the production of knowledge about how the conduct of war in general and military operations in particular impact the quality of civic life, must be taken into account if there is to be a comprehensive scientific explanation of warfare in the twenty-first century.[1] This ensures that marginal populations – those most economically and socially disenfranchised – do not remain rather invisible to the epistemic perspective of the privileged. It also opens the path to those non-privileged members of society to present their lived experience, and indirectly acquire social legitimacy and affirmation through inclusion into the body of scientific knowledge.

Pursuing questions of what we can know about war and how this knowledge can be gained, the reflectivist epistemic position emerging from feminism, endeavours to encompass previously invisible aspects of war by formulating innovative research questions (entirely left out of traditional positivist epistemology, considering them irrelevant to the study of IR). The reflectivist epistemological viewpoint is in part dedicated to ways of acquiring knowledge about politics of systematic and/or mass rape as a war strategy; it is also evidence in favour of the validity of the epistemic concept of embodiment in the study of warfare. Reflectivists claim that sexualised aggression is not a deterministic phenomenon, but structured, repeatedly reinforced and functional social behaviour. As such, it can hardly be considered incidental to the overall political plan (see Kirby 2012). The politics of rape rests on the fact that women and their bodies – seen above all through their biological, social, and cultural role of ensuring new soldiers who will protect the nation from decay and destruction – have a strong symbolic meaning within an ethnic community or state (see Shepherd 2007; Alison 2007; Sjoberg & Peet 2011; Aroussi 2011; Davies & Teitt 2012). Thus, in times of war, the female body itself becomes a front line and is exposed to above all sexualised victimisation as

1) Avishai Margalit describes a decent society one whose institutions do not humiliate its citizens (Margalit 1996, 10–11).

a military strategy. Rape of men is another form of domination, a means to strip the victim of masculinity and ascribe female characteristics by turning them into a sexual object, indirectly humiliating the ethnicity or nation to which the victim belongs (Alison 2007, 81). From this epistemic standpoint, particular attention is paid to ways of recognition and comprehension of forms of not reporting rape through trauma analysis, local prejudice, social stigma, fear of retribution, and means of gathering information for the purposes of official government reports (Davies & True 2017; Mackenzie 2010).

A second example of an innovative reflectivist approach to epistemology emerging from feminism is finding optimal ways of obtaining insight into the concealed process of masculinisation of women as professional soldiers, and how their participation in military operations impacts perceptions of traditional gender roles. There is a contribution to be made to the study of war in the early twenty-first century by revealing a sort of ontological split of women as combatants (King 2016; Parashar 2009; Kay Cohen 2013). On the one hand, women's contribution to military operations is diminished or denied; on the other, their often greater aggressiveness in battle – conditioned by the desire to prove that they are not the "weaker sex", thus earning greater social recognition by patriarchal standards – is abused for the reproduction of traditional gender power dynamics in labelling them as biologically deviant "specimens". As a new structural characteristic of postmodern warfare, women's active role deserves greater attention from researchers, and not to be merely considered emulation of masculine forms of aggression. Women also appear more and more as perpetrators of war crimes (Titunik 2009; Brown 2014). These are aspects of late modern warfare resulting from profound social changes that also impact the human factor in military organisation. Positivist scholars of IR, however, either do not notice or do not consider these relevant indicators of sustainable projection of military power.

Given that all kinds of official data – quantitative data in the form of statistics, reports on battlefield events – are biased, subject to political manipulation and obscure real power dynamics, reflectivist epistemology considers additional/alternative ways of acquiring knowledge about warfare: chief among them are narratives and texts, interviews, case studies, hermeneutics, and a historical approach (see Ackerly & True 2008). In line with the position that scientific knowledge is situated knowledge, reflectivist epistemology allows studied subjects to participate in the shaping of research questions, thus contributing to the project results being applicable for the good of the community or the various groups, that is, social stakeholders. The researcher is even expected to forego the privilege bestowed by academic authority, so that they may better listen to interlocutors and be aware of their positionality. The ultimate purpose of insisting on acquiring situated knowledge is comprehension of ways the research output can be blended with political practice of empowering non-privileged population groups, those who usually bear the brunt of wartime destruction.

CONCLUSION

For centuries, epistemology has encountered researchers with two fundamental questions: what can we know and how do we know it? When it comes to scientifically valid knowledge regarding social phenomena and processes, these questions are not in the least "scholastic" or pretentious, as they imply an additional question: how does our understanding of the world impact our understanding of knowledge. For the research of international relations, in particular war as an eternal research question, it is not in the least inconsequential to first seek the answer to what constitutes a valid research question within the discipline in the first place, and then what would be the gravity of the answer to such question. In that sense, also presenting itself is the question how the personal standpoint of the researcher on the potential for transformation of IR reality then impacts the conduct of research. In this article I have endeavoured to analyse the epistemological standpoints researchers take in specific studies of the phenomenon of war, in order to show that reflectivist approach to epistemology in the discipline of IR can indeed clear up some weaknesses of the mainstream positivist cannon that insists on an exclusively system-centric and state-centric nature of the reality of international relations.

The positivist canon of the disciplinary mainstream does not recognise the ontological transformation of the military profession and "corrosion" of the civic duty of participation in war, two processes that have nearly imperceptibly unfolded in parallel over the last three decades. Since war is considered the sovereign expression of the will of the state (the leading actor in international arena), mainstream research does not recognise the perspective of the individual soldier or civil victim as epistemologically relevant – with the exception of high-ranking individuals, that is, leading actors in foreign policy and military decisions. Proponents of the realist school in IR theory abstract free will and the role of the commoner in executing large, state projects such as war, which carry risks and demand real sacrifices; yet, this also seems to discount the significance of the will of the people in success in war (as a foreign policy tool). In my view, this is an epistemologically privileged analytic model of a rational, disembodied human, abstracted from the social and political context in which she/he lives.

By deploying standpoint epistemology, Enloe's thesis of the international being personal, and the concept of human embodiment, reflectivism in epistemology offers an alternative path in the search for answers regarding how we learn about war as an essential pattern of the state behaviour in international relations. The choice of epistemological position strongly impacts the results of research study, as well as the political utility of these results. It is therefore no surprise that epistemology is itself a field of conflicting views and tensions. Reflectivist epistemological viewpoint allows us to unmask the various differences in scientific explanations of warfare issuing from privileged positions: whether they come from narrow circles of power or have an ideological and vested interest in justifying a specific military undertaking. Moreover, reflectivism can contribute to opening new and reconceptualising old scientific problems in the domain of war, as well as envisioning novel explanatory models, pointing to obscured facts that call dominant theories into question – in general, the advancement of research methods and techniques.

The greatest potential weakness of reflectivist approach to epistemology of IR lies in the danger of potentially distancing the researcher from strict epistemological verification of the scientific nature of new knowledge. There is a risk of turning situated knowledge into a self-reflexive research approach due to potential emotional overload for the researcher. Oftentimes, this happens because of the insistence of standpoint epistemology on a relationship of closeness and trust with the subjects of research study. Still, the role of emotions in research directed at people and their lives cannot be all too easily discarded. Developing the capacity for reflexivity as testimony – and not reflexivity as unsympathetic voyeurism – can provide additional value to the study of the reality of international relations. The researcher's empathy can contribute to the body of knowledge an aspect of war invisible to the positivist mainstream. It can thus create a "critical moment" – in both academic and public discourse – from which to initiate counter-hegemonic practices that would prevent further marginalisation of those disenfranchised by war.

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CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES REGARDING THE EXTENSION OF THE “NEW START” TREATY: CAN THE USA AND RUSSIA PRESERVE EXISTING STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL?[**]

Abstract

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on measures for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (“New START”) is the last pillar of the arms control regime on which the end of the Cold War and the new world order rested. Its expiration on 5 February 2021 is a top security challenge and indicates a possible new strategic arms race. However, can the United States and Russia still preserve the existing strategic arms control by extending the Treaty for another five years? What are the prospects, the opportunities and obstacles for this extension? What are the most pressing issues USA and Russia face with in order to preserve strategic arms control and are they willing to do so? In order to answer to these research questions author analyses several key issues that are of paramount importance for extension of the New START: nuclear modernization processes, invention of new weapons and emergence of new warfare domains; transparency and verification and broader confidence building

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measures; missile defence and prompt global strike; tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia; general US-Russia relations which include question of democratic capacity; and broader influence of this Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation regime. By using content and discourse analysis author concludes that, although it is obvious that the extension of the New START would be primarily in favour of Russia and that the USA has not much to gain, the character of strategic stability in the Third Nuclear Age gives reasons to believe that the New START will be extended for another five years.

Keywords: strategic stability, New START Treaty, arms control, strategic arms, non-proliferation, international security

STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE THIRD NUCLEAR AGE

Today's world order is characterised by the crisis of its main principles based on liberal paradigm, international institutions and multilateralism in general, including strategic stability and arms control regime. If we apply analogy with Thomas Kuhn's observations on resolving the paradigm crisis and scientific revolutions, crises of contemporary world order can be resolved in one of the three ways: by resolving the crisis while maintaining the same order, by transformation of the order or reform, or by revolution, which is a complete change of order (Кун 1974). Transferred to our topic, question that arises is: Will the strategic arms control survive in present form, be transformed in the way to preserve some of the old characteristic and include new, or completely changed with some new form of strategic stability and arms control that is no longer bilateral in nature?

The concept of strategic stability evolved into one of the pillars of the Cold War, but backslid with its end. The concept was reformed after the emergence of new security threats and, generally, less attention paid to the nuclear weapons in national security and defence strategies of the United States and Russia at the beginning of 1990s. However, with the renewed confrontation of the two powers, beginning of modernization of their nuclear arsenals, adoption of nuclear strategies where nuclear triads occupies significant place and nuclear policies that lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts, the Cold War concept of strategic stability revived.

According to these changes of the concept of strategic stability some authors define separate epochs. For example, "Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020" distinguishes three different periods in this regard: the First, Second and Third Nuclear Age. First Nuclear Age covers the period from 1945, when the first atomic bomb was used, until 1991, when the United States conducted the last test of nuclear bomb. The Second Nuclear Age began in 1992 when major threats became asymmetric in the form of nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and lasts until 2018, when China and Russia as nuclear states has again become the main threat to the United States. The "return of great power competition" and the revival of American nuclear weapons production is considered the Third Nuclear Age (Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 9).

The instruments of strategic stability evolved through the Cold War in the way to include not only deterrence, but also international treaties and specific relations among two superpowers and the rest (parity/disparity element). Gerson (Gerson 2013, 5) describes that "the threat of surprise attack was the catalyst to the line of thinking that ultimately led to the concept of strategic stability." First, the primary concern was to survive the first strike and be able to retaliate, which led to the development of concept of deterrence. The so-called Killian Report[1] published in 1955, for example, did not provide solution for the problem of vulnerability of US nuclear forces or a surprise attack through the international treaty, but only through unilateral measures that USA should conduct in order to strengthen its defences and deterrence. This included planning of pre-emptive nuclear attack, strengthening early warning system and reducing the vulnerability of nuclear forces (18). However, the President Eisenhower proposed an agreement with the Soviet Union almost immediately after this Report, in mid-1955, to allow the facilities to be photographed (Treaty on Open Skies was signed in 1992)[2] and supported mutual assurances

1) Named after Dr. James Killian, the President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and a chief science advisor to Eisenhower.

2) Treaty on Open Skies allows state parties to conduct unarmed aerial surveillance flights over the entire territory of its participants and collect data (video, photogra-

that neither side would conduct the first nuclear strike (19). Two years after the Killian Report, in 1957, the Guitar Report[3] called for an agreement with the Soviets on limiting nuclear weapons and an agreement on arms control (21). At that moment, the notion of strategic stability, understood as taking measures to avoid the nuclear danger, including nuclear war between two superpowers, began to include, in addition to deterrence, the concept of arms control through international treaties.

Before any agreement among the two powers could be reached, it was necessary to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is why The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - NPT (1968) had to be signed first, and only then all other strategic arms control agreements were negotiated. Two superpowers ensured that they achieved a central place in nuclear weapons possession with significant disparity with others. This moment is also captured by Kroenig (Kroenig 2019, 92-93) who writes that the First nuclear age had two very different models of strategic stability - first was the “well-known model between the United States and the Soviet Union of mutual vulnerability, secure second-strike capabilities, and rough parity in capabilities” and a second model which is one of large asymmetries of the USA and USSR arsenals compared to other nuclear states.

After NPT entered into force, the international strategic arms control regime was formed on the basis of several treaties - the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - ABM (1972), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty - INF (1987), Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty - CFE (1990) and finally the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty - START (1991). This international regime set the stage for the end of the Cold War and beginning of the Second

phy) of military facilities, activities and forces in order to ensure that neither side is preparing for the attack (primary concern of USA and USSR in the moment when this idea was proposed by the President Eisenhower was how to avoid first nuclear strike). Collected data by observation flight is available to all state parties. USA announced withdrawal from the Treaty in May 2020 due to the alleged Russian violations and non-compliance and contrary to the European allies support of the Treaty. Russia is also considering the withdrawal since the NATO members, parties of the Treaty, can share imagery with USA which would no longer be part of the Treaty.

3) Named after H. Rowen Gaither, first chairman of the Gaither committee that was tasked by the President Eisenhower to create strategy of US response to possible first nuclear strike.

Nuclear Age, where the USA and Russia were no longer perceived as enemies. Main security challenges became general instability and asymmetric threats which required the transformation or even complete change of the very concept of strategic stability in order to include not only the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia, but also other actors, common threats, new types of weapons and warfare domains. Trenin, for example, states that the United States and Russia defined strategic stability in 1990 as the absence of incentives for any country to carry out its first nuclear strike, but that this has now changed due to changes in the geopolitical, technological and psychological environment, which demanded the extension of the concept of strategic stability (Trenin 2019). In 2016, International Security Advisory Board (International Security Advisory Board 2016, 9) proposed that the term "strategic stability" should be replaced with the phrase or "the organizing principle": "agreed characteristics and practices of states possessing nuclear weapons so as to reduce the risks of war, especially war with a risk of escalation to the potential use of nuclear weapons."

However, this change did not happen primarly because the new ballistic missile threats of "rough nations", enlargement of NATO, the crisis in the post-Soviet space, and the rise of China, brought the new confrontation of great powers. With this new strategic environment, that can be called the Third Nuclear Age the term "strategic stability" survived and even strengthened. Rakesh Sood (Sood 2019, 14) for example describes the difference between three ages in the following way: "If Cold War and global annihilation defined the First Nuclear Age and heightened proliferation risks and global terrorism defined the post-Cold War Second Nuclear Age, then in present times, political confrontation among major powers has made a comeback, even as terrorist groups keep up the pressure in seeking access to WMD technologies." In this way the concept of strategic stability in the Third Nuclear Age is a combination of the renewed USA-Russia competition supplemented with the post-Cold War meaning that includes new actors, such as rising China, and asymmetric threats such as global terrorism. This means that the strategic arms control in the Third Nuclear Age will not stay the same nor completely replaced but transformed or reformed by extension.

Deterrence, strategic arms control and parity/disparity principle are still the main elements for preserving strategic stability. Without the "effective functioning of managing mechanisms - mechanisms for cooperation and making agreements between key actors on acceptable behaviour and ways of resolving conflicts" there is no stability of the world order (Костић 2019, 79-80). Thus, arms control agreements are one of the three essential parts of strategic stability and without them stability is no longer possible. Today, the crisis of multilateralism is a crisis of the basic pillars on which the Cold War ended causing the instability of liberal and rule-based world order. The demise of the ABMT, INFT, the Open Skies Agreement and CFE Treaty makes the New START Treaty even more important. Its extension or termination represents a turning point in relations between the two largest nuclear powers and has great impact on other states and general proliferation matter. Without this formal international legal framework, the world will definitely stay without consensual control of nuclear weapons, both in terms of number and in terms of one type of weapon that is controlled.

There are numerous debates about the future of the New START, and the most important ones are taking place within the United States and Russia, while other nuclear powers are inclined to support its extension for another five years on the existing bilateral basis. In 2017 the US President Donald Trump called the New START a "bad deal" and conditioned its extension with including China in strategic arms negotiations (Hitchens 2019). However, this position was softened in the middle of 2020 when Trump said that bilateral structure of strategic arms control should be preserved by taking the US-Ruissa common position and making the framework which would later include China (The White House 2020). On the other side, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed unconditional support for the extension of the New START (Arms Control Association 2020), although from the very beginning and entry into force of the Treaty, Russia threatened to leave it primarily because of the deployment of the US national missile defence in Europe. In the next paragraphs of the paper we will examine what are the prospects, the opportunities and obstacles for this extension and what are the most pressing issues for the USA and Russia regarding the extension of the New START Treaty.

CONTENTIOUS ISSUES RELATED TO THE EXTENSION OF THE “NEW START” TREATY

Contentious issues relevant to the extension of the New START Treaty in the USA and Russia are the modernization of their nuclear forces and the inclusion of new weapons and warfare domains; issues of transparency and verification; missile defence and prompt global strike; general US-Russian relations and the issue of democratic capacity; and the impact on the general non-proliferation regime. According to each of this criteria we will try to draw a conclusion on the impact it has to the extension of the New START Treaty.

The process of modernization of nuclear weapons of the USA and Russia, new weapons and the warfare domains

As for the issue of modernization, in the United States it has so far been inextricably linked to the support to the arms control agreements. Proponents of the New START Treaty emphasize the importance of the extension of the Treaty for the modernization of the United States nuclear weapons and defence in general in order to gain wide support of both Republicans and Democrats. Regarding the possible extension of the New START, one of the arguments of the supporters of the extension is that by not extending the Treaty it would be the first time that nuclear modernization in US is conducted in the absence of arms control agreement, which undermines relations with Russia and gives a bad signal to non-nuclear weapon states. Being the last to embark on the process of modernization of nuclear arsenal United States had an insight into others processes of defence modernization. It is estimated, for example, that by the beginning of 2020, Russia has recapitalized about 76% of the strategic nuclear forces (Richard 2020).

One of the greatest influences on the US nuclear modernization programme has had alleged Russian nuclear doctrine after the conflict in Ukraine, the so called “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine. As the USA interprets it, by adopting this doctrine Russia lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts (Nuclear Posture Review 2018, 30). Another significant influence was made by the invention of new Russian strategic weapons - *Avangard, Sarmat, Tsirkon, Poseidon, Burevestnik, Kinzhal, Barguzin* and *Rubezh* (Congressional Research Service 2020, 20-27). New Russian doctrine and capabilities has led Trump administration not only to adopt plans for modernization of the existing nuclear arsenal, but also to pursue new possibilities and capabilities, primarily low-yield nuclear weapons. In the process of modernization, the US will, also, replace *Ohio* class submarines with a new *Columbia* class by 2031, the existing *Minuteman III* ground based weapon system with a new *Ground Based Strategic Deterrent* system starting in 2028, the new *B-21 Raider* bomber will be introduced and *B61-12* bombs, as well as long-range weapon (*Long-Range Stand Off Weapon*). Infrastructure, facilities, and the command, control and communication system (NC3) will be improved, where the use of artificial intelligence is an issue of special importance. By 2024, it is estimated that the cost of nuclear weapons modernization will be about 7% of the total defence budget, and the peak will be reached in the late 2020s and early 2030s, when the largest allocations for the modernization of nuclear weapons are expected (Reif, Bugos 2020a)[4].

Modernization processes in Russia and the United States have raised two important questions – one regarding the new types of weapons and warfare domains and other on nuclear testing. Regarding new types of weapons, Article 5 of the Treaty allows the modernization, with the new types of armament and their inclusion under the Treaty being discussed at the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Russia's new long-range nuclear systems, which are likely to be deployed by 2026, the *Avangard* hypersonic missile and the *Sarmat* heavy ICBM are included under the restrictions of the New START. The *Avangarde* has already been shown to the US inspectors as part of the verification process of the New START, and the same will be done with *Sarmat* when it is deployed (Vaddi 2019). As for the new warfare domains, during the modernization process,

4) In the period between 2001 and 2017, no more than 4% of the budget of the US Department of Defense was allocated for the nuclear arsenal (Reif, Sanders-Zakre 2019, 4). Between fiscal years 2018 and 2028, the United States is projected to spend about $ 500 billion on maintaining and replacing nuclear forces, which is an increase of about 23% over Obama's planned budget for the same purpose (Reif, Bugos 2020b).

both sides have increasingly talked about the importance of air and space forces. Air and space forces, as a separate branch of Russian Armed Forces, were established on 1 August 2015 (Russian Aerospace Forces or VKS), while the separate Space Command in the United States was re-established after 17 years on 29 August 2019. According to Professor Milinović this new emphasises on space domain and space weapons could make nuclear triad a "nuclear quartet", which could also lead to armaments revolution (Novosti 2020). In July 2020, the United States accused Russia of testing a device, a "new space weapon" that could be used against other satellites in orbit (RTS 2020). On the other side, the United States is currently working on sensors that would be installed in space that could monitor ballistic and hypersonic missiles (hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor (HBTSS)) (H.R. 6395 2020, 18-19). General John Raymond (Raymond 2020) commander of the United States Space Command, describes the importance of space domain for the USA, in the following way: "We are the best in the world in space today…We can no longer consider our superiority in space as a given, if deterrence fails we must be prepared to fight for superiority in space" referring to the China's and Russia's building-up and modernization of their space capabilities. Regarding nuclear testing, the United States has accused Russia of testing low-yield nuclear weapons, which is, according to the USA, violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that Russia ratified, but Russia and the CTBT deny this (BBC 2019). Also, some in the United States during the George W. Bush presidency believed that the refusal to modernize US nuclear weapons necessarily requires a return to underground testing of existing arsenals in order to prove its credibility (Grossman 2008). Trump's mention of the possibility of nuclear testing (Hudson, Sonne 2020) is, thus, directed at those in the United States who oppose the modernization of nuclear weapons since the alternative could be renewed nuclear testing.

Regarding the extension of the New START, modernization process of nuclear forces in the USA have two consequences. First, having in mind the importance of the balance between modernization programmes and arms control agreements in the USA administration it is highly likely that the New START treaty could be extended. But, on the other hand, if the USA wants to develop some new weapons, it does not want to include under any provision, limitations or verification by Russia, then it will not go for the extension. In this case, unlike the Russian modernization program which has been conducted under the conditions of the New START Treaty, the United States may conduct its own modernization without strategic arms control agreement. That will leave Russia without possibility to inspect or verify new US system and capabilities and further contribute to the growth of tensions, lack of confidence, and new arms race.

Transparency and verification

Transparency, in terms of policies (intentions) and resources (capabilities), is an essential part of arms control agreement and important confidence building measure. Conducting nuclear or military build-up in an opaque manner is usually seen as security threat especially by one's neighbours, which is why the USA at first conditioned the extension of the New START by involving China into the negotiations. Without inclusion of China in the strategic and nuclear arms control negotiations it is no longer possible to conduct further bilateral reductions of strategic offensive arms of the USA and Russia, since it would disrupt the parity/disparity element of strategic stability. Having in mind the importance of transparency, the United States has envisaged in the draft defence budget for 2021 (H.R. 6395 2020, 4)[5] the creation of a ,, federally funded research and development center to produce an open source analysis of foreign nuclear programs, to be made available on the internet." The research refers specifically to China, North Korea and Russia respectively, and the Research Centre itself would have its own website where all data would be publicly available. As Republican Congressman Michael Turner (Turner 2020) explained, these centre and research are needed in order to uncover and make public data on other states, since the data on US forces are publicly available, and to enable a national and global debate on nuclear weapons issues.

Regarding verification, according to the New START Treaty, it comprises the creation of a comprehensive database, notifications,

5) More details on what would be contained in such research can be found on the Summary of the FY21 National Defense Authorization Bill, 2020, pp. 13-14.

unique identifying numbers for all delivery vehicles (deployed and non-deployed delivery systems) and on-site inspections. On-site inspections is one of the most important reasons for concluding the Treaty, and still are the main argument of the proponents of the extension of the Treaty. Without it, the argument goes, it would be very difficult to determine the real situation on the ground, to have an insight into the deployment of forces and the doctrine of the use of nuclear weapons of both sides. This would then lead to the need to strengthen "national technical means", that is, intelligence means and capacities in order to determine what could be more easily determined through the implementation of the Treaty. The US Army is the greater proponent of this line of thinking which is why it mostly support the extension of the New START Treaty.

The criticism of the extension of the Treaty refers to the new way of counting warheads where heavy bombers count as one warhead, as well as to the exclusion of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs since the doubt occurred whether they would, if any of the Treaty parties develop it again, fall under the limitations of the Treaty (Treaty Doc. 111–5 2010, 86). The negotiators explained that if these systems reappear, since at the moment of negotiation of the New START neither side had it, they would fall under the regime provided by the Treaty (97-98). This issue has gained new importance with the claims that Russia has again developed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs called *Barguzin* (Kristensen, Korda 2019, 73). Other critics of the New START in the USA included the abolition of the permanent US observation mission at Votkinsk, a facility where Russia produces ICBMs (*Yars, Topol M, Iskander* and *Bulava*) (Treaty Doc. 111–5 2010, 98). This is due to the fact that a similar Russian mission previously ceased to exist in the United States due to the termination of production of ICBMs in Utah. Instead, notifications are scheduled within 48 hours before any new weapon leaves Votkinsk.

Criticism also existed regarding telemetry since it was excluded from the New START, but negotiators answered that this happened because the strength of weapons was no longer measured under the new Treaty and there was no limit to the strength of warheads. Still, the notifications of up to five ballistic missile launches a year remained. There is also controversy over whether the New START really reduces warheads by one-third compared to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) since strategic bombers count as one warhead no matter how many warheads they actually carry. One of the criticisms was also that Russia had already had fewer launchers than the Treaty limit and, unlike the USA, it had no additional security obligations towards more than 30 allies (99). Here, however, it is forgotten that Russia also created a system of collective defence, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and needs to prove credibility in defending its allies.[6]

Today, a special question arises about how to perform verification in space as well as in cyberspace domains. This is why the new round of negotiations is needed in order to improve strategic arms control. Still, preservation of existing verification measures on bilateral level for another five years is one of the strongest argument for the New START extension.

Missile defence and prompt global strike

The issue of missile defence has so far caused a lot of attention and problems on both sides, and forced them to give unilateral statements during the signing of the Treaty in 2010. On the Russian insistence, Preamble of the Treaty contains a special relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms, which some in the United States, mostly members of the Republican Party, see as a limitation on the possibility of deploying US national missile defence. Actually, the only thing that is prohibited by the Treaty is the conversion of strategic offensive arms launchers into missile interceptor launchers and vice versa, and the reason for introducing that provision is that the United States had already converted five such launchers in Vandenberg for missile defence in 2002. However, representatives of their armed forces, as well as the then Minister of Defence Robert Gates, stated that this is

6) The agreement on collective security around which the CSTO was formed contains a provision on collective defence, which is called into question, for example, in the event of a conflict that some members would have, such as the current one between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia, as a member of the CSTO, enjoys this protection, while Turkey, which does not have its own nuclear weapons, supports Azerbaijan. Russia and Armenia also have an agreement according to which Russia guarantees Armenian territorial integrity and supply it with modern military equipment.

no longer the US plan, since the conversion is very expensive and inefficient, although faster, while building a new missile defence launchers is cheaper then converting existing ones (108). This is especially important issue because converted launchers are then exempted from the limitations provided by the New START Treaty. Since 2028, however, Russia is accusing United States for violation of this provision by calling into question irreversibility of the conversion of launchers on some submarines and heavy bombers (Trevithick 2019).

The deployment of the USA/NATO missile defence is also connected with Russia's constant demands that NATO's expansion to the East must not include the expansion of NATO's military infrastructure to the territory of the new eastern member states, such as Poland and Romania, near the Russian borders, as well as the deployment of a significant number of foreign troops on the territories of these countries. Because of these Russian fears, the representatives of the USA constantly repeated that the missile defence system in Europe is not directed against Russia's strategic offensive capabilities, but aims at preventing limited missile attacks by Iran or North Korea. Also, they stress that this missile defence system cannot be effective against Russian massive attack, but only against a limited-range attack (short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, but also a smaller number of long-range ballistic missiles). Also, US experts state that even if the fourth phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach - EPAA is deployed it cannot endanger Russian deterrence because the interceptors are small and slower than the Russian intercontinental missiles, as well as that they cannot reach Russian silos with nuclear weapons. However, the first 10 interceptors that were deployed in Poland were 12 times larger than the interceptors later installed (108). Besides, during the public hearing on the ratification of the New START Senator John F. Kerry said: "This treaty does not, and will not, constrain missile defence in any meaningful way. The United States will continue to develop and deploy defences, as we choose to, against possible attack from states like North Korea and Iran, and, were we to choose to, even against the potential of an attack from Russia or some other country." (392). Still, this should be seen in light of the need for Obama's administration to assure Republicans that national missile defence will not be constrained in any way, and to gain support and ratification by the end of 2010 (Collina 2011). On the other hand, these assurances on non-limitation of US missile defence gave Russia a special incentive to develop new types of weapons that would be able to bypass or break through this missile defence. Russia has threatened numerous countermeasures if the United States continues to deploy its national missile defence - from withdrawing from the Treaty, through the termination of cooperation on the issues of Iran and Afghanistan, to a new arms race. Taking these warnings seriously President Obama gave up deploying the last phase of the EPAA in 2013, which today undermines the support of the members of the Republican Party for the extension of the Treaty. Having in mind that Russia has developed new types of weapons that it claims can pass through the US/NATO missile defence or bypass it, the US missile defence is no longer an obstacle for Russia to extend the validity of the Treaty.

In addition to the connection between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons that the Preamble of the New START contains, there is also a connection between a prompt global strike and strategic stability. It states that the parties are aware of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability (New START 2010, 2). The connection also worried some Republican congressmen in the USA and was significant point of contention due to the concern that it would mean limiting the planned Prompt Global Strike system. However, conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs fall under the New START regime, which raises the specific issue of appropriate combination of nuclear and conventionally armed ICBMs (if a prompt global strike is based on them) in order to be within the Treaty limits. This is another reason why further reduction of strategic weapons would be problematic, especially for the USA, but there are possibilities that this limitation can be overcome by building a completely new system for prompt global strike that would not be based on ballistic missiles and use launchers that fall under the New START limits.

US-Russia relationship and the issue of democratic capacity

Improvement of relations between the USA and Russia should enable transparency, predictability and stability, and thus greater security for both sides leading to the extension of the Treaty. However, there are those who believe that the mere existence of the Treaty represents a proof not of good US-Russia relations but continuation of the Cold War practice. Instead, two parties should conclude multilateral treaty which includes cooperation against common threats. Proponents of the preserving bilateral character of the strategic arms control argument that the USA and Russia still possess more than 90% of all nuclear weapons, which is why the continuation of the Treaty on the bilateral basis is still relevant today not only for these two countries, but for the whole international community. Only by continuation of the New START Treaty or agreement on some other new treaty or package of treaties between the USA and Russia the concept of strategic stability can be widened to include new actors.

Another obstacle to the continued validity of the New START Treaty, which is increasingly mentioned in relation to Russia and China, is the lack of their democratic capacity. According to Robert Joseph, the democratic changes in Russia in the 1990s were supposed to enable the establishment of a relationship based on cooperation in combating common threats and enemies such as nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation management, and not to serve Russia to preserve its superpower status and parity with the United States, making nuclear weapons the basic currency of their relationship (Treaty Doc. 111–5 2010, 358). Eric S. Edelman (362) states that the Clinton's, G.W. Bush's and Obama's administrations based their policies on the hope and expectation that a democratizing Russia would become a "normal country", "an active proponent of a new and stable world order, a partner with the United States in NATO in seeking peace and stability, and a Europe whole and free, and also in resolving conflicts and dangers in Southwest Asia, Northeast Asia, and elsewhere."[7] The very existence of such a Treaty, Edelman states, is a relic of the past and an indicator of the decline and not the progress of relationship with Russia, because the United States does not have such agreements with "normal" countries such as France or Great Britain (366). However, this same author states that in the conditions of the growing authoritarianism of Russia and the conflicts in its

7) Edelman's prepared statement submitted for the Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate states "partner with the U.S. and NATO in seeking peace and stability" (Treaty Doc. 111–5 2010, 366).

neighbourhood, reaching such an agreement becomes “inevitable” (366). Also, for example, US delegation to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly (DiNanno 2019) declared: “For the first time in history, the international community confronts two large autocratic powers with global reach and ambition – armed with nuclear weapons. We can no longer ignore the reality that Russia and China are determined to undermine the liberal democratic order established in the wake of the Second World War and upon which the United Nations was founded…The key and growing difference among them is between democratically-oriented states who are accountable to their publics and undemocratic regimes focused on challenging the existing rules-based order.” Growing accusations of Russia for not compliance with the treaties on arms control served Trump’s administration to withdraw from several of them. Responding to it Russia also made a long list of US violation of arms control agreements (MID 2018), but did not acted upon them as US did and still offers the possibility of extending the only one remaining – the New START. But, in light of these US attitudes, it is unlikely that the New START Treaty will be extended.

Tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia

The fact that the New START Treaty does not cover Russian tactical weapons is one of the main objections in the USA to its extension. This objection was especially highlighted by the US allies in Europe and East Asia after the crisis in Ukraine in 2014. Allegedly, on the occasion of the crisis in Ukraine, Russia adopted the doctrine “escalate to de-escalate”, which envisages lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, primarily tactical, in regional conflicts. Officially, as response the United States is developing a new option of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons for its submarines. However, any use of nuclear weapons, according to Russia, would lead to mass retaliation (Tass 2018).

Immediately after the ratification of the New START, the Obama administration announced the beginning of negotiations with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons in order to mitigate the large disparity. At a public hearing in Congress on the ratification of the New START, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reiterated allegations from the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, that, in addition to strategic offensive weapons, the United States will seek to include non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons in future negotiations, so that Russia increases transparency regarding its non-strategic nuclear capabilities in Europe and relocates these weapons as far as possible from NATO member territory (Treaty Doc. 111–5 2010, 123). Also, in November 2018, Member of Congress Liz Cheney and Senator Tom Cotton submitted a Bill entitled "Stop Russian Nuclear Aggression". This document (Cheney 2018:5-6) proposed prohibition of the allocation of funds for fiscal 2019 and the next fiscal year for the purpose of extending the implementation of the New START beyond 2021, unless the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that extending the New START Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States and the Russian Federation has agreed to include all covered Russian systems under the limits set by the New START Treaty and entered into an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles in a verifiable manner. However, this did not happen because Russia believes that previous to any discussion on Russian tactical nuclear weapons all American tactical weapons must be withdrawn from Europe on the basis of the national principle i.e. that each nuclear state should deploy its nuclear forces only on its territory, which was also the position of the former Soviet Union (Welt 2015, 11). The national principle is also contained in the New START Treaty regarding the deployment of strategic offensive arms.

One of the attempts to start solving this issue was the Russian proposal for multilateral moratorium on deployment of tactical missiles. In his letter of 18 September 2019, Russian President Putin expressed his commitment not to deploy medium-range and short-range surface-to-air missiles in Europe and other regions (Asia-Pacific) as long as the United States refrains from doing the same (Arms Control Association 2020). However, nor the United States or NATO accepted this proposal for a moratorium and Russia stated that it would consider any deployment of these missiles near its borders as strategic (Reif, Bugos 2020b). Other proposal, is the latest US proposal to freeze the whole nuclear arsenals of USA and Russia, including tactical nuclear weapons, as part of the negotiations on the extension of the New START, but this proposal is unacceptable for Russia, which proposes unconditional extension for five years (Defense One 2020).

Regarding the influence of the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe on the possibility of extension of the New START it should be noted that during the unification of Germany, the USSR supported the presence of the US troops in Europe as a guarantor of stability. Similarly, today's presence of the USA nuclear weapons in Europe could be seen as stabilizer since it removes incentives for some European countries or the EU to develop its own nuclear weapons. Still, whether the United States would use nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on a European ally and thus risk the escalation of the conflict to a possible mutually assured destruction, is a question that some Europeans fear. Today, the USA administration under the President Trump has more negative attitude towards Germany allegedly due to the insufficient allocation of funds for NATO and unbalanced burden sharing of costs for the security provided to the Germany (Euronews, 2018). But, essentially, the real cause is strengthening of relationship between Germany and Russia, especially on the issues of energy security and the North Stream 2. This accelerated the question of possible relocation of US troops, including nuclear weapons, from Germany closer to the Russian borders for example, in Poland, the Baltic states or Romania, which would definitively terminate all agreements between Russia and NATO on non-deployment of nuclear weapons further to the East. On the other side, nowadays, Russia is, also, accused for development and deployment of missile system, the 9M729, "which violates the INF Treaty, and poses significant risks to Euro-Atlantic security" (NATO 2019). If we apply analogy with the conclusion of the START Treaty, which was possible only after the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the extension of the New START Treaty would be possible only after the conclusion of agreement or some kind of political arrangements on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Consequences of the New START on the broader non-proliferation regime

Officially, the United States policy regarding nuclear weapons has always been guided by the principle of non-proliferation. This also characterized the period after the Cold War, when Washington treated the issue of nuclear weapons differently from the issue of the collapse of the Soviet Union. While it recognized the newly independent states of the former USSR, guided by the principle of self-determination, the USA insisted on centralization of nuclear weapons and command under the Russian control and helped nuclear weapons transfer from Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus to Russia. During that period, the parity of the two sides continued to be maintained, with very small nuclear forces of third countries and some degree of proliferation (India, Pakistan, for example). Under the pretext of having very small nuclear forces in relation to the two superpowers, China, the United Kingdom and France were never part of the negotiations on strategic arms control and limitation of nuclear forces. These states repeat the argument today. But the US Defence Intelligence claims that the China's nuclear arsenal will at least double in size over the next decade (FAS 2019). At Trump's insistence that China should become part of the negotiations on the extension of the New START Treaty, Russia stated that it will not influence China to come to the negotiating table, and if China is to be part of the strategic arms negotiations, France and the United Kingdom should be too (WSJ 2020). Still, some author states that these are not comparable examples since, unlike China, UK and France are not increasing their nuclear capabilities in a non-transparent way and by threatening their neighbours (Santoro 2020, 11).

As for the impact of the extension of the New START Treaty on the general non-proliferation regime established by the NPT, a lot of authors and officials believe that it is crucial for maintaining this regime. Further limitations and reductions of nuclear arms of two main possessors sets an example and prove their commitment to nuclear disarmament envisioned by the Article VI of the NPT. United States is also calling China to participate in the negotiations of nuclear arms control in accordance with Article VI of the NPT i.e. in a "good faith" as nuclear state recognised as such under the NPT (Heritage Foundation 2020).

Regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons there is an ongoing discussion on what has more negative impact on nuclear proliferation - failure to reach an agreement with Russia or that agreement on further reduction of nuclear weapons can be seen as sign of weakness and reduction of the United States security guaranties to its allies. More often mentioned concern is that reducing US nuclear arsenal further could, also, be an invitation for the US adversaries to attack them or "rush into parity". Opposite argument is that exactly the US withdrawal from the arms control agreements could have opposite effect and motivate other countries to develop weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons as self-defence measures against US aggression, especially in terms of internal regime changes (Valdai Club 2012). Even this criterion does not provide sufficient guarantees that the USA will finally accept to extend the New START Treaty.

CONCLUSION: CAN THE US AND RUSSIA PRESERVE STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL?

Although it is obvious from the analysis of the controversial issues regarding the extension of the New START Treaty that the extension of the Treaty would be primarily in favour of Russia, and that USA does not have much to gain, the character of strategic stability in the Third Nuclear Age, leads to the conclusion that there are reasons to believe that the New START Treaty will be extended for at least some period of time. The Third Nuclear Age is characterized by the crisis of multilateralism and the return of the confrontation of great powers, but also by the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that could fall into the hands of terrorists. Therefore, strategic stability in the Third Nuclear Age is best seen as combination of the Cold War and post-Cold War concept, with the US-Russia relationship still in the centre but complemented with new actors, weapons and warfare domains, at a time when both countries agree.

On initial negotiations on strategic stability and arms control between the United States and Russia in 2019 in Vienna and Geneva the representatives of two countries discussed prospects of arms control, space security and hypersonic weapons, as well as a possible extension of the New START through a more comprehensive agreement covering additional types of weapons and including China (Reif, Bugos 2020c). In January 2020, another round of the US-Russia strategic dialogue was held in Vienna, on the topics of nuclear stockpiles and strategy, the crisis and stability of the arms race, the role and future of arms control, including the importance of moving beyond a bilateral format (Reif, Bugos 2020d). During 2020, these talks continue through working groups on a bilateral basis, with the possible inclusion of China at some point after the United States and Russia reach a common position on the framework for future multilateralization of nuclear (strategic and/or tactical) arms control negotiations. Since the Obama administration, in which Joseph Biden served as vice president, negotiated the New START Treaty it is worth mentioning that in the event of his victory at the US presidential election at the end of 2020, the extension of the New START is more certain (Nagle, Donato 2019).

Finally, resolving some of the controversial issues we have written about in this paper remains crucial for the future of strategic arms control and even the broader concept of strategic stability. The Third Nuclear Age requires the inclusion of new actors, weapons and the domains of warfare in the negotiations on the control of strategic weapons, but in essence, it will still remain concentrated around the two main possessors of nuclear weapons, the USA and Russia. Further reduction of their strategic and nuclear arsenals would not be possible in the event of either horizontal or vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, because the US-Russia parity and large disparity with third nuclear states, along with deterrence and bilateral control of strategic weapons, remain the basis of strategic stability.

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NIKLAS LUHMANN'S SOCIAL SYSTEMS THEORY: THE ISSUE OF SUBSYSTEM AUTONOMY[***]

Abstract

Niklas Luhmann articulates the basic elements of his authentic theoretical position as criticism of, as he calls them, classical sociology or classical organisation theory. While within these orientations, (social) systems are mainly interpreted as centralised entities whose structures are stabilised by purpose determined at the top, Luhmann, in his general theory of social systems privileges internal differentiation in which subsystems autonomously define their purposes, making society more flexible and capable of responding to environmental challenges. In that sense, the main intention of this paper is the creation of cognitive interest for the notions of complexity and flexibility, i.e. for the issue of subsystem autonomy, as the important elements of Luhmann's general theory of social systems. Our premise is that the establishment of subsystem autonomy is not a matter of mere, a priori, theoretical and/or practical arbitrariness, nor does it mean an introduction into deconstruction of the system, but it represents a necessary

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step in the creation of successful responses of the social system to problems arising from the immense and dynamic complexity of its own environment. In other words, through the process of internal differentiation, by establishing subsystem autonomy, the social system increases its own complexity, i.e. ability to adjust to the environment. Thus, challenges arising from the environment are not transferred to the whole, but localised and processed in the appropriate, autonomous parts of the system. By so increasing its internal complexity, the system undeniably acquires the necessary flexibility, or capability for a faster and more efficient creation of alternative.

Keywords: social system, environment, complexity, flexibility, subsystem autonomy.

INTRODUCTION: SOCIOLOGY IN A THEORETICAL CRISIS

Seeing himself as the successor (but also critic) of the theoretical orientation in sociology most prominently represented by Talcott Parsons, Niklas Luhmann took on a heavy burden of building a general social systems theory. By his own admission, at the very beginnings of his career at the Faculty of Sociology of the Bielefeld University, he cited as his only project: social theory; project duration: 30 years; expenditures: none. There is no doubt that Luhmann estimated all the aspects of his ambitious lifetime project quite realistically: from his early university work in 1969 until his death in 1998, he focused exclusively on developing a comprehensive, general social systems theory, publishing 53 books and several hundred theoretical articles along the way. Capping this incredible production is Luhmann's *opus magnum* - the book *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (*translated to English as "Theory of Society"*)* was published in 1997, shortly before his death. (Bechmann, Stehr 2002).

Luhmann constituted the basic elements of his own theoretical position through a critique of classical sociology, in its extreme version of being primarily an empirical science on society. Without diminishing its contribution to the overall expansion of our knowledge about society by partial, specialised empirical research, Luhmann still contends that sociology as a distinct scientific discipline could not have been founded within this orientation[1]. Hence, already in the opening sentence of the *Foreword* to his 1984 book: *Social Systems: Fundamentals of General Theory*, he notes that "Sociology (...) is stuck in a theoretical crisis" (Luhmann 2001, 27). Such a general problematisation of the entire science on society refers mainly to the (majority) part of the sociological community that never actually overcame the issue of existence of a circular attitude to its own research subject. In other words, it is an epistemological paradox because the issue of circularity is immanent to any attempt to analyse or describe society, since any such attempt actually activates and changes social relations[2]. And insofar as research observes society, research is equally observed by society. Research becomes researched, observance observed. Any definition of the subject (society) implies that the defining as such – is one of the operations of that same subject (society). Attempts to overcome this epistemological paradox in classical sociology have relied mostly on the following premises: "that society consists of individuals and relations between them; that society is constituted by a consensus between individuals; that societies are territorially defined units; and thereby, that it is possible to observe societies, as groups of individuals situated in a particular territor, objectively from an outside point" (Lee 2000, 321).

1) There is no doubt that the specialised branching of modern sociology was a kind of symmetrical response to the dynamics and development of contemporary societies. Classical sociology was characterised by the «orientation towards internal units» (Poggi 1965). However, the consequence of this development is the manifest deficit of awareness and care for the overall theoretical rooting which distanced sociology from its initial ideal of being "a general theory of society".

2) Anthony Giddens called this situation «ride in a dragon's carriage», alluding to the impossibility of thorough knowledge of the social world: "The reason for this is the circularity of social knowledge, which primarily influences the social world, rather than the world of nature. In the circumstances of modernity, the social world can never be a stable environment, in the sense of introducing new knowledge about its character and functioning. New knowledge (notions, theories, discoveries) does not make the social world more transparent, but changes its nature, sending it in a new direction. This phenomenon fundamentally impacts the quality of modernity which we called the ride in a dragon's carriage and concerns both socalised nature and social institutions themselves" (Giddens 1998, 147).

However, it is these premises, in Luhmann's opinion, that actually prevent an adequate definition of society as a research subject. Since the theory of society involves an endless self-observation of society, an infinite fractally structured auto-referentiality, it was practically impossible to establish this "external", solid point from which objective observation would be possible, i.e., from which the constitution of a general theory would be possible. This suppression of the general theoretical interest is, in Luhmann's view, an evident symptom of the profound crisis of science on society, a clear indicator that sociologists, by opting for a segmented approach, actually abandoned the quest (except, of course, Parsons[3]) for a comprehensive, systemic theory of society.

By highlighting the need to overcome this crisis in sociology, Luhmann opts for the opposite position and approach to building a general theory of society that would, in its demand for universality, have to appear as its own subject, simultaneously having to address old sociology dilemmas, such as – the individual and/or society, structure and/or action, consensus and/or conflict, evolution and/or stasis. Of course, it is self-evident that such a supertheory would have to be far more complex than anything hitherto assumed about science and society.

3) Luhmann argues that "the only social theory currently in existence was elaborated by Talcott Parsons as a general theory of action systems. It may be put to a good use as codification of the classics' knowledge and as elaboration of the conceptual understanding of action by means of the contingency tables methodology"(Luhmann 2011, 21). Namely, as Milan Brdar (2009) reminds us in the Foreword to *Social Systems,* in the autumn of 1949, Parsons formed a team of associates within the Harvard Department of Social Relations, with an ambitious goal to build the basis for a new theoretical synthesis that would cover the whole field of social relations. Constituting such a general theory was contrary to the hitherto dominant *Chicago School of Sociology*, which strongly advocated a segmented approach in research of society (Parsons 2009). Parsons was mostly lambasted by neo-Marxist and left-oriented sociologists in general. One of them was Wright Mills who grudged him for turning away from practical issues with his "grand theory"and for locking himself up in an "ivory tower" and that such a theory, as consisting only of logical constructions, has no relevance whatsoever for empirical research. Luhmann, on the other hand, sums up Parsons' structural-functional theory as follows: "It is premised on social systems with certain structures and asks for functional successes that must follow for systems to be sustained. In so doing, the notion of function is mostly limited to internal successes, especially to sub-system contributions; the notion of function thus becomes an internal system category referring to the relation of the *parts* to the *whole*."(Luhmann 1998, 284).

On the other hand, as the successor of Parsons' orientation, Luhmann is aware that he must face the heavy legacy of functionalism, summed up in the belief that society is a stable system in which all parts are firmly integrated, that each part of the system has a clear function which contributes to integration, that each social system functions on the basis of consensus on the fundamental values and norms and that each deviation of system parts from their functions is interpreted as pathological. Although he does not even for a moment break the connection with the fundamental category of functionalism - the social system, Luhmann articulates the basic elements of his authentic sociological position exactly through the theoretical framework within which, by differentiation and subsystem autonomy, he resolves the issue of social change, an issue that has marked the sofar history of sociological theory. Within this theoretical scope, the (ostensibly inseparable) categories of system and purpose have a special role. Consequently, clarification of the relationship between the system and its purpose requires us, at least in broad strokes, to analyse the theoretical whole within which this relationship functions. Within that orientation, we particularly higlighted the concept of autonomy which is relatively less discernible in Luhmann's theory and therefore, in our opinion, must be specifically emphasized. Our main assumption therefore is that establishing subsystem autonomy is not a matter of sheer, a priori, theoretical and/or practical arbitrariness, but a necessary/inevitable step in the creation of successful responses of the social system to the challenges of the growing complexity of the environment. In the process of elaborating this basic position, we will more specifically consider: 1) social system as communication; 2) system-purpose relationship; 3) system-environment relationship, and 4) the process of internal system differentiation and the creation of subsystems' autonomy which, at the same time, entails a demand for cooperation between different parts of the system. In other words, through the process of differentiation and establishment of subsystem authonomy, the social system increases its own ability to adapt to the environment – environmental challenges are thus not transferred to the whole, but localised and processed in the appropriate, autonomous parts of the system. This increase in internal complexity enables to form alternatives more easily i.e. to relieve the highest levels from challenges which objectively do not require the engagement of the entire system. The system structure thus acquires the necessary flexibility and subsystem autonomy becomes the real measure of this change.

The theoretical and practical relevance of this topic is more than explicit – one of the central issues of contemporary social and political practice is the articulation of increasingly rapid changes of complex social structures, and thus, in our opinion, Luhmann's systemic approach is also a welcome programme for the understanding of (and systematising) the complex modern world dynamics.

SOCIAL SYSTEM AS COMMUNICATION

The concept of society is, no doubt, the most complex notion passed to us as the legacy of the social and philosophical theories of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century. The pluralism of views of society comes from different schools of thought: from social contract theories, according to which society is created by "contract" in which individuals in their relations "waive" their freedoms and their natural rights in order to do away with the state of war of all against all and preserve their own existence; to different orientations in sociology that explained their subject - society, as a system similar to living organisms, in which general laws of organic development (biologism) apply, as a product of psychological relations between individuals (psychologism); as a system based on social action or the behaviour of individuals (behaviorism); as a self-regulating and self-sustaining system of interactions of different roles (functionalism); as the relationship between individual elements and the social system structure (structuralism); or as a permanent conflict of opposed classes (Marxism). These are different examples of reflections on the processes of constitution of modern societies rising from the ruins of the Christian-Medieval type of system, whose main differentiation principle was based on the unchangeable hierarchy of social classes i.e. on the belief that any occurrence has its place within God's plan. The rise of functional differentiation of modern societies thus triggered different approaches to their self-understanding (Đurić 2016).

Thus, it comes as no surprise that Luhmann legitimates the construction of the universal social system theory, along with the critique of classical sociology, by classical questions – What is society? What is it made of? What operation produces and reproduces it? And he answers immediately. Society is a comprehensive social system incorporating all other social systems[4]. Society is a limited, self-contained, self-referential and self-sufficient system. In this sense, the self-sufficiency of a society should imply the institutionalisation of a sufficiently broad spectrum of components in order to respond to all important social requirements. This, of course, does not mean that all the roles of all members (people) are played out within society, but that a society must be able to respond to elementary requirements of its members (people), at different stages of the life cycle. However, Luhmann argues that society consists not of people (*sic!*)[5], but of - communication: "The basic process of social systems that produces elements systems consist of in these circumstances can only be communication" (Luhmann 2001, 205). This does not mean that society should in the process of deconstruction be traced back to some "zero point" nor does it answer the question about morphogenesis or the primordial, real nature of society. Namely, the communication/society relationship should also be understood as a simultaneous, continuous, dual one – society is not possible without communication, but communication is not possible without society either[6].

4) Evident here is Luhmann's parallelism with Parsons' definition of society: "Essential for the notion of society is not that it should not in some way be empirically independent compared to other societies, but only that it should *contain all* (italics added) structural and functional prerequisites of an independent system" (Parsons 2009, 70). Both of them, however, follow Aristotle who, in the opening sentences of *Politics* defines a polis as a community which incorporates all others: "Since we see that every city is a community and that every community is established with a view to some good (for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good), it is evident that all [communities] aim at some good, but the community which is the highest of all and which embraces all the rest aims at the higest of all [goods]. And it is called the state or political community" (Aristotle 1988, 1).

5) More on Luhmann's posthumanism in: "Niklas Luhmann and Posthuman Modernity" (Lovasz 2018, 1 – 17).

6) But Luhmann does not understand communication as information transmitted from sender to recipient. He sees transmission as a metaphor implying the idea of possession and suggesting that the sender loses information while the recipient acquires it. By contrast, Luhmann defines communication as „the synthesis of three selections, as a unity of information, utterance and understanding" (Luhmann 2001, 215). Communication is considered realised understanding of the information is acknowledged.

Society is thus (self-) produced by communication. Thus, we must understand any change in the way in way of production of communication as change in the production of society[7]. If we accept that assumption, it is self-evident that the boundaries of communication are at the same time the boundaries of society. Society embraces all things social in itself without knowing the social environment: "Because society as a comprehensive ssocial system does not know social systems outside its boundaries. It is thus impossible to observe from the outside" (Luhmann 2011, 79).

On the other hand, any observation of the environment implies internal activity based on differentiation, i.e. self-observation and self-description, which materialises the issues of self, of one's own identity. Both self-observation and self-description are communication operations which "enable to communicate in society, though not *with* society, but *about* society" (Luhmann 2011, 761). In so doing, the process of self-description sharply delimits the social system from the environment.[8].

Differentiation from the environment is the condition both for system constitution and survival. Maintaning the boundary also means maintaining the system. On the other hand, the environment has an extremely relative, unstable status – "it is a different one for each system" (Luhmann 2001, 55), because each system by its constitution becomes distinct from its environment. The operation of distinction is based on the reduction of complexity (for example: system = environment – *n*), or, on the self-description of its own

7) This is evident even in a superficial analysis of the link between a particular communication media and the corresponding society type: namely, verbal commmunication creates tribal societies, writing enables the creation of empires, printing technology the creation of nation-states, while the electronic/satellite communication becomes the prerequisite of global society which "so to speak, inflates or shrinks, depending on how communication is realised" (Luhmann 2011, 71).

8) In that sense, a system (including social) will denote "any serious being that is maintained identical partly on the basis of its own order and partly based on external circumstances, in a completely complex, variable environment that cannot be fully mastered" (Luhmann 1998, 5). Hence, systems must be understood as identities maintained in a complex and variable environment by operation of distinction between the interior and the exterior. Here we should be reminded of Parsons' view that "at a very general theoretical level, there is no difference between processes sustaining a system and those changing it. The difference lies in the intensity, layout and organisation of the «elemental» parts of certain processes and the state of structures they impact" (Parsons 1988, 50).

purpose. However, purpose-setting is not some arbitrary enterprise, but a result of processes unfolding within the sistem itself and thus it deserves to be discussed separately.

SYSTEM AND PURPOSE

In system theory, the concept of purpose denotes those consequences, or a set of consequences which should justify action. At the same time, "...action should be understood as any meaninful and outward-oriented effective human behaviour" (Luhmann 1998, 5). An action system is a set of concrete actions by one or more individuals, which is limited to an environment by meaninful relations between these actions. That is, "immanent to the action system is that this action is normatively oriented" (Parsons 2009, 86). This actualises the issue of order, while the issue of the nature of integration of stabilised systems of social interaction is reduced to a synthesis of motivation and normative cultural standards, made up of value orientation patterns. This notion of agency[9] understands the purpose, aim, as a constituent part of the action structure, as the part which gives the whole meaning and justification. For an actor, purpose is both the reason and a benchmark of his action.

Without arguing with this understanding, Luhmann just transfers the concept of purpose from the action theory to the system theory. The reason is simple and evident: there is no system without purpose. "Purposelessness is", as noted by Norbert Wiener, "by its nature ephemeral" (Wiener 1973, 57). That is why the focus to purpose within the system is one of the pivotal points of Luhmann's

9) "The theory of action is the conceptual scheme for the analysis of behaviour of living organisms. Behaviour is understood as oriented toward the achievement of aims (*or purposes, author's note*) in situations, through normatively oriented energy consuptions. There are four points to note in this conceptualisation of behaviour: (1) behaviour is oriented at the achievement of purposes or goals or other anticipated conditions; (2) it happens in a situation; (3) it is normatively regulated, and (4) it implies energy consumption, effort or "motivation" (which, more or less, can be organised independently from involvement in action). (...) If behaviour can be analysed in this way, and if we analyse it, we call it action; but, in order to call it that, we must analyse it from the standpoint of anticipated conditions that we direct it to, situation in which it unfolds, normative regulation (for example, intelligence) of behaviour and energy consumption, or the motivation involved. Therefore, action is behaviour that are reducible to these elements" (Parsons 2009, 605 - 606).

research. On the other hand, in organisation theory[10] the sensemaking approach has been particularly firmly rooted. It is a generally accepted view that the only rational system is an organised one, which fulfils its purpose. Purpose-setting and subordinating means to the purpose thus always meant the narrowing of the value horizon of action itself, reducing it to the level of a system instrument.

This was not much of a problem in earlier periods of stable conceptual configurations. However, today we know that no purpose and no goal can any longer claim the right to absolute truthfulness and universal validity[11]. In the overall plurality of narratives, none still holds the status of the privileged conflux of truth. Totality is replaced by separate elements that cannot aspire to interpretation of the whole. The emphasis is on the perspective from which a particular phenomenon is analysed and not on some stable, objective truth. The constancy of purposes has thus become only a system-relative constant that does not exclude the possibility of its own change. As purposes are no longer invariable, they assume the statis of the relative view to which the acting subject is oriented[12].

10) On how Luhmann's social systems theory was ignored by authors from the organisation theory field, see more in: "Bright, Excellent, Ignored: The Contribution of Luhmann's System Theory and Its Problem of Non-Connectivity to Academic Management Research" (Baralou, Wolf et. Meissner 2012, 289 – 308).

11) That was also noted by Jean-Francois Luotard in his *Postmodern State*: "the narrative function loses its functors (factors), superheroes, great dangers, great peripeties and a great goal"(Luotard 1988, 6). However, the overall disintegration of meta-narratives does not at the same time mean the disintegration of social ties. Luotard keeps his optimism: "The man himself is small, but he is not isolated, he is captured by a set of relations that are more complex and more mobile than ever. Whether young or old, man or woman, rich or poor, he is always placed on the "nodes"of communication circuits, no matter how small they are. Rather, it should be said: placed in spots through which various messages pass" (Luotard 1988, 29). This interplay of seemingly isolated individuals creates elastic communication networks that experience shifts with each new information item and message. In this sense, a forcible (and full) identification with some meta-narrative is in fact no longer possible.

12) Criticising the ontological tradition, Luhmann frees the concept of purpose from its naturalistic-teleological connotations (purpose as something *naturally given, true, binding constant*, etc.). Purpose is no longer the ultimate cause and criterion for the selection of adequate means, or, a rational cause of individuals' joint action, but becomes subject to subjective selection. This, of course, opens up a new dimension of complexity because, if one subject can choose its own purpose – then so can others. This also renders useless generally formulated purposes which should serve

This differentiation and destabilisation of action structure gives rise to the differentiation of the theory of action itself. In the old tradition, systems were always defined as wholes, consisting of parts but they were more than a sum of their parts (a good example are social contract theories). In that sense, if we project a purpose/means scheme to this concept of the system, we come very close to considering the whole as the system purpose, while the means would be its parts. A particular combinaton of means (organisation), results in something that is more than a sum of its parts – the fulfilment of purpose.

The whole/parts scheme is a static model for a complex state of affairs; by contrast, the purpose/means scheme is based on the dynamic causal action model. This is how we arrive at the thesis characteristic of organisation theories: equating the purpose/means principle with the whole/parts scheme prevails as the main principle. Accordingly, the hierachical order of the system is the order of purpose and means. Within this order, purposes dominate over means, that is, the top of the system represents purpose and lower levels the means for its achievement. The highest instance determines the system purpose. Anything below it are the means to achieve the goal so defined[13]. After all, this defragmentation was also the basis for the industrial division of labour. Namely, the industrial division of labor was only possible between different means and not between purpose and means because the decision on the purpose could not be made without prior knowledge of possible means. The hierarchy based on the purpose/means scheme is based on the assumption that functional division of work only makes sense as a horizontal separation of different sub-tasks. This is why the still prevailing notion of hierarchy views it as generalisation, an ascent from concrete, specialised toward general tasks or decision-making situations.

On the face of it, this does not seem problematic. Only the top of the system can legitimately communicate with the environ-

to create concrete programmes of action (for example, political party ideologies). In this sense, they cease to function as a framework for the development and compliance with the (pre-) defined purpose.

13) In the classical organisation theory, the purpose always programmes possible means. In this process of instrumentalisation, all undesirable or unintended (in sum, redundant) aspects of these means are neutralised.

ment – all the other parts act on behalf of the top. But the weakness of this model is exactly in such a pre-stabilised situation. Namely, system structures have to be problematic, they must have internal tension, in order to collect problems from the environment and integrate them in the system. This is especially important in large systems. Othewise, suppressed problems emerge elsewhere, in a modified form. Thus, a need arises for autonomous responses by certain parts of the structure, while the top of the system for its part responds by introducing additional controls, monitoring of loyalty, etc. This is immediately followed by the necessity for additional coordination, which should address the issue of system inefficiency. In the theory of action, this may be understandable and justified. However, in the system theory, it is an unmistakeable sign of centralisation.

The classical organisation theory interprets the system as a whole consisting of parts, i.e. the whole as the purpose and the parts as the means. It also implies that the internal relationship materialises as a hierarchical organisation of positions with command relations. This, however, creates an extremely simplistic picture of closed organisational structure. And that's exactly what raises Luhmann's doubts. For, excessive simplicity must be suspicious. At this point, it was time to dethrone the notion of purpose and to include it as a variable with specific functions in a more comprehensive theory of organised social systems.

SYSTEM AND ENVIRONMENT

And in this more comprehensive social systems theory, the central paradigm is the relationship between the system and the environment[14]. At the root of social systems is not a "subject" but – the environment. "The final relation of all functional analyses is in the difference of the system and the environment" (Luhmann 2001, 252). However, it should be immediately stressed that the notion of environment is not just the balance, or what-is-not-sys-

14) The system-environment relationship is also characteristic for cybernetics. The fascination with the issue of (system) constancy in an extremely complex, variable setting (environment), as well as the attempt to explain the invariable states of variables by communication, brings cybernetics and sociological functionalism into an area of surprising closeness.

tem. "On the contrary, the relationship with the environment is constitutive for the system construction, (…) the environment is the premise for system identity since identity is possible only through differentiation" (Luhmann 2001, 252). "In this way, the system-environment relationship is not defined from any absolute perspective, but is narrowed down to a relative, variable and yet "objective" (self-) perception operation from the perspective of the pre-set system identity[15]. Each system thereby actually acquires a different environment.

On the other hand, every system is linked to its environment by selective relations that reduce its complexity; thus, the whole environment can never be relevant for the system, the system can never communicate with all the events in its environment. In principle, the system simplifies its position vis-à-vis the environment by substituting the objective situation by its own perspective, operation of self-description. In other words, system action is not determined by the objective reality, but by its own, subjective idea of reality. External system relations are not ignored, but system identity is primarily viewd as a set of internal relations, finalised in the consensus on system purpose or aim. This operation reconfirms areas of varying complexity. Asymmetry is evident: the environment is always more complex than any system, because more events are possible in it than in the system itself. Compared to the environment, the system excludes at least one, but usually many more possibilities, reducing the complexity of the environment and thereby creating an order with fewer possibilities in which system actors can more easily orient their own action.

However, this asymmetry simultaneously handicaps the system, making it incapable to adequately respond to unplanned events in its environment. In the perspective of continuous intensification/acceleration of global communication, the immense complexity of the environment appears as a growing array of (un-) expected challenges that must be evaluated in a way that system action can be organised and coordinated. For every system seeking to maintain its own identity, to survive, the extreme complexity of the environment

15) "In the plane of *reflection,* the system defines its own identity that differs from everything else. A decline in complexity gains its purest, most abstract from here; identity as the distinction from everything else is, in essence, nothing else but the definition and localisation of the decline in complexity" (Luhmann 2001, 261).

is always posed as a problem, as a series of challenges requiring response. The question which logically follows is – which elements and resources would the system have to mobilise and keep ready in order to be constantly able to adequately respond to environmenal challenges? But, no system can be open to all possible options all the time. The system tries to compensate for this deficit, this latent inability to adequately respond to environmental contingencies, by stabilising selection criteria, by "planning" to which problems it will respond and in what way. Of course, the system's tendency to stabilise the selection criteria is quite understandable, but this intention should not rely on the prescribed, "predictable" processes, which essentially block possible alternatives. A pre-selected model of response to environmental challenges is characterised by low flexibility and a low integrative capacity. In this way, the system is prevented from maintaining a high level of sensibility, i.e. self-correction. In other words, any rational projection of future conditions, any "planning" is only an attempt with a highly uncertain outcome, since the complexity of the environment is virtually unlimited, so any long-term prediction is impossible.[16]

INTERNAL SYSTEM DIFFERENTIATION

Therefore, and in order to be able to address these problems at all, the system must, within its limits, develop certain forms of autonomy, consisting in the ability of system parts to process problems selectively. Thus, the only remaining effective strategy is the strategy of internal system differentiation, or subsystem creation[17]. "Subsystem creation", Niklas Luhmann argues, "means

16) This is convincingly attested by the history of socialist states with their so-called "planned economy". It turned out that the intensification of central planning is essentially directly proportionate to the increase in inflexibility, rigidity and therefore also system inefficiency.

17) "The development of society is often described as progress towards a growing differentiation of the system. This view is correct, but needs clarifying. It would be difficult to compare all kinds of societies by the degree of their differentiation, assuming a common measurement; societies are too heterogeneous because they use different forms of differentiation. Degrees of differentiation and related complexities are produced and mediated by forms of differentiation and these forms of differentiation differ in the way in which they establish internal boundaries between the subsystem and internal environments"(Luhmann 1977, 32). This brings us to an apparently paradoxical situation: for the system to preserve its own identity, it

improving the ability to adapt which is usually critical for survival; it is thus possible to localise harmful environmental impacts and stop them in system parts; they are not transferred further to other parts, or to the whole, because due to the partial independence of parts, there is only a transfer of impacts that are functionally meaningful or overstep a particular threshold of interference and are therefore rare in a given environment " (Luhmann 1998, 131). In this way, the system gains time. Internal differentiation enables quick adjustment, i.e. increased system flexibility, because it is not necessary to load, engage the whole system to increase the number of possible reactions.

By this internal differentiation, the system is able to process much more environmental complexities than in the case of a centralised, undifferentiated system. However, every part of the system processing a certain aspect of environmental complexity is premised on specific purposes, goals, which serve as its framework. This framework must be defined and, at the same time, undefined: defined – in order to, as a premise of decision-making, point to the choice of problems to which it then responds; undefined – so that it can absorb as much environmental complexity and variability as possible without structure change. This simply means that the system is not fully planned in detail, but only to a certain extent. In this way, the system becomes capable of transforming external complexity into internal complexity relatively efficiently and by doing so, strengthen its own boundaries. "Internal differentiation claims an additional right to external boundaries and strengthens them. Internal differentiations converge at external boundaries and can only be maintained if external boundaries keep the external environment away. The difference from the environment will be amplified once more if the internal differentiation scheme is selected autonomousl[18], and not relative to the environmental realities" (Luhmann 2001, 271).

must be differentiated from the environment; on the other hand, in order to respond to the variable challenges from the environment, the system must introduce certain environmental elements into its own structure. Thus we come to the internal differentiation of the subsystem.

18) Namely, insofar as the system can be independent from the environment through self-referentially established patterns of differentiation, it can also autonomously implement differentiation processes. Paradoxical as it seems at first glance, the system becomes more sensitive to its own environment in this way.

It is therefore, understandable that each of these different, autonomous system levels must have its own purposes, goals. The notion of system rationality thus must necessarily be transferred from centralised rationality to a more complex, more comprehensive form. This also sets the limits of effectiveness of each level created by these goals. The change profoundly alters what we implied by system rationality: "The central theses of the classical organisation science, interpretation of the system a whole comprised of parts, interpretation of the whole as the pourpose and of the parts as means and the thought that the final relationship abstracted to indefiniteness must be concretised by a hierarchical organisation of positions with command relations, in their distinct simplicity provide the picture of a closed organisational structure" (Luhmann 1998, 61). Namely, the tradition of the Western way of thinking has for a long time understood that rational choice within one system can only be the choice of means for the achievement of some unique goal, rather than the choice of different goals. The starting point of this belief was based on the view that the system is a whole consisting of parts but that it is also always more than the simple sum of its parts. Accordingly, the operation of defining the goal, purpose of a system always departed from the idea that this goal is in fact unachievable for its individual parts.

However, due to the increasingly rapid and intense changes in the environment/world[19], the constancy of goals becomes questionable, without excluding the possibility of changing (and decomposing) the very same goals or purposes. Thus, the category of purpose, goal, loses the significance of the symbol of the unique system, introducing the possibility of setting multiple different goals or purposes at sub-system level. In this way, the production of possible orders within the system is achieved, or, the system-environment relationship is multiplied – each of the differentiated subsystems views other subsystems as its own environment, resulting in a general increase in system flexibility. This internal transformation makes possible to overcome the simple and sharp binary schematism of system/environment (us/them, friend/

19) Despite the increasing pace of change, what remains unchanged is the fact that these are areas of different complexity; the environment is always more complex than any system; more conditions and more events are always possible in the environment than in any other system.

enemy, etc.), which ultimately creates conditions for strengthening the capacity of the social system in the process of addressing new and more complex challenges.

CONCLUSION

Starting from the thesis that the specificity of the facts of social life, or, the specific circularity of knowledge about society contributes to the elusiveness of that same society, Luhmann, reconstructs the very way of defining the subject of sociology: he postulates society as a comprehensive system which incorporates all other social systems. In that sense, society is a closed autopoietic system constantly self-produced by communication. At the same time, communication as the basic autopoietic operation determines the boundaries of society and its environment. And it is precisely in the relationship between the social system and its environment that the most important relations meet, influencing in turn the condition of the social system: namely, the imperative of any system is to affirm itself by overcoming the environmental complexities. At this point, Luhmann distinguishes two possible strategies of any social system – a) centralising the system and strengthening its strucure that props it forward, defined purpose at the top, and b) internal differentiation of the system in which subsystem levels autonomously define their own purposes and thus assume the task of resolving challenges from the environment. Needles to emphasize, strategy „b", in Luhmann's opinion, produces far more balanced and developed social systems and is also extremely relevant in the context of social practice.

This is why our intention in this paper has been to form, from the perspective of system theory, a cognitive interest in the notion of subsystem autonomy, in order to emphasize internal differentiation as a key process that enables society to overcome problems arising from the indefinite and dynamic complexity of its own environment. These problems introduced the issue of society's capacity to adequately respond to growing challenges within the classical understanding of the whole and parts on the agenda of modern social theory, as well as political practice. Attempts to resolve these issues by stabilising the system by strengthening centralisation had clear consequences – systems would become torpid and inflexible, devoid of any potential for social learning and (self-) correction. Because of this, we focused our attention in a different direction – toward a model of internal differentiation and development of the autonomy of system elements.

The idea of a social system, as a structural whole in which the action of integral elements has, as its sole purpose, the survival of the system thus becomes, in the circumstances of global acceleration, simply outdated and obsolete. This is why Luhmann analyses the notion of purpose from the perspective of system elements, rather than the whole system (like the classical functionalist position). This analysis makes obvious the issue of the system flexibility deficit in relation to an extremely variable environment. Since, in systems in which only the top of the organisation defines its own purpose (while the elements are limited to internal success of maintaining the systems), any problem from the environment transferred through the whole structure heavily burdens the system, making it inefficient and slow.

This becomes particularly evident with the intensification of relations on the global scale and the fact that social systems face growing complexity. The system's ability to remain identical in a complex and variable environment is thus threatened by its own structure – centralised organisations gradually lose capacity to organise the production of adequate alternatives. Attempts to solve this problem by prediction and planning possible challenges and model responses have proved clearly inferior. Another way to respond to the growing complexity of the environment was the model of differentiated systems' autonomy. This model (in practical policy materialised as a subsidiarity principle) implies the competences of lower system structures for some decision-making. As we already noted, it would be a way to bring the problem-solving level closer to the level at which they arise.

However, in his theory, Luhmann goes a step further in order to radicalise the whole-parts relationship, or to question the level at which purposes are defined. This means that it would be necessary to abandon the tradition of classical functionalism which would imply that the rational choice, at sub-system level, could only be the choice of means for the achievement of a purpose and not the choice of the purpose itself. By operation of internal system differentiation, sub-systems acquire autonomy which also includes own purposes. Thus, new complexity in the system is released – differentiated subsystems become able to communicate with environmental challenges and produce alternatives themselves, without engaging and endangering the entire structure.

In this way, the development of autonomy within a particular system is not a matter of some superficial "political aesthetics", nor is internal complexity established in this way worthy by itself. On the contrary, we believe that it logically results from the dynamics of the system-environment relationship. The system must adapt and become flexible throught the process of differentiation, while at the same time maintaining the principle of synthesis, or its own identity. The optimal system complexity established in this way becomes, in our opinion, while at the same time preserving the principle of synthesis, or its own identity. The optimal system complexity established in this way becomes, in our opinion, an assumption of the successful survival in a complex and dynamic environment of the globalised world.

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THE RELATION BETWEEN POLITICAL IDEOLOGYAND RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM

Abstract

The aim of this paper is examination of general relationship between political ideology and radical environmental activism, with a special focus on considering the extent of influence and the exact position of the politics in the domain of mentioned eco-activism. Within the first four parts, the general characteristics of radical environmentalism, as well as its relationship with the political left-wing, political right-wing and apolitical/anti-political beliefs are analyzed, while the final part is devoted to discussion and general conclusions. Among other things, it was concluded that the basic ideological dimension of radical eco-activism is based on the idea of biocentrism, as the original environmental and nonpolitical category, while political ideological elements represent secondary and facultative components that can influence the specification of the ideology of a part of eco-activists. At the same time, it was pointed out that the proper perception of such (i.e. secondary) position of political beliefs within the radical eco-activism creates a precondition for understanding heterogeneity and frequent contradictions in the political beliefs of radical eco-activists.

Keywords: political ideology, ecology, radical environmentalism, left-wing, right-wing, eco-terrorism, direct action.

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RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

Radical environmentalism represents a subcategory of general environmental ideology, which, as its name suggests, is characterized by advocating the use of more drastic (in some cases even criminal) actions with the goal of environment protection. It originated in the 1970s as the expression of dissatisfaction of one part of the members of mainstream ecological movements, which considered that battle for preserving the eco-system should also be extended to use of some more invasive methods (Long 2004: 19-20; Liddick 2006: 19). Within the radical environmental movement, the use of direct action method is of great importance ((Long 2004: 5). Some of the characteristic types of such direct action are some forms of civil disobedience[1], tree spiking[2], arson, use of explosive devices[3], monkeywretching[4], blocking or destruction of roads that go through natural habitat and others (Manes 1990; Long 2004; Liddick 2006). Different acts of protection of animal world in natural environment, i.e. liberation of animals that are kept or raised in artificial conditions (farms, science laboratories etc.) represent a special and very significant aspect of radical action of one part of the eco-activists, especially radical advocates of animal rights (Liddick 2006: 39 and further). Among the radical environmentalists, there is a widespread rule of restraint from every type of endangering life and health of people. However, even though a large number of extreme environmental organizations accepted this principle, cases of attacks on life and body of people are registered in practice (up: Liddick 2006: 2-3).

The characteristic of action of most well-known radical environmental groups is the leaderless resistance tactics, i.e. independent and self-initiative work of independent individuals or smaller groups that are organized in cells which are not related with each

1) For example, tree sitting: staying in the canopy of trees to prevent their cutting.

2) This technique involves the nailing of nails or other sharp and solid objects into the trees that are intended for cutting.

3) The placement of fire and explosive devices in order to damage or destroy residential, business, infrastructure and other objects built in natural habitat, as well as other immovable and movable property that, in some way, endanger the ecosystem.

4) The term is used to denote the destruction of earth-damaging machinery - vehicles, machinery, etc.

other – covert cells (compare: Manes, 1990). Such approach, which is characterized by lack of hierarchical and other organization, an absence of unique plan and program of specific actions, member anonymity, lack of interaction between members of different covert cells, makes the described strategy of work very vital and greatly complicates the possibility of suppressing the movement by authorities. Some of the globally best-known organizations of this type are: Greenpeace, EarthFirst!, Earth Liberation Front (abbr. ELF), Animal Liberation Front (ALF), Earth Liberation Army (ELA), Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (SSCS) and others (Liddick 2006: 4-6; Long 2004: 4 and further).

In relation to the described, criminal aspect of radical environmentalism, use of term ‘‘eco-terrorism’’ is commonly seen in practice. According to R. Smith, this controversial name was first used in 1998. (Smith 2008: 545), and it is officially used in the USA since certain eco-activist organizations are proclaimed as terroristic and classified in the domain of national terrorism.[5] Relying on the results of previous research (Matković 2013; Matković 2017), we can say that, in order to denote totality of ecologically motivated criminal actions, use of the term ‘‘pro-environmental crime“ is the most precise, while every potential (and still equally contentious) use of the term terrorism needs to be limited only to narrow circle of the most extreme types of environmental violence. It would also be expedient to simultaneously carry out the terminological modification and to form a new construction: ”pro-environmental terrorism”, in order to distinguish that behavior from the actions of the same name, but drastically different by content, for which the term ”eco-terrorism” is already being used, and which refer to planned and strategic destruction of ecosystem (Matković 2017: 113).

Defined like this, radical environmentalism as ideology and as a movement brings together organizations and individuals that are very heterogenic when it comes to their characteristics and beliefs. Focusing on the subject of our research, in the following sections we will closely consider the connection between radical

5) According to the definition of FBI, eco-terrorism is „the use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentally oriented, subnational group for environmental-political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature“ (Long 2004: 3-4).

environmental activism with political ideologies.[6]

Left-wing politics and radical environmentalism

Environmental ideas have a very fertile ground within ideologies of political left-wing. In the original ideas of Marxism, an interest in environmental issues can be seen (Burkett 1999; Foster 2000). K Marx said that even society as a whole, that is, all existing societies, are actually not owners of the earth, but only its possessors, its beneficiaries, so that they have to leave it in improved condition to the future generations (Foster, 2000). Also, in some established socialist societies, environmental ideas can be noticed. After October revolution in Russia, during the first decade in which the Soviets ruled, there were tendencies within the Russian scientific intelligence to include environmentalism in Bolshevik political thought and to harmonize the production with the laws and limits of nature. On the contrary, Joseph Stalin carried out the repression of ecological awareness promoters and of science of ecology, creating a drastic ideological turn in the mentioned domain (Gare 1996; Gare 2002). A similar anti-environmental approach can be seen in China, where Mao Zedong rejected environmentalism, believing that, regarding the patterns of historical materialism, complete nature has to be put in service of the revolution (Shapiro, 2001).

In the modern world, various types of left-wing ideologies and political orientations are connected with ecology. Among the most well-known are: green politics, eco-socialism and green anarchism. Besides them, the following orientations and sub orientations should be mentioned (otherwise very diverse, both by its nature and by its ideological content): anarcho-primitivism, eco-feminism, green syndicalism, veganarchism, social ecology, total liberationism etc. (compare: Dobson 2007; Wall 2010, Martell 1994). As far as pro-ecological extremism is concerned, it seems that, out of all these options, the most radical environmental activists of left-wing orientation find themselves in the domain of green anarchism and its subcategories. Green anarchism or eco-anarchism is a movement within anarchism, which is specifically focused

6) About a relation of classical environmentalism and political theory, see: Eckersley 1992.

on environmental protection issues, with the goal of establishing non-hierarchical connections with the non-human world of living beings. According to this, the theory of green anarchism extends beyond the standard social-anarchist frames of critique of interpersonal relations, as it also includes a critique of the interaction between people and other living beings. This theoretical approach provides the basis for the application of radical environmental practice that aims both at the same time at human liberation and non-human liberation, in order to create an ecological anarchist social community made up of people and other living beings and based on heterarchical relationships (up: Hall 2011: 374).

Speaking of practice of radical environmentalism, it can be noticed that a significant number of registered extremist and other radical pro-ecological acts is carried out in connection with a certain left-wing ideological preference of their perpetrator.[7] Such examples are numerous at the global level. Many radical acts, carried out by the members of leading radical environmental organizations (EarthFirst!, ELF etc.), as well as by globally well-known individuals (for example Michael „Arrow" Scarpitti, Theodore „Unabomber" Kaczynski etc.[8]), were followed by indicators that suggested their political preference, but also the political dimension of their ecological work.[9] Due to this factual situation, sometimes the whole work of mentioned radical eco-organizations can be placed in the domain of left-wing ecological work. However, one should be careful when making these generalizing conclusions (which will be discussed more in the next sections of this paper).

Right-wing ideologies and ecological radicalism

As with the political left-wing, there are also some elements of ecological postulates among some right-wing political ideolo-

7) About left-wing extremism in general see: Đorić 2016; Kushner 2003; Brockhoff et al. 2012.

8) More about Theodore Kaczynski, PhD of mathematics, ex-university professor and convicted domestic terrorist, as well as about his alleged relation with anarcho-primitivist ideology in Chase 2003; Kaczynski 2016.

9) For example: self-declaring of perpetrators as anarchists, pointing to the "anti-capitalist", "anti-bourgeois" and related dimensions of their struggle, calling for a "revolution" and for a "fight" against the existing society (class, capitalist, exploitative, materialist, etc.).

gies. In the historical context, certainly the most extreme form of political ideology (but also the ruling order) that has incorporated certain elements of environmentalism is the German national socialism, especially in connection with its famous "Blood and Soil" motto (Zimmerman 2008: 531-532). In the modern social environment, there is also a noticeable connection between environmental ideas with right-wing politics. Along with the development of pro-ecological left-wing political philosophy, the opposite movements in the field of the political right-wing were formed, which also adopted certain elements of ecological principles within their ideology. Examples of such ideas and movements are green conservatism, eco nationalism, eco-capitalism etc. Apart from this, as a part of right-wing ideologies connected to environmental preferences, can also be considered the following ones as well: agrarianism, bio-conservatism, ecofascism etc. An important aspect is the domain of so-called religious environmentalism, i.e. environmental activism related to different religions, religious movements and religious communities.[10] Apart to all aforementioned historical and modern ideologies and movements, we consider it very important to highlight an example of current extreme right-wing ideologies, movements and associations that incorporate a Neopagan system of principles and beliefs, based on the pre-Christian tradition of the European people. Bearing in mind that the Pagan heritage is inextricably linked with the world of nature, and taking into account the fact that the worshipers of extreme right-wing Neopagan beliefs, as a rule, advocate the need to return to the old way of life that implies life in accordance with nature and natural laws, it seems reasonable to state that one of the most straightforward connections between right-wing ideology and environmentalism is precisely in this fraction of the extreme right.[11]

Unlike general environmental questions that evidently find space in the ideology of some right-wing movements, it can be noticed that extremism in the name of environmental protection is much less performed in the name or under the wing of a right-wing organization or ideology. Radical activism of members of

10) About religious environmentalism compare: Berry 2013.

11) About a relation between Neopaganism and radical right ideology see François, Godwin 2008; Asprem 2008.

(extreme) right-wing groups is most often connected to social[12] rather than environmental issues. Therefore, it can be concluded that the most radical forms of environmental action are not typical for extreme right-wing activists.[13] This also corresponds with the general (conservative or reactionary) nature of right-wing ideologies, since violent revolutionary changes (in which can, basically, a part of extremist ecological activism be included) correspond more to the extreme left-wing ideologies by their nature. When it comes to religious environmentalism, some groups actively participate in certain environmental projects and campaigns which have different ecological goals (preservation of ecosystem, preventing global warming, anti-nuclear campaigns etc). This practice is connected with the movements and initiatives such as evangelical environmentalism, dharmic ecology etc. (compare: Gottlieb 2017; Nanda 2004). However, actions of those movements mostly stay in the domain of classical environmentalism, without going into its more radical form. However, there are statements in literature that among radical environmentalists can be seen the whole spectrum of those who could not be described as admirers of political left-wing- among others: Neopagans, Wiccans, anti-globalization protesters, Third Positionists, bioregionalists etc. (Manes 1990). Based on this, it is possible to indirectly notice that the admirers of various right-wing orientations participate in the radical environmentalism - either alone or as part of some of the renowned environmental organizations that include heterogeneous membership. However, according to available data, in the context of concrete examples from practice, indicators of explicit right-wing political declaration of perpetrators of such pro-ecological actions, who acted in the name of some of the leading radical environmental organizations, were not noticed. Regarding the registered individual actions, it can be noticed that most often it is not about radical environmentalism that would directly base its work on some ideology associated with right-wing values, but rather individual decision about executing extremist acts in order to solve the concrete ecological problem, with desire to preserve the existing order in nature (conservation action) or to establish the previous, damaged state (reactionary

12) Different types of endangering people and property by various criteria (racial, national, religious, gender etc.) are characteristic for such groups.

13) For general characteristics of right-wing extremism see: Đorić 2014; Marks 1996; Atkins 2004.

action).[14] Because of this, sometimes it is not easy to demarcate these actions from some types of apolitical environmental activism.

APOLITICAL AND ANTI-POLITICAL POSITIONS WITHIN THE RADICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

Bearing in mind the heterogeneity of philosophical and ideological starting points within the general radical environmental movement, political pluralism and diversity of attitudes in relation to politics and political issues comes up as a logical result. Because of this, besides the activists that combine environmental and certain political ideology, there is noticeable the presence of those individuals or groups that carry out their pro-ecological actions independently from the political ideological dimension. In that manner, it is possible to notice different ideological approaches – both apolitical, and even more radical, anti-political approach. In relation to this, a division can be formed: a) apolitical and b) anti-political environmental activism. Within the first one, it is possible to form an additional division: a) activism in which radical pro-ecological activities are executed by apolitically oriented individuals; b) those pro-ecological activities that are not related to political ideological beliefs of their perpetrators. As examples of apolitical environmental orientation, those organizations in which there is no visible direct presence of relation with the political ideology of any type can be mentioned.[15] Also, it is partly justified to place in this category those organizations which, even though they eventually developed a certain connection with the domain of political ideology, originally represented exclusively interest in the ecosystem, regardless of political and other social issues.[16]

When it comes to the second category (i.e. anti-political environmental activism), it is about those types of activities in which actors categorically deny the importance of political issues and their

14) As an example can be mentioned Wiebo Arienes Ludwig, leader of the Christian community named Trickle Creek from Canada, who is known for eco-sabotage actions aimed towards local oil and gas industry.

15) For example Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and other organizations that focus exclusively on environmental issues in their program and concrete actions.

16) For example EarthFirst! organization during the 1980s (Bari 1998: 6)

interest in them. As a rule, it is about individuals and groups who represent biocentric ideas in combination with: a) general lack of interest in issues that concern global social community; b) even more radical starting point: with an openly hostile attitude towards human community and/or humankind in general. In this other case, clear elements of anti-human, misanthropic, nihilistic and other similar attitudes are noticeable (compare: White et al. 2006: 131-132).[17] In some examples, a certain intertwining of radical activism of described anti-social oriented environmentalists with actions of socially interested environmentalists (such as green anarchists for example) can be noticed, which causes some ideological dilemmas within the environmental movement.[18]

DISCUSSION

The ideology of radical eco-activism started to form during the 1970s. Most of the radical pro-ecological actions, concluding with the first half of the 1970s, were individual, isolated acts, partly inspired by counter-culture from the 1960s (Long, 2004: 19). They did not represent a part of the coherent radical environmental movement and ideology on which it would be based. This leads to the conclusion that the beginnings of extreme forms of struggle to preserve ecosystem did not have a clearly formulated general ideological program, which consequently means that they did not have a narrowly specified, political doctrinal background as well. However, in the marked period (i.e. during the 1970s) starts to develop a specific philosophical and ideological base on which the future radical eco-activism will be based. Such aspirations were inspired by a wide spectrum of influence - from Marxism and socialism, through feminist ideas, postmodernist ideas, to Eastern religion (Long 2004: 19; Liddick 2006: 19). These environmental ideas were in direct confrontation with capitalism, patriarchal society and Judeo-Christian tradition, as the factors that were considered responsible for endangering nature. According to Liddick, radical environmentalists saw a parallel and a similar pattern between the planet Earth exploitation and victimization of minorities, women

17) To consider the general link between radical environmentalism and anti-human and misanthropic ideology, see Keeling 2013; Watson 1992; Taylor 1991.

18) For such examples in Eastern Europe, compare Маткович 2017; Черный блог.

and marginalized subjects of society in general (Liddick, 2006: 19), which can explain the abovementioned point of view. All this shows that there is a significant connection between certain left-wing ideas and the beginnings of a radical environmental movement. However, this circumstance should not lead to one-sided conclusions about the alleged unified political nature of radical environmentalism. Very diverse beliefs can be seen within the radical environmentalism (including the diversity when it comes to political position). As it is graphically stated, among radical environmentalists are, among others, present: deep ecologists, earth liberationists, animal liberationists, anarcho-primitivists, green anarchists, bioregionalists, ecopsychologists, ecofeminists, neo-Pagans, Wiccans, Third Positionists, anti-globalization activists, anti-capitalist protesters etc. (Manes, 1990). This truly impressive diversity clearly points to a conclusion about the impossibility of theoretical unification of the political ideology of radical environmentalism. At the same time, bearing in mind the breadth of its philosophical and ideological base and the necessary interweaving of various influences, it is appropriate to conclude that the ideology of radical environmentalism is syncretic in any case, whereby there are different modalities and forms of that syncretism, depending on the concrete doctrinal starting points of some ecological groups and individuals.

Even though there are many ideas and ideologies that surround radical environmental movement, some of them represent its backbone. Long thinks that the most important among them are: deep ecology, ecofeminism, social ecology and bioregionalism (Long 2004: 20). However, it seems right to bow to Liddick's narrower definition, by which deep ecology is actually the central base, i.e. the core idea of radical environmentalism (Liddick 2006: 19). In any case, deep ecology, with its fundamental idea of biocentrism, represents the basic and broadest accepted starting point of the whole radical environmental movement.

Considering everything previously mentioned, it can be concluded that philosophical postulates of radical environmentalism represent a very heterogeneous base that allows the connection with different (political and other) ideologies.

It is necessary to consider doctrinal elements of biocentrism, as a key element of beliefs of radical ecoactivists (Liddick

2006: 19; Hays et al. 1996: 167). Biocentrism is the opposite of anthropocentric beliefs, according to which the humankind is the most important and central kind among all entities in universe. Unlike anthropocentrism which is human-based, i.e. assumes access from the position of humankind, or exclusively in relation to human values and principles, biocentrism extends the category of relevance to all living beings - in other words, it represents a nature-based system of thought (up: Yu, Lei 2009; Liddick 2006: 3). Biocentrism can also be defined as an ethical and ideological starting point which, among others, relies on the following principles: all beings are members of the community of planet Earth; there is a ”system of interdependence“ among all living beings; all living organisms realize their well-being in their own way; all organisms have equal inherent value – people are not superior (in moral terms) in relation to other beings (Taylor 2011). Based on the abovementioned, it can be confirmed that biocentrism is a pivotal ideological starting point of radical environmentalism. At the same time, it is justified to notice that biocentric ideology is apolitical in its basic shape (or precisely, without necessary connections with the domain of political theory and practice). This represents a very important insight which gives us the answer to the essence of the political dimension of radical environmentalism. Biocentrism, as the base of radical environmentalism, is not political by its nature, which means that the entire radical ecology movement can function completely independently from the political dimension. However, the biocentric ideological concept allows the connection with the domain of political ideology. The connection between politics and radical eco-activism is created precisely in this area. Because of this, we consider it reasonable to conclude that the connection between political ideology and eco-activism is of secondary nature.

Analogously to general ideology of radical environmentalism, the ideology of leading radical environmental organizations and movements is primarily based on the idea of biocentrism. Because of that, and because of the described nature of those organizations (leaderless resistance tactics, the organization in the form of independent covert cells etc.), there is their principal openness towards members who adopt different ideological views, including very diverse political positions. Hence the conclusion about the hypothetical possibility of participating in their radical environmental acts practically by every individual, regardless of his political orientation. However, the doctrine of some environmental organizations (for example the ones that, apart from environmental, focus on social issues as well; that call for the need of revolutionary changes in the existing socio-political system etc.) shows a significantly lower degree of political openness, often remaining exclusively in the domain of left-wing politics and attracting activists mostly from the ranks of green anarchists. Also, practice shows that when executing pro-ecological acts in the name of some of the leading environmental organizations, such extremist acts, by rule, are not followed by symbols that would directly point out to right-wing political orientation of their perpetrators. Such acts usually are either not followed by political messages at all, or some symbols, messages or slogans, that directly or indirectly point out to the left-wing orientation of their perpetrators, can be noticed in relation to them. For example, in rhetoric of some organizations (ELF, ALF, EarthFirst! etc.) expressions characteristic for (extreme) left-wing activists can often be seen: highlighting class issues; calling for fight against "bourgeoisie," "capitalists", "capitalist society", "Western society"; calling for a "revolution" etc. (compare: Long 2004: 16; Smith 2014: 154; Parson 2008: 62-63). All of this points out to the assumption that the representation of all ideological starting points is not equal in practice of organized, group environmentalism, and that apolitical/anti-political and left-wing ideologies are mostly present within the leading (most popular and most well-known) radical environmental groups, unlike the right-wing, which is the least present.

It is noticeable that there are numerous contradictions (and even paradoxes) regarding the adopted political ideology within the environmental movement. Most obvious proof for that is a parallel presence of supporters of fundamentally opposite and conflicting political options (such as extreme left and right-wing) within individual environmental actions[19], and often within the same environmental organizations. However, even among environmentalists of the similar political orientation can sometimes be noticed significant ideological discrepancies – it is enough just to recall the heterogeneity of previously mentioned left-wing orien-

19) For example, including the evangelical and other religious organizations to pro-ecological actions organized by left-wing environmentalists.

tations, which are related to environmental issues in general.[20] All this provides additional confirmation of the conclusion about the secondary role of political ideas inside the ideology of protectors of the environment. Starting from the insight that the general ideology of environmentalism (with particular emphasis on the idea of biocentrism) is key to the doctrine of radical ecological activists, it is justified to notice how political beliefs issue comes as additional, facultative factor which can, but it does not have to, influence to additional specification of ideology of some eco-activists, without interfering with the essence of the very radical environmentalism itself. In this way, the presence of very heterogeneous and often contradictory individual political orientations within the environmental community can be understood and logically explained.

One of the elements that can be useful in clarification of political issue of radical environmentalism is the way in which this problem is approached in the USA, as a country that is confronted with the intense work of ecological extremists, and which, in turn, took very energetic measures- among other things, by defining that behavior as "eco-terrorism" and by classifying it as domestic terrorism. Starting from such stances, FBI characterizes eco-terrorism as "special interest terrorism", separating it from traditional categories: right-wing terrorism and left-wing terrorism (Lewis 2004; Long 2004: 4; Smith 2014: 45-46). According to the FBI's point of view, special interest terrorism is different from mentioned traditional, political categories of terrorism because extremist special interest groups seek to resolve specific issues, rather than effect widespread political change (Lewis 2004). This attitude clearly emphasizes the difference between radical environmentalism and extremism of both left-wing and right-wing orientation, which additionally confirms the need to relativize the influence of elements of left-wing and right-wing political ideologies within the radical environmental approach. However, the same attitude also suggests the essential uniqueness of radical environmentalism in relation to political extremism in general, since, under the "special interest" category, eco-terrorism is separated from political terrorist forms.

20) For some contradiction compare: Smith 2014: 147-148; Long 2004; Bari 1998: 2-4.

FINAL CONCLUSION

Radical environmentalism is a phenomenon that theoretically allows, and confirms in practice, the possibility of connection with different political ideologies, including apolitical/antipolitical as well. Unlike the general environmental philosophy, which is incorporated by different a(nti)political, as well as left-wing and right-wing political ideological aspirations, in radical environmentalism more often we encounter a connection with the left-wing or with apolitical/anti-political ideas. However, sometimes it is not easy to notice such political differences in practice, since most famous radical environmental organizations often lack explicitly defined political profile of their program, leaving a wide space for individual ideological interpretation to their members and sympathizers. In any case, basic ideas of radical environmentalism (led by biocentric ideas) are of non-political nature, which is why political ideology, where it is present, shows as a secondary, facultative ideological element.

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POLICY-LEGAL INSTRUMENTS OF INDIRECT ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

Abstract

Effective environmental protection cannot be imagined without direct management of such protection by state authorities through legal prohibitions and orders, permits, approvals and exemptions, mandatory notifications, control, and repression measures of the state administration, etc. Yet, in modern environmental systems, instruments of indirect influence on the addressees of norms are gaining increasing importance, with the aim of influencing their desirable behaviour through citizens' awareness. Such instruments are used by law primarily in the field of prevention, with the aim of preventing environmental damage. When using indirect means, the state appeals to the addressees to act appropriately to protect the environment, but without forcibly sanctioning behaviour, if that appeals are not accepted. This paper analyses the nature of indirect instruments, such as public information, economic incentives of the classical and modern types, as well as environmental agreements, with an indication of their role and importance in modern environmental systems.

Keywords: environment, protection instruments, indirect protection management instruments, information system, economic incentives, consensual instruments.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTES

For the protection of the environment, it is of paramount importance to determine the objectives that its standards aim to attain, as well as the principles on which that protection will rest. However, once the goals have been set and the principles established, the instruments through which those goals will be pursued come to the fore.

In principle, environmental instruments should be such as to meet the general criteria of each policy, including environmental policy. They should therefore be effective, efficient, administratively easily enforceable, and politically acceptable. In addition, they should be legally comfortable (see Kotulla 2014: 40), their implementation should be understandable and acceptable to the addressees of legal norms but should also be easily enforceable for public authorities.

More specifically, environmental instruments are remarkably diverse, from planning, financial, public law to numerous others. Their abundance and diversity only testify to the fact that environmental protection is a highly interdisciplinary field with many intersections and overlaps of different objectives, principles, and systems of legal norms. Environmental law is justifiably said to cross public law, private law, and criminal law in their interplay (Pfeiffer 2015: 2).

Therefore, it is not at all simple to not only consistently systematise these instruments, but to list them precisely. However, for the purposes of the environmental protection system, perhaps the simplest way to systematize could be as follows: planning instruments, public-law instruments, private-law instruments, criminal-law instruments, and legal-political instruments.

The importance of particular types of instruments could be widely discussed. There is no doubt that due to the interdisciplinary nature of environmental rights, each of them has a corresponding importance. However, the totality of the system of norms of this field of law clearly shows that besides planning, public-law instruments are by far the most present and significant, despite the fact that, over time, instruments of a different character were successfully affirmed in environmental law. Environmental law is still unimaginable without the dominant legal prohibitions, authorizations, exemptions, repressive measures, administrative control, and supervision, as well as other well-known public-law measures of the state government. That is quite understandable. When looking at the genesis of environmental law, it is clear that it evolved through the instruments of administrative law, the so-called "Police law" and Trade Law (craft and trade). Just as today, the classic instruments of direct, imperative influence on environmental behaviours are irreplaceable, without orders, injunctions and force modern environmental law could not be imagined (Schmidt and Kahl 2010: 21). Such direct instruments of influence on the addressees of environmental norms are legal prohibitions and orders (injunctions) of permits, permits and exemptions, as well as the obligation to report, inform, etc. In addition, they are characterized by both controlling and repressive instruments of public administration. For direct instruments, therefore, it is characteristic that a legal norm or an administrative measure requires a certain person to behave in a certain manner or omission. If the addressee does not behave in the required manner, the public authorities may coerce him into such behaviour, or punish him with a fine or other sanction.

However, in modern systems of environmental protection, instruments of indirect influence on the addressees of norms are gaining increasing importance, with the aim of influencing their desirable behaviour through citizens' awareness. Such instruments are primarily used in law in the field of prevention (Kluth and Smeddinck 2013: 53) with the aim of preventing environmental damage. These indirect instruments are also numerous, such as adequate information, financial incentives (subsidies, tax exemptions and reliefs), incentives through approving the use of advantages in the pursuit of activities, etc. Indirect instruments, in fact, influence the motivation of the addressees of the norms to behave in an acceptable manner, without the use of coercive means. When using indirect means, the state makes a specific appeal to the addressees to behave appropriately (Schmidt and Kahl 2010: 33) without sanctioning the behaviour if that appeal is not accepted (Kloepfer 2016: 260). This paper analyses the nature of indirect instruments, as well as their role and importance in modern environmental systems.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIRECT INSTRUMENTS

Although direct environmental instruments (legal prohibitions and orders, permits, approvals and exemptions, mandatory applications, control, and repression of management, etc.) are still key, indirect instruments of influencing environmental addressees are gaining importance every day. For increasing their importance, indirect instruments must be thankful to their specific characteristics.

First of all, citizens and other addressees of norms do not perceive indirect instruments as direct pressure from public authorities, which is always the case with direct instruments. Indirect instruments do not impose binding conduct threatened by sanctions but leave addressees free to decide. Instead of command, they are given the appearance of incentives that they can enjoy, if they behave in a desirable way. This means that the addressee of the norms remains free to choose between more different ways of *legal* behaviours, but the choice of the behavioural option also depends on the ability to use the intended incentives. He, therefore, chooses between socially desirable and undesirable behaviours. In other words, the norms determine a certain desirable behaviour, but it is up to the citizens and other addressees (companies, other legal entities, etc.) to decide whether and how they will be treated. When using indirect instruments, the state, therefore, does not want to address the norms for certain behaviours (acts or omissions) but wants to reward desirable behaviours.

The incentives themselves may be different. They are usually "positive", i.e. for desirable behaviour the addressee of the norms will be rewarded with some financial or other benefits. However, they are not rare, so-called "negative" incentives. They are characterized by the fact that, in the case of undesirable behaviour, the addressee is not only denied positive incentives, but also exposed to some additional material and other disadvantages (e.g. increased environmental contributions, etc.).

The main advantage of indirect instruments, therefore, is that it leaves citizens freedom to choose. This does not only develop their general awareness of the need for environmental protection, but also raises awareness of their “cooperation” with the state in that protection. In addition, sometimes indirect instruments can be more effective than direct ones, if they are sufficiently interested in the benefits of desirable behaviour.

In addition, indirect instruments significantly relieve the governing bodies of certain tasks in the field of environmental protection and promotion (Kloepfer 2016: 363), which, on the other hand, leaves them more dedicated to the implementation of direct protection instruments.

Alongside the benefits, indirect instruments also have certain downsides. They include insufficient transparency in the behaviour of the addressees of the norms, as well as insufficient certainty in predicting desirable behaviours. When it is necessary to implement certain behaviours, especially in emergency situations requiring emergency measures, indirect instruments can certainly not be compared to direct environmental measures, although they can be used to supplement them. In providing a minimum of environmental protection, direct instruments are irreplaceable, but in providing them with optimal protection, indirect instruments are proving to be instruments with a complementary (Kloepfer: 2011: 106), but very important function.

Indirect instruments can be diverse, but ones that occur most often in modern environmental systems are:

- information from public authorities (states)
- classical economic instruments
- new economic instruments
- other indirect instruments

INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

Information provided by public authorities is one of the most significant indirect environmental management instruments (Kloepfer, 2011: 106). The state collects all environmental information, so only it can fully inform the general public about the state of the environment, as well as the risks and dangers that threaten it. Public authorities should systematically collect environmental information to meet their obligations to inform all members of society about the state of the environment (Lilić and Drenovak-Ivanović 2014: 42). Due to this position of the state in many countries, legal obligations of public authorities at all levels are prescribed to continuously, timely and fully inform the public about the state of the environment. In some countries this obligation of the state is raised to the level of constitutional norm. This norm is also stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia.[1]

Public information on the state of the environment indirectly, but significantly, influences environmental protection. Their importance is growing day by day (Erbguth and Schlacke: 2016: 120). The forms of information can be different. It is important, however, that the information system as a whole is such that it continuously provides timely and complete information to the public on the state of the environment. Only such information system provides the right basis for the response of different members in society to diverse environmental threats.

In the information system, news, explanations, tips, and warnings are most commonly used as indirect instruments of environmental impact.

News is considered to be both individual notices, and general and comprehensive environmental reports for a particular area and for a specified period of time. The news may also have the character of a notice which is indicated by an appropriate sign (e.g. blue flags as a sign of a clean, unpolluted part of the sea or a sign on the health of a product, etc.). It is especially important for news to be timely, complete, and true, as otherwise adequate responses of citizens and other entities in society in the event of an environmental threat cannot be expected.

Often the news itself, even when complete, true, and timely, is not enough for citizens and other members in society to grasp the essence of particular forms of environmental threat. In such situations, the additional explanations provided by public authorities are used. These explanations are most often given when proper

1) According to Art. 74 para 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia of 2006 "everyone has the right to a healthy environment and to be notified on time and completely of its condition".

professional education (e.g. chemical breakdowns, etc.) is required to properly understand the resulting environmental threats.

In addition to informing, sometimes it is important to give citizens advice on how to behave in the current state of the environment. Citizens are being helped with advices on how to adequate behave to protect themselves and their property, but also to help general measures with such behaviour to eliminate the consequences of environmental damage.

When citizens and other entities are directly threatened by the risks of environmental damage, public authorities also use warnings. They point out the risk that has been incurred, as well as the possible adverse consequences, if realized. Alerts include notices about the amount of harmful ingredients that certain products contain, and which are declared according to regulations. Warnings are often combined with advices, which further informs citizens about appropriate behaviour, to prevent or minimize the occurrence of adverse consequences.

For the systematic monitoring of the state of the environment, in addition to the aforementioned instruments, comprehensive statistics on the state of the environment in a particular area and at a particular time are of particular importance. Based on them, not only can this state be identified at a certain cross-section, but corresponding trends can be observed.

Information provided by public authorities should be distinguished from information provided by other, primarily private entities. Such information may be mandatory but may be optional. Among the mandatory information that private entities are required to give to the general public, the most significant are those that are declared on products under the regulations.

Opposite to the obligation of public authorities to provide information on the state of the environment, there is a right of citizens and other entities (companies, other legal entities) to be informed about it. This is usually determined by law, but sometimes by the Constitution. Thus, from the aforementioned constitutional norm according to which “everyone has the right to a healthy environment and to timely and complete notification of its condition” (Article 74, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of

Serbia), it can be unequivocally concluded that such right exists in the Republic of Serbia as a subjective right of every citizen. And not only that. The right to a healthy environment and to be informed about it has been established as a universal human right (Pajvančić 2009: 96). This stems both from the constitutional norm itself ("everyone has the right to a healthy environment and to be fully and timely informed about it" - paragraph 1 of this Article) and from the fact that this article is in the section that establishes human rights and freedoms (Šogorov Vučković 2018: 405, 406 Environmental Law and Constitutional Norms). As a universal human right, therefore, the right to be informed about the state of the environment belongs to everyone, without exception. Since it has the character of a universal human right, this right, as well as the right to a healthy environment, is directly applicable. This means that the law is not a necessary mediator (Pajvančić 209: 96) for the application of the constitutional norm in practice. Furthermore, the right to a healthy life, as a universal human right, also has the character of a constitutionally guaranteed right.

Public authorities are obliged to make publicly available information on the state of the environment to an adequate extent, without the special request of citizens and other entities. In comparative law, it is considered that access to this information does not need to prove the existence of a particular legal interest (Kloepfer, 2011: 113). In our opinion, this rule should apply in our law, as soon as possible, given the direct application of the aforementioned constitutional norms. This responsibility of public authorities is general (see Šogorov Vučković, Jelena 2019: 607: Constitutional Responsibility of Public Authorities for Environmental Protection in the Republic of Serbia) and applies to all its levels.

Due to the importance of environmental information in EU law, a separate directive was adopted, which was later incorporated into the legal systems of the Member States.[2]

2) V. Directive 2003/4/ec of the european parliament and of the council, of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC.

CLASSICAL ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS

Indirect economic instruments are of particular importance in environmental management. Some have been in use since the beginning of environmental protection, while others are more recent. Among the classical indirect instruments of economic character, duties (so-called environmental taxes) and subsidies are of the greatest importance.

Subsidies are characterized by economic acts (benefits) granted by public authorities to private individuals for the achievement of a certain public interest in the field of environmental protection (Kotulla 2014: 42,43) without the obligation of those individuals to consideration. The point of the subsidy is to discourage private individuals from engaging in environmental damage, or at least reduce the damage caused by such activities. They can come in the form of direct and indirect subsidies.

Direct subsidies are financial assistance provided by public authorities to private individuals with the aim of encouraging them to act in an environmentally friendly manner. These are various forms of grants, financial aid, recourse, etc. Unlike direct subsidies, indirect subsidies are not financial benefits, but are economic benefits that the state grants due to the desirable environmental behaviour of citizens and companies. These are, first and foremost, tax exemptions, reliefs and privileges granted for such behaviour or for investments of an environmental nature.

Due to the incentives that are directly visible, subsidies are readily accepted by private individuals. However, in addition to the good side, the subsidies have some downsides. They are primarily expressed through distortions of competition, as they administratively strengthen the market position of the beneficiaries of the subsidy.

Subsidies are a kind of expression of the principle of jointly (socially) bearing the burden of environmental costs. This, not much favoured, principle in environmental protection means that the cost of environmental protection is financed through the budget, i.e. that they are borne by society as a whole, ultimately, by taxpayers. It is also the most significant departure from the key principle of causality according to which the cost of protection should be borne by the one who caused the damage to the environment (see Frenz, 1997). Nevertheless, the application of the principle of shared costing is in some cases necessary, especially when it achieves the desired environmental effects in the fastest way (Storm 2015: 148).

The breach of the principle of causality in favour of the principle of shared cost protection does not occur, however, only with direct subsidies but also with indirect ones, i.e. other forms of state aid (gifts, tax exemptions and reliefs, other financial benefits, etc.) to encourage private environmental protection measures (Messerschmidt 2011: 310).

Unlike subsidies, duties (primarily taxes) of public authorities are public-law revenue, monetary obligations imposed by public authorities on those who use or damage the goods of the environment. There are numerous analyses on the impact of environmental taxes (see, e.g., Bakker, 2009; Gaines and Westin, 1991). Environmental duties, especially environmental taxes, are usually defined from a tax base point of view (Dimitrijevic 2012: 231), especially at the international level (OECD, Commission EU). Accordingly, environmental tax is understood as a tax whose tax base is expressed in physical units of substances, which have an established negative environmental impact. This means that, contrary to subsidies, public duties are precisely based on the principle of causality. They are, therefore, paid by those who use the environment and consume its resources. The addressee of the norm may reduce or avoid the public duty if it reduces or avoids the use or the consumption of protected environmental goods. Since this is the case, such duties have a steady, permanent effect.

Duties may have different goals (Kluth and Smeddinck, 2013: 54) depending on the predominant effects that they seek to achieve. Some serve as a regulatory measure, so they are influenced by the addressees of the norms to disrupt the environment to a lesser extent or in a less harmful way. Others are primarily used as a means of financing environmental protection, since successful environmental policy management must be based on stable sources of financing (Lilić and Drenovak-Ivanović 2014: 69). The third, again, is characterized by a kind of compensation.

In principle, duties are a useful indirect means of environmental protection. Still, they are not without weaknesses. The main weakness is that it is difficult to quantify the impact of specific activities and actions of individuals on the use or damage of the environment, and consequently it is difficult to quantify an adequate amount of public duty. This is especially pronounced when certain environmental damage occurs because of a number of different causes. However, the burden, at least on average, is one that damages the environment, thus incurring the costs of protecting and improving the environment that it would not otherwise or would not bear (Ramsauer 2010: 120).

In the field of environmental protection, the most important public duties are taxes, but besides them there are also taxes, contributions, etc. Taxes are typically characterized by public duties being levied without any counteraction by public authorities. In contrast, fees, contributions, etc. imply such counteraction (e.g. municipal taxes or municipal waste management contributions.).

NEW ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS

In addition to the classical ones, more recently new indirect instruments of economic character are being used. Unlike the classical ones, new economic instruments have emerged and evolved according to specific environmental needs. It can generally be said that their aim is to rationalize the use of the environment as much as possible and to improve the efficiency of that use (Kloepfer, 2011: 114). There are more such instruments, with the most famous being:

- convenience of use,
- compensation,
- certificates,
- sharing.

For convenience of use is characteristic that they are being a kind of reward for products or processes that are highly environmentally friendly. Such products or practices shall be exempt from any existing prohibition or restriction and may be used. Thus, e.g. allows the use of certain light aircraft, electric motors, etc. in areas where the use of aircraft and engines is otherwise prohibited or restricted. In this way, other entities are indirectly encouraged to use environmental protection products or processes.

Certificates or licenses are an interesting new indirect instrument. They are particularly used successfully in the field of emission. When regulations set the maximum value of harmful emissions for a particular area, that value is allocated to the appropriate number of certificates or licenses according to certain criteria. The holder of the certificate may carry out harmful immissions up to the value determined by the certificate (Schnedl 2014: 110). The certificate contains a right similar to property law (Kotulla 2014: 43). As a result, the certificate is transferable and can be traded on the regional ecological exchange as a property. Those in need of higher emission quotas buy additional certificates, at prices that are determined according to the principle of supply and demand, as on each stock market. In this way, the total value of the immissions is maintained at the established level, but the secondary redistribution of permitted immission quotas is done through the certificate trade, and according to the real needs of each participant in the immission.

Compensation (compensation model) is also a situation involving regulatory environmental burdens. These burdens (use, damage, damage) must not be exceeded in their total prescribed value. Each entity whose activity represents a particular environmental burden has its own approved contingent (e.g. the value of allowable emissions) that it must comply with. However, entities with such contingents may educate the business community in a particular area, so that all environmental burdens correspond to the sum of the approved contingent of those entities, but that some of them may exceed their contingents if the volume of use of contingents of other entities in that community is reduced by the same values, thereby compensating such exceedances. Regulations, however, generally stipulate that the total environmental burden in the final result (after compensation) must result in a lower burden (Storm 2015: 147). This instrument can be seen to have some similarities to the certificate model (Erbguth and Schlacke, 2016: 120), but contingents cannot be exchanged, but their use can only be given (in whole or in part) to only other entities in the business community.

A specific indirect type instrument is the sharing of certain resources to reduce environmental burden. Thus, it can oblige the owner of an existing facility to endure the use of that facility by competitors, so that the construction of additional facilities and networks does not put additional lade on the environment. A typical example of such sharing is the obligation of the pipeline, electricity, or communications network owner to suffer the use of those networks by competitors, under prescribed and agreed terms. Resource sharing has, as an indirect instrument, emerged from the strong influence of antitrust and antitrust policies, especially in the European Union.

OTHER INDIRECT INSTRUMENTS

In addition to the above, other indirect instruments are emerging in recent times, which, without the use of state power, seek to stimulate the desirable behaviour of certain entities.

Such instruments include, first of all, environmental agreements concluded by public authorities with interested entities. These agreements jointly determine the behaviour of private entities in the pursuit of an activity or other activity, which should provide environmental protection. Instead of forcing such behaviour to be compulsory, the state enables appropriate agreements to be concluded with interested parties. Such an approach is quite in line with the principle of cooperation (Sands, Peel, Fabra and MacKenzie 2018: 213), which is one of the most significant principles in environmental law. This principle, among other, means that it is essential that the full cooperation of state authorities and citizens, or different social groups and organizations, must be achieved in establishing environmental policies and norms (Meyerholt 2007: 66,67). In other words, environmental protection has ceased to be the exclusive obligation and responsibility of the state (which is characterized by the so-called directive principle) and has already become both the responsibility and the obligation of the so-called civil society (Messerschmidt 2011: 313), with all its members. Therefore, in the 1970s and 1980s, the attention of science and politics began to shift from a purely direct approach to the principle of agreement, communication, and cooperation between the state and other interested parties of society. However, in modern environmental law, these two principles are most often combined.[3]

The cooperation of the state and the citizens in environmental protection has two ideas at its core. The first is that the interest of society in environmental protection is expressed not only indirectly, through the state as a general representative of society, but also directly, by the citizens themselves, social groups, and organizations. The second idea is to meet the general interest of the society, embodied in the state, in the process of negotiation, with the partial interests of individual citizens, social groups and organizations, and thus, with the respect and consideration of all legitimate interests, develop and implement socially best policies. In this way, with the previously applied directive principle, the consensual principle, i.e. the principle of cooperation (cooperative principle, principle of cooperation), has become increasingly affirmed.

These agreements, by their legal nature, may be administrative contracts but also private contracts (Erbguth and Schlacke 2016: 121) of two equal contractual parties. However, in practice, informal agreements between public authorities and certain private entities that do not have a legal character, but result in the desired effect to occur, because the participants behave responsibly to what they have agreed. Such arrangements, therefore, rely on the moral or political responsibility of the parties rather than on legal ones.

The good side of the environmental agreement is that the desirable behaviour of private entities is realized instantaneously, and not until after a relatively lengthy procedure provided for by law or regulation. In addition, they are provided with voluntary cooperation by certain environmental member, which stimulates their behaviour.

Indirect instruments also include various national proclamations on environmental goals. They are not legally binding, but they inform the public of the intentions of the state, so that, accordingly,

3) When combining a directive principle with a cooperative principle, various modalities are possible. The degree and manner of participation of citizens and their organizations in environmental protection can range from mere informing of citizens, through their participation in policymaking and drafting of legal regulations in this field, to participation in their implementation, including control and surveillance activities.

they may also be found in binding legislation at some future time. In this way, interested parties are given the opportunity to plan their activities better, as they are timely informed of the state's environmental goals and intentions in certain areas.

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SPACE AND PLACE OF THE BALKANS: A GEOCRITICAL PERSPECTIVE**

Abstract

The literature that explores the representations of the Balkans is based on the assumption that the Balkans were constructed, imagined or invented. This claim is usually accompanied by the attempts to highlight the discrepancy between physical and imaginary geography and to point out the gap in semantics between the Balkan Peninsula and the Balkans. While the first one functions as physical geography, the other one refers to a place populated by representations, rather than people. Following the trend of linguistic and spatial turn, they hold the binary logic that insists upon the duality of the spatial. Some of the most important studies in this field can be read and interpreted as another in a series of texts about the Balkans. Thus, the aim of this paper is to: 1. Point out the places and passages where academic discourse on the Balkans separate physical and symbolic geography; 2. Highlight the political implications of this approach; 3. Suggest a geocritical aim that provides a sort of ballance between the material geography („real“) and imaginary spaces.

Keywords: The Balkans, space/place, symbolic geography, geocriticism, academic discourse, discoursive practice

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THE BALKANS: AN EMPTY SPACE

During the 1980s political and economic crisis of Yugoslav society has been brought to public awareness through discussions in the mass media, both within Yugoslavia and outside of the country (Bakić-Heyden 1992: 1-15). While seeking for answers, academics, writers and journalist testified popularization of texts from the 19th century, 1920's and 1930's.[1] Mentality, national character, and various other modernist concepts became subject to spatialization, while the Balkans were explained with a help of metaphors and symbols that connoted liminality (Lazarević Radak 2011: 255-269). There was something inherently mystical, "something dark, exotic, and left unspoken" about its people, history, political life, which had to be understood in order to explain the crisis (Žižek 1991).

While recalling the role of popular culture in creating the image of the Balkans, academics took the position of a neutral observer, whose scientific engagement was aimed at deconstruction of stereotypes and raising the awareness of their negative impact. The invisible text on European periphery and marginalized region, was recognized in literature, film and political discourse. The papers and books to mention here are numerous, but noteworthy among them are Maria Todorova's *Imagining the Balkans* (1997), Vesna Goldworthy's *Inventing Ruritania* (1998), Dušan Bjelić and Obrad Savić 's edited volume *Balkan as Metaphor* (2002), Božidar Jezernik's, *Wild Europe*, (2004) and in addition to earlier, seminal articles by Milica Bakić-Hayden.

Starting from the assumption that there is no consensus about where the Balkans extends, researchers problematize the relation between symbolic and physical Balkan. According to this group of researchers, the formulation ,"The Balkans" is related to representations, identities and political discourse, while the term Balkan Peninsula indicates physical geography which similary to "the Balkans" share the imagined complexity. All the "questionable" and "unconcrete" geographical determinants such as Southeast Europe and the Western Balkans, in 20th and 21st were understood

1) See: Vladimir Dvorniković, Karakterologija Jugoslovena, Prosveta: Beograd, 2000; Jovan Cvijić, *Balkansko poluostrvo i južnoslovenske zemlje,* SANU: Beograd, 1991; Arčibald Rajs, *Čujte Srbi, čuvajte se sebe,* Grafid, Beograd, 2008.

as euphemisms created to counterbalance the negative political connotation of stereotypes about underdevelopment, backwardness, primitivity and xenophobia (Lazarević Radak 2014: 45)

Indeed, the extensive insight into travel accounts published in 19th and early 20th century speaks in favor of producing these and similar representations and stereotypes, and therefore, the significant progress to criticism of sterotypes on the Balkans cannot be denied to this group of schoolars. Despite their undoubted scientific contribution, these studies had an ambivalent role in the search for "authentic" stereotypes, and today they open the path to new forms of geocriticism. This approach should involve not only exploring place / space as presented by different authors, but also examining the impact of representations on the space being written. Thus, the influence of literary representations on the Balkans goes back to studies which renewed interest in the representations on the Balkans from the 18th and 19th centuries. These books and papers encourage reflection upon the impact of deconstruction, reconstruction and potential, unintentional revitalization of stereotypes. Nowaday, results of the Balkan studies can be read as another in series of clichéd texts about this part of the world. The text about imaginary, invented, produced or constructed Balkan is situated in a political context and retains its own logic. It relies upon the analysis and deconstruction of stereotypes and modes of interpretation that can be re-interpreted in the light of current social context and geocritical approach.

GEOCRITICISM AND SPACE/PLACE

While novels and newspaper articles propagated and underpinned the construction of Southeastern Europe, travel literature is the most revealing medium for exploring the perceptions of the Balkans. The assumption that British travelers "produced", "invented" and "imagined" this geography at the time of the colonial rise is common to Balkan studies. The first decades of 19th Century required the use of particular language and style of thought. As an area of underutilized natural resources, Balkan has been designated as a zone of "cultural delay" (De Vindt 1907: 15) The Balkan was inscribed in imperial maps under the different names and geo-political terms like Illyria, Rumelia, the Near East, although in 19th century, Turkey-in-Europe was considered the most precise and accurate (Lazarević Radak 2013: 35). This inscription was a by-product of Brithish expeditions and missions to the so-called Far East, although, The Balkans, under the same name, have been recognized by other, especially German and Austrian, and rarely by French and Italian travellers. Accelerated industrial development has made possible, but also demanded, a more precise and detailed knowledge of the world. This understanding of progress has enabled creating opposition to such progress or "evolution."

The fact that most travelers notice the absence of capitals, temples, galleries, institutions, industry, and "rush of civilized life" in the Balkans has became the main representation around which Balkan studies concentrate in the 1990s. Indeed and despite the fact the Balkan was not rich in material objects, flora, fauna, monumental architecture, city scapes, painted textiles, gems, porcelain, mosques and churches, it gradually became the terrain of exotic geography (Schmidt 2015: 8) The exotic could be found in its simplicity, in social relations, uprisings, wars, social instability, powerty or lack of formal education of its inhabitants. This new geography delivered new ways of exotic and produced another kind of pleasure – knowledge about national and confessional; it was „hybrid", „dangerous", but most of all adventurous place. The pleasure was not of material kind, although it was original in its own way.[2] The Balkans or European Turkey was not an administrative unit, and with the instruments available in the 19th century it was not possible to define the physical boundaries of this peninsula. Geography emerged in the early nineteenth century characterized by environmental determinism and historicism, and at the time, it was still developing its instruments (Warf, Arias, 2009: 1-17) One century later, the Balkans were defined as geographic area also

2) Tomas Forester, *Danube and the Black Sea,* London: Edward Stanford Charing Cross, 1857, p. 98; Parnauvel Omney Tcherson, *A Trip to Turkey and Travellers Guide to the Turkish Capital,* London: Houlston and Stoneman, 1855:IV; Harry de Windt, *Through Savage Europe,* London: T.F. Unwin, 1907:15; Howard Douglas Bart, *Excursions in Albania:comparing a description of the wild boar, deer and woodcock shooting,* London: W.H. Allen and Co. Leadenhall Street, 1842, p. 54; Alexander Kinglake, *Eothen or Traces of Travel from the East,* New York: Goerge P. Putnam, 1848, o. 3; Theodor Child, *Summer Holidays,* London:Harper and Brothers, 1893, p. 18;n Andrew f. Cross, *Round About the Carpatians,* Edinburgh, London: William Blackwood and Sons, p.2.

known as Balkan Penninsula with various definitions and meanings including geo-political and historical.

THE MEANING OF SPACE/PLACE

The development of human geographies made it possible to understand how spaces are produced (Lefebvre 1994: 70). The spatial turn allows this gap between the physical and the imaginary to be understood as the logical consequence of the social production of space (Unwin 2000: 11-29) This is not a unique phenomenon, nor can it be related to a kind of Balkan exclusivity. Nonetheless, with purpose or unconsciously, researchers separate The Balkans as an empty geographical space from what the traveller imagines by projecting their own ideas and cultural discourses into place.

In the frames of human geography one come accross the concepts of place (physical space that people naturalize through patterns, behavior and communications) and place (the representation of any area, as produced and defined by social process (Campbell 2018: 23-45). Space has traditionally been considered empty abstraction within which existed a set of interrelated events of objects. Linking together humanistic tradition in geography, Yi-Fi Tuan broke from contemporary studies of environmental perception and prepared the ground for the emergence of cultural geography. According to Tuan, space and place are familiar words denoting common experiences (Urry, Tuan 2011: 426-431). While space is an abstract term for a complex set of ideas, places are centers of emotions and values where biological needs are satisfied (Tuan 2001: 4). Place, on the other hand always refers to a physical location but its existence can be either real or imagined (Sen, Silverman 2014: 1-18) As spaces are used and made by human beings, they become places (Xiangming, Orum, Paulsen 2003: 18) Henry Lefebre claimed that social space is a social product and introduced the distinction of spatial practice (the experienced and used space), representation of space (the space of knowledge, signs and codes) and spaces of representation – the imagined space of image and symbols (Rohkramer, Schulz, 2009: 1338-1349) The discussion of space/place relation ressembles the strategy of radically polarizing time and space, and of defining space by the absence of temporality to the broader mode of dualistic thinking which has been widely criticized. It is just one in series of numerous dualities and dualistic formulations but also one of the numerous forms of dichotomies which might be challenged (Massey 1994: 7) A less common position is that space and place are separate constructs, but overlap such that, there is an area where they intersect and come together (Low 2017: 12). In daily use, they are synonyms to region, location, region (Rohkramer, Shultz 2009: 1338-1349). Both sides, frequently fell into reductionism claiming either that space can not be taken as an objectively given, or that space is no longer purely the domain of geography, but a topic for humanities. Space was constructed as neutral, fixed and immobile, unrelated to the social and without impact on the formation of subject identity and biography (Edwards, Usher 2008: 36) Places and spaces differ and these differences have important consequences for people's lives. Although implicit, creating a space and place dichotomy remains a Balkan studies background. Instead of claiming that the object of the research cannot be the objective reality of the Balkans, because of its relativity, researchers were denying its ontology. This problem enters the domain of prolonged debates on the territoriality of the Balkans, dating back to the creation of independent Balkan states. Such deterritorialisation of the Balkans at the academic level became a step forward towards resolving the political issues. Due to the problems posed by the creation of borders, territorial and other divisions, studies of representations make it possible to find simple answers to complex questions. The conclusion that the Balkans, due to its negative imagination, tentative description and almost systematic creation of stereotypes, has become "inhabited" or "overpopulated" by the Occident's imagination, becomes one of the humanities' responses to the political problem. But let us take an insight into conclusions given by the academics in this area.

A PLACE WITHOUT A SPACE: SPATIAN TURN AND TEXT ON THE BALKANS

Academics in Balkan studies draw from some of the basic notions about stereotypes that originate from social psychology and literary theory. First, they understand stereotypes in the manner of social psychologists – the stereotype is, generalized belief of particular group of people. They also rely upon theories of Daniel

Henry Pageau and Jan Marc Moura's and their understanding of imaginary, alterity and identity. Whereas the issues of alterity and identity were born in relation to persons, they were transferred by analogy to the realm of abstract entities such as nation states (Czarniawsaka 2009: 49-67). During the 1980's and 1990's academics made step forward by introducing the term discourse as Michael Foucalult defined it. The next step was discoursive formation, and finally image or representation. Their work can be summed up as a research of literary image of "foreign countries" through confronting imagined reality and researching historical traits which produce certain context and thus certain image. Thus, representation or image, especially the one about the Balkans is always political or it has political implications, so the final goal is deideologization of representation.

The Balkan studies were strongly influenced by Edvard Said's study *Orientalism*. In this groundbreaking book, Edward Said defines orientalism as the acceptance of "the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for theories, epics, novels, social descriptions and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, 'mind,' destiny and so on" (Said 2009). Despite the influence, one can easily spot the differences in approach to Orient and the Balkans as geographies. Said explained how the imagined Orient represents different spaces and types of space according to the arbitrary distinctions made by individuals or groups assuming that Orient is symbolic geography, but in the meantime, a space inhabited by real people, ideas and lifestyles (Tally 2005: 1-16). Said notes that the division between East and West was not just imagined but lived through many centuries, suggesting, that physical passage of Europeans through foreign landscapes and cultures had impact on the process of their writing and representation of those spaces. Unlike its theoretical successors in Balkan studies, Said does not seek to establish the physical boundaries of the Orient, nor does he insists on immateriality of the Orient. He does not deny its ontology but, keeping in with the academic climate and context, lingers on the representations of the Orient. At the beginning of his study, Said points to the countries and geographies that are considered Oriental – the Far East (India, China), Egypt, Syria, Arabia, Persia and India (Said 2009: 29). In literary era, writing about space did not include rethinking of the relationship between so called objective referent and its representation, between the so-called real and fictious world. Despite these claims, which come from the very beginnings of the analysis of representations, the authors deconstruct the Balkans with an attempt to determine the physical geography of this part of the world, pointing to the gap between the physical, spatial and symbolic. Several pages or passages of these studies occupy repetitive conclusions about the early records of the Balkans. Until the early 18th century, the part of the world now called the Balkan Peninsula had no name. During 18th century, the names Hemus (Rhodopes) and the Balkans were used interchangeably and alternately (Todorova 1999: 20). In 1930's British travelers used this term to designate mountain range in Bulgaria. German geographer Zeune, introduced the term the Balkans in the natural sciences taking it from the French traveler Ami Boue who used this term to mark the Old Mountains, taking this name from Turkish sources (Lazarević Radak 2013: 33).

The connection between the Balkans as a place / space was established by travelers from different parts of Europe, and most of these records occured in the 19th century. From the moment it was first published in 1997. Maria Todorova's Imagining the Balkans, became a must-read for those interested in the history of the Balkans. Her concept of balkanism can be considered congruous with the wider practice of Orientalism through the 19th and 20th centuries and into the 21st . It shows that Western writers have been unable fully to conceptualise this region with that result that their analysis were unable to define a clear object (Hywel 2015: 973-991). Her understanding of the Balkans as unchanging space remained one of the most influential among researchers on this geography. Considering that Balkan requires separate and unique paradigm, she argues that this part of the world is different from the Orient because of its concreteness and tangibility (Todorova 1999: 71). In order to determine the space / place of the Balkans, she points to the possibility that the "Balkan adjective" was torn away from its empirical-ontological basis and recreated as an "abstract demon" (Todorova 1999: 72. Todorova claims that in some spatio-temporal context, the Balkans was a physical geography, a neutral space with no concrete meaning, but its spaceness was torn off for the sake of creating an imaginary world. Instead of The Balkan Peninsula, this part of the world becomes The Balkans – a border that divides and signifies the cultural and political parts of the world. Her claim that the Balkans possesses an ontology, but that it is repressed, pushed, forgotten in the process of creating a political and spatial order dominated Occident, allows her to create a distinction between the Orient as understood by Edward Said and the Balkans as the boundary between the Orient and the Occident. Thus, The Balkans does not have a legitimate place because this term came into use without being described in the manner required by the rules of 19th Century botanical, zoological, or other nomenclature. The Balkans, according to Todorova, were never standardized because its name was not defined in encyclopedias and dictionaries.

Unlike Todorova, Vesna Goldsworthy assumes that Balkan is a product of Western imagination. In the Balkan region itself, she claims, it is believed that Bakan is actually somewhere else, southeast of where the person is (Goldsvorthy 2005: XI). Balkan identity originated in British literature, not in the Balkan Peninsula and therefore it is inhabited by British imagination, transformed by the British and American entertainment industries through films and countless television programs, scattered across the world to an unprecedented degree (Goldsvorti 2005: XIII). Balkan is the product of a publishing and media industry that has claimed to have exceeded South Africas diamond and gold deposits (Goldsvorti 2005: XIV). As a space, the Balkans resides on the foggy edges of perception (Goldsvorti 2005: 3). In the context of this study, peculiarities from history are less important than representations because the Balkan is an imagined landscape. To substantiate her claim, Golsworthy reminds for a disagreement on the exact extension of the Balkan Peninsula from the 19th century to the present (Goldsvorti 2005: 4.

In his meticulous research, *Wild Europe* that include over a thousand first-hand reports and comparing narratives spanning nearly 500 years, Bozidar Jezernik seeks to locate the Balkans in the world map. Similar to Goldsworthy, he argues that it was not until the 19th century when books about the Balkans began to be published, but the area remained unrecognized in physical terms. These concerns were followed by comparisons with other geographies instead of precisely defining boundaries: " Balkans is like the interior of Tataria, unknown parts of Asia and part of the world less known than the top of Himalayas. " (Jezernik 2007: 24). Jezernik notes that the "West was never prepared to see the Balkans as they really are" (Jezernik 2007: 24). Instead of the geography of the Balkans, the subject his research is the perception of the Balkans - a man who, according to travelers from the West does not classify himselves as European and speaks of Europe as a separate area (Jezernik 2007:26). Jezernik points out that for the travelers, the Balkan is a geography that seems too complicated, ethnography full of ambiguity, tangled history and inexplicable politics. Instead of geography of the Balkans, the 17th, 18th, and 19th century books offer images of the Balkans. In stories from the ,,West", they are projections of their own nostalgia rather than narratives about real people. Based on travel accounts written by British travelers, he draws on conclusion that Balkan could be considered the "beginning of the Orient", another imagined geography (Jezernik 2007: 21). If geographic terms are conventionally neutral, then the Balkans is an exception to this rule. Instead of corresponding to physical geography, the term was introduced to produce an ideological prejudice with a negative connotation – dirt, passivity, unreliability, laziness, superstition, slowness, backwardness.

Although he points out that the earliest mention of the name the Balkans dates back to the 15th century, Predrag Svilar argues that physical boundaries of this part of the world are impossible to determine. Any attempt at geographical determination lacks consensus on whether it is a peninsula or a different kind of entity that could be defined by "natural boundaries". Within its natural boundaries, this author includes rivers and mountain ranges that limit other parts of the world. The Balkans thus, go beyond natural-scientific definitions, remaining probably the unique example of a discursive-imaginary entity that lacks clear boundaries in the West, North and South but not in the east. In these parts of the continent, European identity some are denied, while others are attributed. Although "Non-Western Europeans" live in the East, the West has more than one East. One of them is Orthodox Christian and Slavic, and among others are societies of European Islam. The Balkans are not the East, neither the Eastern Europe, but neither the West, nor Europe could be understood as an equivalent pair, since there has always been at least one other Europe outside the Western origin (Svilar 2011: 99). So this is an issue that is not physical, but it is bound to the questions of identity and politics. Thus, the geographical, historical and cultural boundaries of the Balkans have never been drawn.

While analyzing the developement of the Yugoslav crisis, Milica Bakić – Heyden points to the elements of Orientalist discourse that preceded the economic crises and the war in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslaiva. As used originally by Edward Said, orientalism refers to pervasive patterns of representation of cultures and societies that privilege a self-confidently progressive, modern, rational Europe over the putatively stagnant, backward, traditional and mystical societies of the Orient (Bakić Heyden 2006: 19). The logic on which the debates between the Yugoslav republics were based is broadly understood as an orientalist practice. As she points out in her study, *Variations on the Balkans*, “nesting orientalism” was a rethorical means to discredit the neighboors (Bakić Heyden 2006: 19). In order to point out the fluidity of the geography of the Balkans, Bakić-Heyden recalls ideological-political concerns regarding symbolic-cultural geography. They come to the fore in the public discourse of post-Yugoslav states in sentences such as: “Do we, the Balkans, belong to Europe”? (Bakić Heyden 2006: 19). According to this author, the Balkan Peninsula belongs to European continent, while numerous cultures of the Balkan people are an integral part of European cultural heritage. Emphasizing that elements of this geography intersect in the space which used to belong to Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, she draws conclusions about the Balkans based on internal and external discourse about this country. The territory of Yugoslavia was therefore, the meeting point of the Eastern and Western Roman empires, the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian, Cyrillic and Latin, Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Protestantism, Islam of Judaism, and the politics and ideology of the war between the Warsaw Pact and NATO (Bakić-Hayden 2006: 25). According to Bakic-Hayden, the Balkans could rather be considered a frontier than a complex geography that corresponds to the Yugoslav territory. Although, one must notice that for the second time, border becomes a dominant representation on the Balkans, Todorova and Bakic Hayden define the border differently. While Todorova considers this part of the world a concrete area and an opposition to both the “ephemeral” Orient and the “concrete” Occident, Bakic-Hayden emphasizes the role of discourse and political myth in political life of the most countries located in the Balkan Peninsula. In Yugoslav society, and later in post-Yugoslav countries the representation of the frontier had political connotation of Non-Alignment and neutrality with the respect to both Eastern and Western political blocs. The dominant political myths in Serbia suggest the importance of borderline and non-alignment to the East and / or West dating back to the early Middle Ages.

According to Dušan Bjelić physical ontology of the Balkans is less important than the construct of "the dark side of collective Europe", the place of Europe's forbidden desires, of vampires and tribalism (Bjelić 2011: 3). Broadly understood, the Balkans are "other Europe", a corresponding geography of small Eastern Europen nations from the Baltic to the Balkans that share more or less the same historical pattern of internnaly split populations allied with Western or Eastern empires. Although, physical geography is less important than being subjected to normalization, one can trace the frontiers of the Balkans in the broader context of Eastern Europe. Dušan Bjelić is one of few authors in this field who assumes a clear connection between the Balkans and Eastern Europe. In 1994. Larry Wolf published his book *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization in the Mind of the Enlightenment*. In his book, Wolf, shows that the distinction between East and the West did not arise by chance but came about as the result of an intellectual agenda, related both to Western European ideological self-interest and to scholars and writers self-promotion in the age of Enlightenment. In Southeast Europe, especially in post-Yugoslav countries, in Bulgaria and Albania this study has gone almost unnoticed. The first impression is the lack of interest in finding the connection between Enlightenment and imagining of the Balkans, although further reflection lead us to the problem of relation between two identities: between East-European / Southeast-European identity. Yugoslav societies have nurtured the aforementioned myth of physical and cultural displacement, both in relation to the East and to the West. The sense of triumph and superiority that these societies had been experiencing since the split between Tito and Stalin led to an increasing distance from Eastern Europe. The representations about Eastern Europe, which Wolf recognizes in the texts of the Enlightened, were in fact accepted in Yugoslavia (Wolf 1994).

Eastern Europe, as another imagined geography was considered economically and therefore socially and culturally inferior to Yugoslav societies that fostered different forms of hybridity. The image of poverty, corruption and dictatorship are among the dominant representations of Eastern Europe in the Balkans.

Kata Kulavkova considers the Balkans to be a geographical, historical, cultural and civilizational part of Europe, while its physical geography remains a subject of controversy (Kulavkova 2009: 9-12) The reason for this controversy is Western perception, which starts from the stereotypical image of a part of the world and associates it with “underdevelopment”, “barbarism”, cultivating political deception, myths with destructive ideologies and political immaturity. According to Kulavkova, Balkan is not a geography, but the result of imagination and mystification, the site of a memory and European axis. If he truly is a physical place, it must be related to a particular geostrategic position. Its intellectual, scientific and artistic potential have to be demystified not by the mere discovery of the space but by the deconstruction of counterproductive stereotypes (Kulavkova 2009: 9-12).

The conclusions about the discrepancy between the symbolic and physical geography of the Balkans can be roughly reduced to the division between the Balkan Peninsula and The Balkans as two incongruous or not-quite-consistent geographies. Unless The Balkans inhabits Balkan Penisula the usage of both terms is problematic to this day. However, by denying the physical place of the Balkans, these studies have largely closed their own path to developing and incorporating new theoretical and methodological challenges.

A GEOGRAPHICAL ‘TRAP’

While trying to point to the gap between the physical and symbolic geography of the Balkans, these authors, claim that this part of the world is “inhabited” by stereotypes. The analysis of stereotypes begins to resemble to a new production of geography that might be comparable to a museum of imaginary geographies. Denying its physical side, the imaginative side allows the deconstruction and reconstruction of the fluid world of imagination.

For example, while claiming that Balkan is tangible and firmly comparing to the ephemeral Orient, Maria Todorova supports the masculinist stereotype of the struggling Balkans, later recognized as part of the Western representation (Todorova 1999: 15). She also generalizes the myth on liminality on the Balkans as in-between space although different societies in this region hold on different semantics on this representation. Vesna Goldsworthy relies on the Orientalist paradigm, pointing to its relevance through only a couple of sentences. Dracula and other vampires, dark pitfalls, murder of the royal couple Obrenović, murder in Orient Express, are actually images from what she named imaginary travelogues. In the meantime, she neglects the fact that travelogues are the results of imagination and therefore, the author is not obliged to convey specific and accurate information. The place of the Balkans in the text remains tentative, based on the assumption that Hercoslavia and Ruritania are in fact camouflaged Balkans, and that murder in Orient Express happend somewhere near imaginary Balkans. Božidar Jezernik distinguishes "stunning" representations of South East Europe where people have tails, their eyes are glowing in the dark or they have ability to fly due to the fact they have wings (Jezernik 2007: 97)

The analysis of these sterotypes led to re-creation of a 19th Century map of the Balkans where these parts of the world were mentally inhabited by vampires and murderers; where strange and inexplicable things were happening; an imaginary space with irrational, dark features which cannot fit the "physical reality" of Europe. Such a map had to be rewriteen since the political circumstances of the late 1990s and early 2000s required creating the Balkans with new meanings .Thus, the Balkans as a place lost its space. So, does this mean that academics had to abolish the imaginary Balkans precisely because it is densely populated with stereotypes that made it unacceptable for the political, social and economic trends of the postmodern era? After the researchers reinvented their meanings to the world map by analyzing stereotypes, the Other had to be constructed as the creator of this map. Political circumstances that were moving toward democratization, transition, reconciliation of formerly conflicting countries and republics, and it was necessary to provide geographical, literary-theoretical, psychological and other explanations instead of those coming from the political sphere (Vukasović, 2020:77). The perception of the Balkans as a synonym for the Balkan Peninsula grew out of a somewhat paradoxal desire to present it in a neutral manner. The liminality that the authors are discussing cannot be seen on the map. The Balkans is not an area, in a geographical, cultural or social context. To determine the boundaries of a space means to bring it into a stable position, to attach it to the territory. If the geography attached to the Balkans is unchanging, that part of the world fosters a sense of displacement, rejection, unwantedness and danger, and its symbolic map lacks stability (Lazarević Radak 2011: 277) In doing so, by creating a dichotomy between place and space, Balkan studies entered the trap of their own theoretical and methodological position. This becomes a by-product of the critique of dichotomies that produce new dichotomies.

After this academic decade was over, it was clear that the text has opened an insight into constellations of literary worlds, some real, some less real, some clearly fictious. But in an attempt to continue with this research it is necessary to combine cros-disciplinary inputs, such as postcolonialism, literary theory, third space theory in order to open up a literary approach to spaces, one that is closer to globalization theory than to imagology. According to Tally, geocriticism expresses a capacity to sustain and improve these academic trends (Tally 2015: 1-16). The Balkans and Balkan Peninsula as a place as much as a space are more than mere physical location or imaginary geography. Narratives produce maps of the real and imaginary places represented in them, and the Balkan is just one example of these geographies. Geocritical approach emphasizes the ongoing interplay between text and land, earth and place. It uses the variety of texts to explore not only different geographical sites, but to identify tropes across geographic regions and across media representations (Tally 2001: 1-12). Both space and place, in this contex aim to bring together something that cannot be separated. This point of view allows cultural geographers to explore space and place through a network that includes people, practices, languages and representations. Physical and symbolic geography remain in constant interaction for it is inevitably entangled in power relations. Thus, space, place, human geography and representation should not exclude each other, but rather allow for a complementary, mutual understanding of how geography change in particular circumstances. In the last twenty years or more, the Balkans, like other parts of the world, were exposed to strong changes and adjustments to global trends. The reconstruction of his map of the 18th or 19th centuries actually testifies to the presence of particular discourses during the twentieth century, their slow variability and entry into political discourse.

According to Bertrand Westphal, these symbolic worlds are neither unique nor exceptional. They could rather be considered a rule. Traveling to Ruritania or Poldevia, did not bring a fundamentally different experience compared to traveling to, say, Lemuria, as it was a very similar place which image include mythologizing and derealization. Between the real and the imaginary, one comes across virgin spaces or terra incognita that offer no clear geographic referent that can be reduced to a unique representation (Westphal 2007: 119) Space oscillates between reality and fiction but the levels are not always discernible. The real, material order absorbs all configurations of representation, even those that seem to encompass modification of its structure (Westphal 2007: 91). According to Edward Soja, dualism or binary logic has tended to polarize spatial thinking around such fundamental oppositions as material, vs. mental, real vs imagined, space vs. thoughts about spaces. Therefore, traditional dichotomies require a creative deconstruction. The trialectics of spatiality identifies lived space, and alternative mode of spatial enquiry that extends the scope of the geographical imagination beyond the confiling dualism of spatial practices or perceived space, on the one hand, and the representations of space on the other (Soja 1999: 260-278)

CONCLUSION

Geo-criticism associates both geometric and philosophical coordinates of life – time and space in spatiotemporal scheme. It promotes a polysensuous approach to places as concrete and realized spaces (Westphal 2011: XIV). Such an inclusive approach to spatiality could be a way of looking at the spaces of literature, broadly conceived to include not only those places that readers and writers experience by means of text but also examining people and their lives. Balkan studies need to be situated between the geography of the real and the geography of the imaginary - two similar geographies that may lead to one another. The exploration of the real as much as imaginary spaces of literature is the goal of geocriticism. It certainly does not provide the answers to the question what are physical and what are imaginary borders of the Balkans, but to explore, seek, read, feel space/place. It should use polysensuous approach to places, concrete, imagined or both. These places are perceived with our eyes but it seems most appropriate to diversify sensing to include physical side of a place (Westphal 2011: IX-XVII) No representation is stable and permanent fluidity have to be considered as fundamential representation of identities and referentiality. Therefore, representations are linked with the referential world. Whether imaginary geography or physical space, the Balkan is not unique and unchangable. Representations and physical space remain interdependent while demographic changes, those in climatic and other natural conditions, reflect on the cultural context by changing lifestyles.

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Review article

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ONE DRAFT OF A POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR KOSOVO AND METOHIJA**

Abstract

The authors will point out some possible models for solving an extremely complex problem, which for decades has been an open issue for which, without much success, a mutually acceptable solution is being sought - Kosovo and Metohija. The paper analyzes three possible options, with different intensity of relations between the Republic of Serbia and so called Kosovo. In the first case, which implies the strongest relationship between Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija, this issue could be resolved by passing a law on substantial autonomy (with changes to certain constitutional provisions) which would formally assign all the competencies now available in the province, while the other two models do not imply the adoption of such a law, so it could be done exclusively by changing the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. In none of the proposed models, the so-called Kosovo would not have full international legal subjectivity, Serbia would not recognize Koso-

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vo's self-proclaimed independence, nor could so-called Kosovo become a member of the United Nations, and there would be no Kosovo Army. The province would have internal sovereignty.

Keywords: Kosovo and Metohija (KiM), Constitution, Duality of Constitutional Orders, Sustainable Solutions.

INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS

Kosovo and Metohija represent the core of our national and state-building identity. It gained a special place in the collective memory of Serbs thanks to the fact that a powerful medieval state of Nemanjić dinasty emerged in Kosovo and Metohija (hereandafter: KiM) and that it was its spiritual, economic and national centre and core. Hence, the term Kosovo for Serbs means the holy Serbian land, "Serbian Jerusalem", it is also a space from which Serbs have been systematically repressed by Albanians for centuries (Bataković 1999, 7). For KiM Albanians, the word Kosovo has the opposite meaning and it is a symbol of "ancient Albanian land" and means a combination of ancient Illyrian and modern Albanian ethnic community living in that area, and at the same time is a symbol of "occupied ethnic territory" (Bataković 1999, 8-9).

The specificity of the constitutional position of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (hereandafter: KiM) in the constitutional system of Serbia can be observed in the period from the formation of the second Yugoslav state until today (Bojanić 2017, 179-180). The Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia from 1946 established a form of asymmetric decentralization in Serbia, as one of the six Yugoslav republics. The Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Kosovo-Metohija Autonomous Region were formed. The latter is constitutionally equated with Vojvodina by the Constitution of the SFRY from 1963, when it acquired the status of an autonomous province.

The strengthening of the status of the autonomous provinces culminated in the 1974 Constitution, when they were almost equated with the republics in their position and became constitutive elements of the federation. This was preceded by the constitutional amendments from 1968, and in addition to the fact that Serbia's position was significantly weakened by them, the name of the southern Serbian province, which remains without Metohija in its official name, was also reduced. This process changed its direction at the end of the eighties of the twentieth century, when autonomy returned to the limits of its original meaning. As the decentralization of power in the previous period was basically a retrograde process that led to the disintegration of Serbia, in 1989 the Republic of Serbia, in an effort to eliminate the weaknesses of the then organization of power, passed amendments to the 1974 Constitution, where status of the provinces has changed significantly. Their normative powers were significantly narrowed, and Serbia no longer needed the consent of the provinces for the constitutional revision. The autonomous provinces no longer had constitutional and legislative power, nor their own judicial system.

Both post-socialist constitutions represent a complete break with the previous concept of decentralization of power in Serbia, and autonomy took on a new form which, now in the opposite direction to the period of socialist constitutionalism, deviates significantly from its theoretical concept (Bojanić 2017, 179). Here we primarily mean the position of AP Vojvodina, since on the territory of AP Kosovo and Metohija in 1999, after the end of the war that began with the attack of the most powerful military alliance - NATO on Serbia, an international protectorate was established, and in 2008 contrary to international and domestic law there was a declaration of independence of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, so that the implementation of constitutional provisions relating to the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is not possible at present.

An attempt to reach a solution to this decades-long conflict began in 2010, under the auspices of the United Nations, and with the mediation of the European Union in the negotiation process between Serbia and the so-called Kosovo. The dialogue resulted in the signing of The First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations (2013), (hereandafter Brussels Agreement) and the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo – general principles/main elements (2015) (hereandafter: CSM). These two political, as well as several technical agreements that were concluded in the negotiation process, did not, however, bring the desired results. They have only been partially implemented, or we can say, they have been implemented to the extent appropriate to Priština, while the part related to the Union of Serbian Municipalities is the only part that can potentially bring certain benefits to the Serbian side, although extremely limited, stay only as a word on paper.

COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCES AS A POSSIBLE GUIDE TO THE "FINAL" SOLUTION

In an attempt to find an answer to the question of which model would be sustainable and what would be a mutually acceptable solution for the KiM, we will take a look in comparative practice. Numerous conflicts in different parts of the world have been resolved, more or less successfully, in very different ways. Some solutions have stood the test of time, while on the other hand we have conflicts that have lasted for decades and have several agreements behind them that have not been able to be a good response to existing conflicts for a long time, and the final solutions are still not in sight. Arrangements that deserve our attention in light of the theme of this paper are undoubtedly Hong Kong, the Åland Islands and South Tyrol.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) is one of the exemplary models with *sui generis* formula "one country, two systems" enabled the re-establishment of Chinese sovereignty over a part of its territory that was a British colony for more than a century (from the First Opium War to 1997). The period of colonial rule left strong consequences on culture, economy, education, in a word, on all segments of the life of the citizens of Hong Kong. In order for the reunification process to run smoothly, with much less negative consequences for the citizens of this region, the motherland opted for a theoretical model that was not previously applied in practice, and except in the case of Hong Kong, the same formula was applied to Macau (1999).

The basis for the establishment of this model was created by the constitutional changes from 1982, when the new Constitution of the People's Republic of China was adopted at the fifth session of the Fifth National People's Congress. Article 31 stipulates that the state may, if necessary, establish special administrative areas by law (Constitution of the People's Republic of China). China has committed itself not to establish a socialist system on the territory of HKSAR and that the existing political and economic system will be maintained on the territory of Hong Kong for the next 50 years (BL, Art. 5) . It is clear that China intends to preserve the specifics of the HKSAR within the "one country, two systems" model, while at the same time being part of a single national space and as such an example of a possible reunification of China with Taiwan (Yip 2015, 21).

The position of Hong Kong as an inseparable part of China (BL, Art. 1), the organization of government and the relationship with the motherland are regulated by the Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. The People's National congress granted HKSAR a high degree of autonomy in the area of legislative, executive and independent judiciary, including the last instance court (BL, Art. 2). Legislative and executive power will consist of representatives of residents permanently residing in the region, in accordance with the guarantees provided by the Basic Law, and the regional authorities will take care of the protection of human rights and freedoms of HKSAR residents, in accordance with the law (BL, Art 3 and 4).The Basic Law stipulates that legislation that was in force while Hong Kong was under British rule will apply in the region, with the exception of norms that are in conflict with the Basic Law or other laws of the People's National Congress (BL, Art. 8), in addition to Chinese and the English language is in equal official use (BL, Art. 10).

HKSAR enjoys a high degree of autonomy and is directly under the Central People's Government. The Central Government has two key competencies, defense and foreign affairs, whereby the Ministry of Foreign Affairs having an office in Hong Kong that cooperates with regional authorities on issues of regional importance, and in accordance with the Basic Law (Art. 2), regional authorities are empowered to deal with "relevant foreign affairs (IOSCPRC, 6).

The process of reunification did not go completely smoothly, but according to Sou (Alvin Y. So), it betrayed the expectations of both “political pessimists” and “economic optimists”. Namely, it turned out that after 1997, China respected the policy of “one country, two systems” and that the fear of authoritarian rule was unfounded, so in that sense there was no restriction of freedoms in any segment. On the other hand, economic expectations have been betrayed, although the economic downturn cannot be attributed to the transition but to the 1998 Asian economic crisis (So 2011, 108). The beginning of the 21st century brings the first wave of discontent, so in 2004, 500,000 people took to the streets of Hong Kong. Ten years later, new mass protests known as the “umbrella of the revolution” followed, as a reaction to the way the head of the executive was elected, and in 2019 the continuation of the “umbrella of the revolution” followed in protest against the extradition law. Regardless of all the “noise” that occurs on the Hong Kong-Beijing route, it could be concluded that the “one country, two systems” model works successfully and manages to deal with the problems that arise in its functioning.

One of the frequently mentioned arrangements is the one applied in South Tyrol, ie the province of Bolzano. This province in South Tyrol (Italy) is said to be an example of successfully resolved interethnic relations and conflicts between two national communities - the Italian and the German (Austrian). The problem of the German minority in South Tyrol has long burdened relations between Italy and Austria. It was finally resolved in 1992 when the Italian government informed Austria that it had fully implemented the agreements reached and fulfilled all agreed obligations to the German minority in South Tyrol (Raduški 2008, 243). Although it is not possible to compare the German-Italian dispute in South Tyrol with the Serbian-Albanian one in Kosovo and Metohija, neither in the social, cultural, nor in the civilizational sense, it is still easy to identify some common elements. This would eventually indicate the possibility of applying this model in our conditions, no matter how specific they were in relation to those in South Tyrol. By the way, after the Second World War and the impossibility for South Tyrol to join Austria (Raduški 2009, 237), this Austrian-Italian dispute escalated so much that in some elements it reminds us of what is happening (and was happening) in Kosovo and Metohija between Serbs and Albanians, with one peculiarity. Namely, what happened to the Germans as a national minority in Italy, in the southern Serbian province in the period of almost five decades after the Second World War, happened to the Serbs by members of the national minority. This primarily refers to the violent assimilation of the German minority, its Italianization, ban on the use of the native language, favoring Italians in employment, unequal economic and social treatment of South Tyrol in relation to the rest of Italy, etc. Patiently and with good the will of both sides, the Austrian and the Italian, this problem began to be solved back in 1946. by concluding the agreement De Gasperi - Gruber[1] that in the 60s of the XX century it was fulfilled with a Package of measures that was supposed to ensure broad autonomy for South Tyrol in various areas of life. This referred to linguistic equality in social and public services, bilingual marking of topographical names, learning in native language, broad competencies in culture, economy, finance, etc. (Raduški 2009, 239).

Italy has successfully resolved this conflict with the Austrian national minority in South Tyrol (Bocano province) by giving it broad autonomy, which shows that its regional model of decentralization is also functional and applicable to solving problems in other countries and national communities. The province of Bocano (as well as Trentino as part of the region of Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol) within the framework of primary regional jurisdiction (in accordance with the Constitution) regulates a number of issues of common regional importance, provincial bureaus, naming places, protection of historical, artistic and folklore values, cultural institutions: academies, libraries, museums, etc; landscaping, nature protection, development of crafts, hunting and fishing, roads, traffic, water supply, catering, tourism, etc. (Raduški 2009, 239). In addition to this primary (joint) competence, even more important for the provinces is the secondary legislative competence with which (in accordance with regional laws) they regulated issues of provincial importance: local police, education, local public events, public companies, health, sports, etc. (Mitić 1998, 407).

1) De Gasperi signed this agreement, which guarantees the German national minority the widest autonomy, without any external pressure. In addition to preserving the language and culture, all Germans who moved from South Tyrol to Nazi Germany were offered to return, provided they did not commit war crimes. His motive could be located in the desire for the neighboring Yugoslavia to act in the same way with regard to the Italian minority that was expelled from Dalmatia and Istria.

At the other end of the European continent, in the Åland Islands, there is a much higher level of autonomy, which those well acquainted with this topic do not hesitate to claim is the best European model of autonomy. Even some analysts believe that the autonomy enjoyed by Swedes on the island is so broad, with such powers that they are sufficient for an independent state (Raduški 2008, 246).

Åland autonomy has been developed since 1920. when Finland offered the local population on the island some autonomy. The completion of this process of shaping Aland autonomy followed in the 1990s, when the peak was reached in the conduct of minority policy and the guarantee of minority rights (Mihajlović and Bojanić 2012, 137).

The specificity of the Åland autonomy is the developed competence of the Åland Parliament, which independently regulates the spectrum of local areas of life: culture, education, police, social protection, sports, health, etc., but also some original characteristics that make this autonomy typically "Nordic", different from others in Europe. This originality of Åland autonomy includes some symbols and elements of statehood: citizenship, official Swedish, flag (blue-yellow-red), special car plate, postage stamp, national holiday (June 9 - start of the local parliament 1921) but also some other characteristics such as independent local newspapers and television, the Åland delegation that resolves disputes between the island and Finland, etc. (Raduški 2008, 154-155).

The Åland autonomy succeeded because Finland showed goodwill towards the Swedes on the island and made concessions to them that were respectable. Of course, the question remains whether, in the conditions of strained Serbian-Albanian relations and the exclusivity of the Albanian side, which for now does not agree to anything but independence, Albanians would be ready to accept for themselves and be satisfied with such a status and to generously offer to Serbs the same kind of political concessions, autonomy within autonomy.

IN SEARCH FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION

From the constitutional point of view, the formula for resolving the "Serbian square" can be sought only within the four fundamental grounds of international and domestic law, which means relying on the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, which request the change of the Serbian Constitution, a greater or lesser extent, in accordance with the prescribed procedure, which includes the voting of citizens in a referendum.

When it comes to specific modalities that would enable a permanent solution to the issue of Kosovo and Metohija, and the nature of this text is such that they will be given in principle, "steps" of three possible options will be presented, and that could be the basis for negotiations opposing sides. Before we present the basic elements of some of the possible ideas in the search for a formula for resolving the issue of Kosovo and Metohija, we want to emphasize that this view is basically the closest to the views they have presented on this topic, both in their scientific works and in the first Round table (whose participant was also the first author) within the Internal Dialogue by the Professors Vladan Petrov (2017: 99-102 and 2014: 111-120) and Slobodan Orlović (2017: 103-106; Orlović and Ristivojević, 2018: 247-265), which was initiated by the President of the Republic, in the way that many issues will be elaborated in this paper.[2]

In our opinion, with full respect for reality, and on the basis of the current course of "negotiations" between KiM Albanians, ie. Priština authorities and the Republic of Serbia, which are conducted with the mediation of the European Union, there are not many possible modalities left to resolve this complex issue, which would respect the facts and guarantee as applicable a solution that would enable stability in the region. To be more precise, we believe that it is possible to talk about three *sui generis* scenarios (modalities), where, basically, there are three different degrees of connection, ie independence of KiM, and consequently, from the point of view

2) In this paper, we will point out the solutions that should provide guarantees for the position of the Serbian community within the Kosmet autonomy - the model of "autonomy in autonomy", without pretensions to conceptualize the "ideal model".

of Serbia's interests, in the first case it can speak of a *desirable*, in the second of an *acceptable* and in the third case of a solution that represents a *red line*, a minimum below which it is not possible to go because in that way the sovereignty of Serbia in other parts of the Republic - Presevo, Bujanovac, Medveđa, Dimitrovgrad, Bosilegrad, parts of Bačka mostly inhabited by the Hungarian national minority - would be called into question. What is common to all three options is that in no case will the so-called Kosovo have full international legal personality, will not under any circumstances recognize Kosovo's independence, which means that a seat in the United Nations is reserved for the Republic of Serbia, without the possibility that KiM will one day become its member.

The preferred model implies substantial autonomy of the KiM, which means that the law on substantial autonomy, which would be adopted in accordance with the procedure for amending the Constitution (in accordance with Article 182), would "given" powers, and in that sense, this solution would eliminate the gap between the normative and the real, ie. between the constitutional and factual position of the southern Serbian province. This model implies the existence of two different legal orders within the Republic of Serbia, one that would be valid on the territory of central Serbia and the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, and the other on the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, as a separate entity under the constitutional umbrella of Serbia, which would be regulated by amendments to the Serbian Constitution and the law of substantive autonomy. In that context, Orlović talks about "resetting" in two steps (2018: 263).

With this law, the Republic of Serbia would transfer all competencies in favor of so-called Kosovo, except those that limit the international legal subjectivity, ie external sovereignty of this territory and competencies in securing the territory's borders with third countries, and they would be provided by members of the Serbian Army in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244, together with members of the Ministry of Interior of so-called Kosovo (KPS), while customs and inspection activities at border crossings would be "sovereignly" performed by the Priština authorities. At the external borders of the province and at the external borders of Serbia, in order to increase internal and regional security, harmonized rules of border control would be applied. KiM would have a constitution as the highest legal act, and it would be passed by the province`s Assembly. The province would have the right to its symbols - the coat of arms and the flag, and they would reflect its multiethnic character and commitment to European values and principles. In the areas inhabited by the majority Serbian population, in addition to the provincial ones, the republican symbols would also be prominent. In the territory of KiM, the competencies that manifest the internal element of sovereignty would fully belong to its bodies, in accordance with the Constitution of KiM and the Brussels Agreement.

At the internal level, "autonomy" would be reflected in the existence of all elements of statehood, and the organization of government would be as it actually exists in that territory today, according to the current "Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo" and the Brussels Agreement. Kosovo and Metohija, but this new constitution would not have to contain changes of essential character in relation to the current situation, but it could be in fact the same text, with certain linguistic and stylistic changes that are necessary, but this opportunity should certainly be used to eliminate so-called Kosovo Constitution's text inconsistencies in Serbian and Albanian, which is now the case. Professor Darko Simović wrote about this issue in great detail (2018: 213-222), and the nature of this text does not allow a more detailed treatment of this issue).

Thus, power would be organized on the principle of division into legislative, executive and judicial. Legislative power would belong to the assembly, executive power would be shared by the government and the president, and judicial power would be exercised by courts organized in accordance with the constitution, laws and the Brussels Agreement. The Constitutional Court would be competent to assess constitutionality and legality. The monopoly of physical force would belong to the police and gendarmerie of KiM,[3] without the right to establish an army. Republic and provincial criminal legislation and the system of execution of criminal

3) The unconstitutionally formed "Kosovo Army" would be transformed into the KiM Gendarmerie, which would be a counterpart to the Gendarmerie of the Republic of Serbia in terms of weapons, formation and role, and would have its role on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. This formation should not possess weapons larger than 30 mm.

sanctions would be harmonized. The province would pursue an independent monetary and fiscal policy, while maintaining the bi-currency system that now actually exists, under the control of the respective central banks.[4] The possibility of double taxation would be ruled out and customs policies would be harmonized, with consistent application of the CEFTA agreement. An unhindered flow of persons, goods and capital would be guaranteed. The system of insurance of property (movable and immovable), persons and capital would be harmonized. Natural resources would be managed by joint "Belgrade-Priština" corporations, and the share in ownership would be divided in the ratio of 50% -50%, whereby the same principle would apply to property on the entire territory of the province.

Provincial legislation related to the state survey and real estate cadaster would be harmonized with the republic legislation, and the records in the land books would be fully harmonized within two years from reaching an agreement. By mutual agreement, in order to increase general security and prevent abuses in terms of exercising rights in the Republic, ie autonomy, republican and provincial authorities would have the right to inspect the registers of both levels of government, with appropriate measures to protect against possible abuse of personal data.

The autonomous province would be widely decentralized, and in addition to local self-government units - municipalities, there would be a middle level of government - the cantons. Serbs in the province would enjoy territorial, personal and institutional autonomy, so that they would exercise the right to self-government within Serb-majority municipalities, which, according to the territorial principle, would be interconnected into Serbian cantons (the cantonization proposal dates from 1998 when he presented it D. Bataković (1988: 1-2 and Bataković 2013), and later, in a similar or modified form, was supported or proposed by the representatives of Serbs in the Transitional Council, the Government of Serbia and the Serbian Orthodox Church) to which Serbian monasteries and their estates would be annexed where possible, while in other cases, the principle of extraterritoriality was applied, which would also

4) The bi-currency system would exist throughout Kosovo and Metohija and would function according to the 1999 UNMIK model.

apply to the clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church (property and clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church in KiM would be protected by members of the MUP and the Serbian Army, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244). The highest legal act of the canton would be the cantonal statute, which is independently adopted by the cantonal assemblies as an expression of the right to self-organization. Local and regional self-government would be conceived in accordance with the principles contained in the European charters on local and regional self-government. Local and regional self-government units would have original competencies and source revenues that provide a significant level of self-government and autonomy. The right to education and health care for Serbs would, as before, be exercised within the education and health system of Serbia. Apart from the province, Serbs would have the right to exercise their electoral rights in parliamentary and presidential elections, in accordance with the electoral legislation of the Republic. Voting for the republican elections would be organized in each municipality that is a member of the CSM, and it would be possible to vote online, so that as many voters as possible could exercise their right. The citizens of the province would have provincial citizenship, and in accordance with the republic legislation, the citizenship of Serbia, and they could decide whether they will have a passport of the Republic of Serbia or a travel document of the Priština authorities. All persons born on the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija would have the right to provincial citizenship, as well as all persons whose both or one of the parents was born in KiM. The basic limitation of sovereignty would refer to the international legal subjectivity of the territory. KiM would independently establish its consular missions, pursue an independent foreign policy, but its membership in international organizations would be limited. Membership in the United Nations, Military Alliances (NATO), the European Union, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, UNESCO, INTERPOL (the list would be precisely defined in the law on essential autonomy and agreement between the Belgrade and Priština authorities) would be reserved for Serbia, and Priština could have its representatives within the Serbian delegation. Civilian airspace control, which has been under the authority of the KFOR Commander since 1999, would be the responsibility of the Air Traffic Control Agency of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo and Metohija (now SMATSA), and the KFOR Commander would have oversight powers over the control of the airspace of Kosovo and Metohija. This constitutional arrangement outlines the essential autonomy such that the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija represents a territory with a special legal system under the constitutional roof of Serbia, which has internal but not external sovereignty, without which there is no statehood. Therefore, it is a political-territorial collectivity that has a limited international legal subjectivity, and at the internal level it is legally unlimited, sovereign.

An acceptable solution would include several more concessions that Serbia would make in relation to the presented model. The name of the territory would be bilingual in all documents and official communication, which means that the name in Serbian and Albanian would be used at the same time, and it would read the Autonomna Republika Kosovo i Metohija[5]/Republika Autonome e Kosovës[6]. Unlike the first model, in this case the establishment of a special constitutional order in Kosovo and Metohija would be regulated exclusively on the basis of constitutional provisions, without the enactment of a law on substantial autonomy. The constitution would provide for certain restrictions on the independence of that separate constitutional order, and it would refer to the non-existence of the military and membership in international organizations as in the previous model. Decentralization of power would be carried out at the level of local self-government, with municipalities with a majority Serb population enjoying a higher level of self-government, and the CSM would be established, which would have significant source competencies and source revenues, and statute would be passed independently. Members of the CSM assembly would be elected in direct elections.

In Serb majority municipalities, there would be a local police force to ensure public order and peace.[7] The property and clergy of

5) In Serbian

6) In Albanian

7) The entry of special police forces and gendarmerie would be possible only in the case of the fight against organized crime and terrorism, with prior notice to the KFOR commander and the simultaneous presence of the local police and the Protector of Citizens.

the Serbian Othodox Churc, which would enjoy extraterritoriality in the territory of the autonomous republic, would be protected by members of the local police force with members of the Kosovo and Metohija police. The ownership and management share of Serbia in natural resources and property on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija would be 30%, and the autonomous republic would have 70%, except when it comes to Gazivode, National park „Šar-planina", Trepca and ski center Brezovica, where the ratio would be 50% - 50%. Residents of the KiM would have citizenship and autonomous travel documents, and Serbs would also have Serbian citizenship, in accordance with the Repulic of Serbia Law on Citizenship. Citizens of KiM would exercise the right to vote within the borders and bodies of autonomy, and Serbian citizens in accordance with the republican legislation (as according to the first model). Kosovo and Metohija would have independent diplomatic and consular missions, and as in the previous model, it would not have full international legal subjectivity.

The most powerless connection between Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija would be based on the third model. As in the previous model, Serbia would prescribe the duality of constitutional legal orders on its territory, and it would transfer all competencies in the area of Kosovo and Metohija to its authorities. Autonomna Republika Kosovo i Metohija[8]/Republika Autonome e Kosovës[9] would not have the obligation to adopt a new constitution, but the existing constitution of the so-called Kosovo would be "accepted" by agreement, with the necessity of changes discussed within the first model (and this applies to all laws and bylaws). Decentralization would be achieved at the level of local self-government, in accordance with the current factual situation and with the obligation to form the CSM, whereby the community would have executive powers, and the election of assembly members would be modeled on the election of local assembly members.

It would be possible to form new Serb-majority local self-government units (municipalities) in line with the Ahtisaari plan and the 1981 and 2000 censuses (UNMIK census). These municipalities

8) In Serbian

9) In Albanian

would join the CSM.[10] Based on these censuses (15% of the Serbian population), in accordance with the principle of positive discrimination, the Serbian population would be guaranteed a representation of 16.67% (1/6) of employees in state administration bodies and public companies. on the territory of the province, as well as in the provincial authorities. The guaranteed number of seats for members of the Serb community in the provincial assembly would be 15, out of a total of 120. The province's constitution would define issues of vital national interest for the Serbian people, whose changes would require a two-thirds majority of the total number of deputies. a majority of all elected representatives of the Serb community. The statute of the CSM would be adopted in accordance with the provisions of the Brussels Agreement, and in accordance with the above censuses and the situation before March 24, 1999 with regard to property rights, the territory "covered" by the CSM could not be less than 1/5 of the territory provinces. Local self-government units (with a majority Serb population) would have a local police whose competence, among other things, would be to protect religious buildings, the entire property of the Serbian Orthodox Church and its staff, for which a special status would be provided. The external borders of Kosovo and Metohija would be secured by its police and gendarmerie, and integrated management would function at administrative crossings, with the application of uniform rules of border control at all external borders, as envisaged in the first model. The possibility of using the symbols of the Republic of Serbia, along with the symbols of Kosovo and Metohija, on the territory of the CSM would be regulated by a special law. Civilian control of airspace, by the decision of the KFOR Commander, would be entrusted to the Air Traffic Control Agency of Serbia and Montenegro, and would be carried out under the auspices of the UN and KFOR. According to this model, Kosovo and Metohija would not have the right to its own army, and international legal subjectivity would be limited, while in all other segments it would enjoy full independence, as already shown in previous models (without full membership in the United Nations, Military Alliances (NATO), the European Union, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, UNESCO, INTERPOL).

10) Establishing of new Serbian municipalities would be approved by an independent EU commission, and verified by the Provincial Assembly without the right to challenge it.

When it comes to natural resources, Serbia would have an ownership and management share only in Trepca, Gazivode and the Ski Center Brezovica, and it would be 50% in all three entities. A two-currency system would exist on the territory of the CSM and the Republic of Serbia would have the right to constitute monetary, financial and tax control bodies that would be employees of the CSM. Criminal legislation, state survey and cadastre, insurance of property and persons, free movement of property, persons and capital would be regulated in the manner envisaged by the first model.

The Republic of Serbia has the permanent right to delegate one non-residential operator of information and communication services that would function on the entire territory of the province in full technical not roaming capacity, but would represent a specially registered legal entity on the territory of the province whose taxpayer it would be.

The education and health system would function in accordance with the Brussels Agreement, with curricula in primary and secondary schools in the Serbian language fully harmonized with the curricula in central Serbia and AP Vojvodina, and students would receive double certificates and diplomas, the Autonomous Republic of Kosovo and Metohija and the Republic of Serbia. A joint commission, consisting of an equal number of representatives of the national accreditation bodies of Serbia and KiM, would be responsible for the accreditation of study programs and institutions in higher education (the University of Kosovska Mitrovica with its 10 faculties and the Academy of Vocational Studies). After graduation, students would receive double degrees, since these institutions would be accredited in the higher education system of the Republic of Serbia, based on the principle of non-territoriality of the University.[11] Health institutions in the Serb-majority area would be organized in accordance with the current facts and educational institutions, would be under the jurisdiction of local self-government and CSM. The status of employees in education and health would be regulated in the way it was done in the judiciary and the police. The Republic reserves the right to special

11) And now on the territory of the province there is IBCM (http://www.ibcmitrovica.eu) which is accredited in the German higher education system (EVELAG). Also, in central Serbia, many faculties accredit their study programs in English in the USA, UK, German, French, and even Slovenian accreditation bodies.

subsidies to institutions and employees in health, education and culture, as well as the Serbian Orthodox Church, in accordance with regulations adopted at the state level. Grants are not subject to taxation and fees.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We are sure that the first model, desirable for Serbia, would be difficult to accept for the Priština authorities, but it could serve as a good starting point for a platform for negotiations. Unfortunately, the other model, which is acceptable to us, does not have much more chance of success, but in the second phase of the negotiation process, it could be a "topic for discussion" between the two sides. The third, "minimal" model is something that seems the most realistic, because in every negotiation process, both parties are expected to make certain concessions in relation to the initial positions. If there is no readiness for concessions, then there are no real negotiations or prospects for an agreement, so negotiations are pointless if Priština ultimately insists on "mutual recognition".

As far as Serbia is concerned, in our deep conviction, the third model is a red line that must not be crossed. Therefore, Serbia must not recognize Kosovo's independence at any cost, nor can it agree to Kosovo and Metohija's membership in the United Nations. At the same time, it is necessary to provide an appropriate level of self-government for members of the Serb community in Kosovo and Metohija, and about a specific model - whether the Serb community would get the status of the Republika Srpska in the Federation of BiH, whether it would be the position of the Åland in Finland, Tyrol in Italy or "Hong Kong in Hong Kong", is an issue that would be resolved through negotiations. The European Union, which is interested in extinguishing this hotspot, as one of the basic security challenges on "its" territory, should provide additional motivation to the conflicting parties, and it would consist of the accession of the Republic of Serbia with Kosovo and Metohija to the EU, within one year from the date of reaching an agreement. We believe that this would significantly relax the position of both sides in the negotiations, because it would be easier to agree to some compromise solutions, which would have a different meaning and weight from the point of view of an EU member. The guarantors of the agreement between Belgrade and Priština, in addition to the EU, would be Russia, China and the United States.

It should be emphasized that reaching an agreement is extremely important from the aspect of the global fight against terrorism, considering the fact that Kosovo and Metohija is one of the largest bases in Southeast Europe for recruiting and training members of numerous terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda or ISIS. After reaching an agreement between Belgrade and Priština, Kosovo and Metohija would be the center of Southeast Europe in the fight against terrorism, and with the security services of Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija, in this field would play an active role all other relevant entities dealing with this globally issues. Multinational teams would be formed to fight terrorism.

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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE LIFE**

Resume

The paper analyzes the relationship between freedom of expression and the right to respect for honour and reputation. It was pointed out the importance that is given to freedom of expression nowadays, and it was especially considered the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. On that occasion, the difference that exists between public and private personalities was pointed out, as well as the doubts that may arise from the distinction between factual statements and value judgments. When it comes to the right to privacy, the author referred to the importance of honour and reputation, and on that occasion reminded of the "double" presence of these values. In one case it is Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and in another the case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the meaning of the term of the right to privacy from Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Solutions in domestic law and case law are analyzed, and special attention is paid to one case in which the relationship between freedom of expression and violation of honor and reputation was discussed. The specificity of this situation is reflected, inter alia, in the fact that we are talking about university professors.

The author used the normative, comparative and historical method when writing the paper.

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The Supreme Court of the United States [SCOTUS] in *Cohen v. California* (403 US15.24 [1971]) pointed out that the guarantee in Amendment I (The US Bill of Rights) on freedom of speech and expression stems from „the belief that no other position is linked to the principle of dignity and free choice of every individual, on which the American political system“ (Wachsmann 2012, 450). This approach points to two aspects of freedom of expression, where the first is of a personal and the second of a social and political nature (Favoreu et al. 2009, 478).

The personal aspect of freedom of expression is manifested as the right of everyone to spiritual freedom, ie the right to have opinions and beliefs and to be able to express them freely without fear of harassment. On the other hand, freedom of expression is necessary for social life, because it enables everyone to communicate with others. Properly from the social side of freedom of expression arises its political dimension, as pointed out by the European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR][1] in a 1995 case [ECtHR [G.Ch.], *Vogt v. Germany*, 17851/91, 26. September 1995). On that occasion, freedom of expression was marked as a cornerstone of the principles of democracy and human rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with additional protocols Ratification Act – [ECHR], „Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro – lnternationals treaties“, N ° 9/03, 5/05 and 7/05-correc. and „Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia – Internationals treaties“, N° 12/10 and 10/15).

The importance of the right to freedom of expression is undoubted for the establishment of democratic institutions, because freedom of opinion is possible and conceivable only in an environment that presupposes the presence of different ideas and at the same time enables their confrontation. However, in certain cases, it may

1) It is a judgment Grand chamber [G.Ch.] of ECtHR.

be raised the question of the limits of the exercise of this freedom. These are situations that in the doctrine of constitutional law and the practice of the highest courts are usually referred to as „fighting democracy“. This is the basis from which is derived the court's ability to restrict certain rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of expression (Hennebel and Tigroudja 2016, 1090).[2]

In that sense, the doctrine mentions the prohibition of abuse of rights provided by Article 17 of the ECHR,[3] stating that these are exceptional cases that do not diminish the essential power of the guarantee of freedom of expression (Renucci 2012, 186). Namely, the general aim of Article 17 of the ECHR is to prevent totalitarian groups from exploiting the principles proclaimed by the ECHR (Villiger 2012, 322-323). The European Commission of Human Rights [ECom.HR] has already taken the position (*ECom.HR, J. Glimmerveen and J. Hagenbeek v. The Netherlands*, 8348/78 & 8406/78, 11 October 1979) that Art. 17 the ECHR focuses essentially on rights that provide an opportunity to try, if invoked, to take effective action aimed at destroying the rights or freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR.

BOUNDARIES OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

The right to freedom of expression includes, in accordance with Art. 10 para. 1 ECHR, the freedom to hold opinions, to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. There are exceptions to this

2) The US Supreme Court first acted in this way in 1919 (SCOTUS, *Schenk v. United States*, 249 U.S. 47-1919) when it assessed that the notion of „obvious and present danger“ justifies the enactment of laws restricting freedom of expression. The key arguments he relied on were espionage during the war and subversive activities that the government sought to prevent. This second reason served during the Cold War as a basis for restricting the freedom of expression of the Communist Party (SCOTUS, *Dennis v. United States*, 341 U.S. 494-1951). The SCOTUS has subsequently significantly eased the restrictive approach and now requires the submission of evidence of concrete action, as freedom of expression cannot be restricted on the basis of ordinary statements.

3) Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention (art. 17 ECHR).

rule contained in Art. 10 para. 2 of the ECHR, and their ratio is derived from the duties and responsibilities that exist in the exercise of this right. The cases where the right to freedom of expression may be subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society are: national security, territorial integrity, public safety, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or morals, protection of reputation or the rights of others, preventing the disclosure of information obtained in confidence and preserving the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Before a more detailed analysis of the relationship between the right to freedom of expression and the protection of the reputation of others, it will be considered the development of the practice of the Strasbourg authorities in the most important terms (Art. 10 para. 2 ECHR).

The European Court of Human Rights first ruled on the boundaries of freedom of expression in the *Handyside* case (ECtHR, *Handyside v. The United Kingdom*, 5493/72, 7 December 1976). It was about the seizure of „The Little Red Schoolbook“, which was intended for students, and contained a part related to sex education. The position of the European Court of Human Rights was that the English courts did not violate Art. 10 ECHR.

Such an approach is based on the understanding that the right to freedom of expression applies not only to information or ideas that are accepted by the public with approval, but also to those that may offend, astonish and upset the state or part of the population. In other words, freedom of expression has been placed in the function of a democratic society as the highest value protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (Popović 2012, 325-326). The same verdict states that there is no uniform European system of „morality“ and that states have a wide field of free assessment when determining measures to protect moral standards in society (Omejec 2013, 1269).[4]

4) Precisely this ECtHR judgment is considered to be the basis for the emergence of the doctrine of free assessment by national authorities. Namely, it expressed for the first time the position that state bodies, due to their direct and permanent contact with the most important forces in their countries, are in principle in a better position than any international judge to decide on the actual content of the request, as well as „necessity“ „restrictions“ or „penalties“ aimed at meeting those requirements.

The existence of European differences could be one of the explanations for the inconsistency with which the European Court of Human Rights approached exceptions to the right to freedom of expression. Namely, until the entry into force of Protocol 11 to the ECHR in the practice of the ECtHR there was no excessive consistency in the interpretation of certain exceptions, which is an expression of the understanding that at the European level it is not possible to uniformly determine the requirement for protection of morals as opposed to protect the independence of the judiciary (Wachsmann 2012, 453). Accordingly, the Strasbourg Court found a violation of the right to freedom of expression due to the criminal conviction of a television journalist who published on the show statements of young people from the social margins who expressed extremely violent racist views (ECtHR [G.Ch.], *Jersild v. Denmark*, 15890/89, 23 September 1994). And in one case against France, in which national courts convicted persons of justifying the crimes of Marshal Péten's cooperation with the enemy (although it was not a denial of *stricto sensu*, but an attempt to initiate a debate on a comprehensive view of his role in public life), a violation of Art. 10 ECHR (ECtHR, *Lehideux and Isorni v. France*, 24662/94, 23 September 1998). In the doctrine part, there is an opinion that these decisions express the efforts of the European Court of Human Rights to condemn large democracies that seek to provide protection to „victims" of anti-democratic actions (Renucci 2012, 188-189).

Following the entry into force of Protocol 11 to the ECHR and the abolition of the European Commission of Human Rights in 1998, the practice of the ECtHR has become more uniform. This has the consequence that statements characterized by racist content, discrimination or hatred do not provide protection linked to the right to freedom of expression. In that sense, the ECtHR took the position that the conviction of the president of a political party for statements in which he publicly incited discrimination or hatred did not violate Art. 10 ECHR (ECtHR, *Féret v. Belgium*, 15615/07, 16 July 2009).

Some authors express concern that the practice of the ECtHR could move in the direction of giving excessive freedom to the media in relation to the discussion of issues of general interest

(Wachsmann 2012, 453-454). A drastic example is the case in which the European Court of Human Rights found that a French court violated the right to freedom of expression under Art. 10 ECHR by a decision banning the sale of the book of President Mitterrand's personal physician due to a serious violation of the obligation of professional secrecy (ECtHR, *Edition Plon v. France*, 58148/00, 18 May 2014). The health condition of the President of the Republic as an issue that can be the subject of public debate in a democratic society, was the key argument on which the Strasbourg verdict was based.

This evolution of ECtHR practice should come as no surprise, especially given that freedom of media coverage has always been given great importance, which means, among other things, that journalists can use exaggeration and even provocations to some extent (ECtHR, *Prager and Oberschick v. Austria*, 15974/90, 26 August 1995). Given that this approach carries the risk of sensationalism in the media, the task of the ECtHR is to contribute to the discussion of topics of general interest and at the same time to the development of professional reporting standards (Renucci 2012, 198-199).

One of the reasons why it is possible to restrict the right to freedom of expression is to protect the reputation or rights of others. Some authors consider that it is surprising that, until comparatively recently, there was so little direct authority under Art. 8 ECHR on media intrusion into the private lives of individuals (Ovey and White 2006, 296). This was „compensated" in a certain way by Resolution Res1165 (1998) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the right to privacy adopted on 26 June 1998. It is prescribed in Art. 4 that the right to privacy, guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, has already been defined by the Assembly in the declaration on mass communication media and human rights, contained within Resolution 428 (1970), as „the right to live one's own life with a minimum of interference." The reference to Resolution 428 (1970) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, adopted on 23 January 1970, which contained the Declaration on mass communication media and Human Rights, meant that the term right to privacy concerns, inter alia, moral integrity, honour and reputation (Art. 16).

RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR A PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE

The right to respect for private and family life implies that everyone has the right to respect for his private life, his home and his correspondence (Art. 8 para. 1 ECHR). The doctrine emphasizes that privacy is a necessary condition that the processes, which contribute to social uniqueness and civilization, take place in accordance with human dignity. Privacy represents the possibility of respite and withdrawal from public life, provides an opportunity and space for reflection, thus opening the door to social engagement (Sourgens 2017, 360). The main goal of Art. 8 The ECHR is to provide effective protection of the individual against any arbitrary interference by public authorities (Renucci 2012, 265-266). It is somewhat strange that Art. 8 ECHR does not mention the right to respect for one's honor and reputation, although it does Art. 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which served as the main source of reference for the drafting of Art. 8 ECHR (de Vries 2018, 678).

This issue has been resolved in the practice of the ECtHR, which accepts that the right to protection of reputation is a right which is protected by Art. 8 ECHR as part of the right to respect for private life. It is about a broad term which is not susceptible to exhaustive definition, which covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person and can therefore embrace multiple aspects of a person's identity, such as gender identification and sexual orientation, name or elements relating to a person's right to their image (ECtHR [G.Ch.], *Axel Springer AG v. Germany*, 39954/08, 7 February 2012). In order for Art. 8 ECHR to come into play, however, an attack on a person's reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life (ECtHR [G.Ch.], *Bédat v Switzerland*, 56925/08, 29 March 2016). This requirement covers *social reputation* in general as well as *professional reputation* in particular (ECtHR [G.Ch.], *Denisov v. Ukraine*, 76639/11, 25 September 2018). The Court has held, moreover, that Art. 8 ECHR cannot be relied on in order to complain of a loss of reputation which is the foreseeable consequence of one's own actions (ECtHR [G.Ch.], *Axel Springer AG v. Germany*, 39954/08, 7 February 2012).

Despite the general agreement on the meaning of the right to personal and family privacy, it is clear that this is a term that is normatively expressed in a rather vague way. The ECtHR therefore faced the need to further define the content and scope of this right. The basic characteristic of the case law that has arisen in this regard can be defined as the expansion of the field of application of the right to respect for private and family life. One such way relates to the obligations of the state arising from the existence of this right. Namely, Art. 8 para. 1 The ECHR provides primarily for a *negative obligation* of the state to refrain from encroaching on human rights. In order to effectively exercise human rights, it is necessary for the state to take appropriate measures in that direction, which is defined as the concept of its *positive obligation*. The concept of a positive obligation of the state was introduced into the practice of the European Court of Human Rights in connection with the violation of Art. 8 ECHR (ECtHR, *Marckx v. Belgium*, 6833/74, 13 June 1979), to then be soon extended to the right of access to a court (Kuijer 2004, 53-55) as an integral part of the right to a fair trial under Art. 6 ECHR (ECtHR, *Airey v. Ireland*, 6289/73, 9 October 1979). Otherwise, the ECtHR connects the positive obligation, above all, to ensure and respect the right to life (Art. 2 ECHR) and the prohibition of torture (Art. 3 ECHR) (Ilić 2012, 146-148).

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION VERSUS HONOUR AND REPUTATION

In the previous exposure it is pointed to the importance of the rights from Art. 8 and 10. ECHR. There are frequent cases in which arises the question to which of the mentioned rights should be given priority, especially if it is a question of the honour and reputation of a certain person. In searching for an answer to this question, it is necessary to look at the distinction between public and private personalities, and then direct the analysis to the difference between *facts* and *value-judgments*.

Public and private personalities

The assessment of the existence of a breach of honour and reputation depends to a significant extent on the circumstances of whether a specific person performs a political or official function, or is otherwise involved in public life. Of crucial importance is the fact whether a certain person voluntarily exposed himself to the public or joined the public debate. If this is the case, it is understandable that he is expected to accept public control and criticism (McGonagle 2016, 39).

Such an approach also exists in the practice of the ECtHR, which points out that the limits of acceptable criticism are greater when it comes to a politician than a private person (ECtHR, *Jishkariani v. Georgia*, 18925/09, 20 September 2018). This principled approach does not exclude the possibility that the admissibility of certain statements may be assessed differently when it comes to private persons, under condition that they are included in the public debate. In such a case, they are expected to show a greater degree of tolerance for criticism (ECtHR, *Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H. (N° 3) v. Austria*, 66298/01 and 15653/02, 13 December 2005).

One of the questions that can be asked in this regard is related to university professors. It should be recalled that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted on 30 June 2006 Recommendation 1762 (2006) on Academic freedom and university autonomy which proclaims freedom of expression and the dissemination of knowledge without any restrictions. This document did not call into question the restrictions imposed by Art. 10 para. 2 of the ECHR, which means that the freedom of academic expression can be analyzed in the light of the violation of the reputation of another person, ie Art. 8 ECHR. It is important to emphasize that the ECtHR, when analyzing the freedom of expression of university professors, has in mind the freedom to distribute *knowledge* and *truth* without restriction (ECtHR, *Sorguç v. Turkey*, 17089/03, 23 June 2009).

Based on the current practice of the ECtHR (which will be discussed in more detail), it can be concluded that university professors represent public figures. However, this does not mean that they are expected to show the same level of tolerance as required of politicians, even when university professors, as experts in certain fields, are appointed by the authorities to certain advisory bodies (ECtHR, *Kaboğlu and Oran v. Turkey*, 1759/08, 50766/10 and 50782/10, 30 October 2018). This is not a specificity that is related exclusively to university professors, but it is an approach that is established in the practice of the ECtHR. The situation is similar with the position of a judge and a public prosecutor in criminal proceedings, because there is a fundamental difference between the roles of the prosecutor, being the opponent of the accused, and the judge. This distinction generally provides an increased protection for statements that are critical of the prosecutor (ECtHR, *Nikula v. Finland*, 31611/96, 21 March 2002).

Distinguishing facts and value-judgments

The boundaries of freedom of expression depend to a large extent on whether it is a factual statement or a value judgment. The matter is basically reduced to the possibility of proving, which should not be a problem with factual judgments, while with value attitudes such a thing would be excluded (Popović 2012, 327). This rule was established by the ECtHR in the mid-1980s, indicating that a careful distinction needs to be made between *facts* and *value-judgments*. The existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the truth of value-judgments is not susceptible to proof (ECtHR [Plenary], *Lingens v. Austria*, 9815/82, 8 July 1986). Although at first glance this distinction seems clear, in practice it is sometimes difficult to draw a clear line between these two terms (McGonagle 2016, 29).

The problem is that the value judgment, although not suitable for proof, may be excessive, in particular in the absence of any factual basis (ECtHR, *De Haas and Gijsels v. Belgium*, 19983/92, 24 February 1997). Therefore, the ECtHR cannot accept that a value judgment can only be considered as such if it is accompanied by the facts on which that judgment is based. The necessity of a link between a value judgment and its supporting facts may vary from case to case according to the specific circumstances (ECtHR, *Feldek v. Slovakia*, 29032/95, 12 July 2001). In the case law of the Court in Strasbourg, there have been cases in which it has been stated that a statement of fact is a value-laden on (ECtHR, *Karsai v. Hungary*, 5380/07, 1 December 2009). In other words, the ECtHR introduced the term *fact-value judgments*.

REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

The Republic of Serbia has already been under the scrutiny of the ECtHR several times when it comes to the relationship between freedom of expression and protection of honour and reputation. First, in two cases from 2007, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Art. 10 ECHR. In the first case, the court found the applicant guilty of criminal defamation (ECtHR, *Lepojić v. Serbia*, 13909/05, 6 November 2007). The second case is specific in that the first-instance criminal court convicted the applicant of criminal defamation, while in the second-instance procedure the court, on the same facts, found the applicant guilty of the crime of insult, rather than criminal defamation (ECtHR, *Filipović v. Serbia*, 27935/05, 20 November 2007).

Given that the ECtHR judgments concerned the boundaries of freedom of expression in relation to public office holders, the Supreme Court of Cassation (SCC) took the view that the limits of acceptable criticism were wider when it came to public figures than private individuals. Unlike ordinary citizens, who do not have this quality, public figures are inevitably and consciously exposed to careful examination of their every word and action, both by journalists and the public in general, and therefore must show a greater degree of tolerance (Legal Department of the SCC, 25 November 2008).

Criminal defamation was deleted by the Criminal Code Amendments Act („Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia“, N° 121/12), so that the Criminal Code (CC) „Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia“, N° 85/05, 88/05 – correc., 107/05 – correc., 72/09, 111/09, 121/12, 104/13, 108/14, 94/16 and 35/19) contains the criminal offense of insult (Art. 170 CC).

After that, it was committed another injury to Art. 10 ECHR by the Republic of Serbia, which, among other things, can be explained by the fact that it was a case in which in civil proceedings is established a violation of honour, reputation and dignity, and the defendant, who is obliged to compensate for a damage, did not have the status of a public figure (ECtHR, *Tešić v. Serbia*, 4678/07 and 50591/12, 11 February 2014). The last case in which the Republic of Serbia violated the right from Art. 10 the ECHR referred to a case in which it was found that the applicant had committed a criminal offense of insult when having stated for a particular public figure „although she has been called a witch and a prostitute" and gave her a judicial warning. The court established that the impugned phrase had been indeed previously published in another article by another author in a different magazine. However, the applicant did not put it in quotation marks which meant that she agreed with it, thus expressing her opinion (ECtHR, *Milisavljević v. Serbia*, 50123/06, 4 April 2017).

Media ethics and media lynching

There are rare cases in which domestic courts have had the opportunity to discuss freedom of expression and the violation of honour and reputation between university professors. One of these was brought before the First Basic Court in Belgrade (FBCB) on a private lawsuit and ended with a conviction for criminal offense of insult (Art. 170 para. 2 in connection para. 1 CC) (FBCB, Judgment K. 868/11, 12 September 2013). The Appellate Court in Belgrade (ACB) dismissed the defendant's appeal as unfounded and upheld the first-instance judgement. The position of the Appellate Court was that the terms used by the defendant were objectively appropriate to insult the honour and reputation of another person, in this case a private prosecutor (ACB, Judgment Kž. 6814/13, 5 February 2014).

The subtitle of this part of the paper is identical to the title of the book in which the allegations were made which violated the honour and reputation of the private prosecutor. The writer's idea was that the book is used for teaching at the faculty (such a proposal did not receive support from other professors), and it is not without significance that the author of the book (ie the accused) and the private prosecutor were professors at the same faculty. Given the mood of colleagues, as well as the outcome of the criminal proceedings that were later initiated, the question can be asked to what extent the views expressed in the book are consistent with the point of view that teachers are figures of authority to their pupils, their special duties and responsibilities to a certain extent also apply to their activities outside school (ECtHR [G.Ch.], *Vogt v. Germany*, 17851/91, 26 September 1995). The presented position of the ECtHR gained in importance especially because in this particular case it is about university professors and students.

Given that it was a book written by a university professor, it could be assumed that the disputed content included the defendant's polemics with the private prosecutor's scientific views, or a discussion of some issues of general importance to academia or the wider community. Unfortunately, that was not the case. After stating the name of his colleague, the accused wrote, among other things, that: „That individual ... he perceived a bit like a tick (*krpelj*). I have never been afraid of such individuals who looked to me like some kind of cringing person (*puzavci*) and slimy type (*ljigavci*) ... In the folklore of the Dinaric type of people, it is said for them: „That slimy (*ljiga*)". Just as houses are built of brick and mortar, so that individuals are built of evil (*zla*) and lies (*laži*)."

These are just some of the terms used to describe a private prosecutor. These are essentially statements of disparagement which, given that the statements are contained in the book, should have been learned from another. In our doctrine and court practice, disparagement is understood as denying or underestimating the *values* that make up a *honour* of one person (Stojanović 2020, 569). As a criterion for determining whether something constitutes belittling has been accepted an objective criterion, which means that the authoritative assessment is one from the aspect of existing customary, moral and other norms in a certain environment (570). Since the intention to belittle is not prescribed as a subjective element of criminal offense of insult, the position of the SCC is that the intention does not represent an essential element of the act (SCC, Kzz. 903/2020, 17 September 2020).

A statement of disrespect can represent both allegations of *fact* and (negative) *value judgments*. The untruthfulness of what constitutes the content of an insulting statement is not necessary for the existence of the criminal offense of insult. This means that an insult can exist even if someone is disrespected by presenting true facts (Stojanović 2020, 570). Although the court should not engage in determining the truthfulness, ie untruthfulness of what constitutes the content of the offensive statement, nevertheless in the case of obviously true allegations, other circumstances under which the act was committed must be determined, ie. offensive character in the case of true statements of fact or correct value judgments can be determined only from all the circumstances of the case (the manner in which the statement was made, subjective orientation, etc.) (570-571).

Based on the above statements (but also other statements that he analyzed in detail), the first instance court „ ... could not accept the defendant's thesis that this book is not a clash with specific people, that its message is what kind of relationships should be established in professional and human behavior in academic communities ... ". The Court recalled „ ... that the limits of acceptable criticism are wider when it comes to public figures in relation to persons who do not have that capacity; that there is a right to communicate, in good faith, information on matters of public interest, even when it involves harmful statements to the individual; yes, however, it must not be a personal attack on the private life, in this case of a private prosecutor ... " (FBCB, Judgment K. 868/11, 12 September 2013). All this resulted in the criminal proceedings ending with a conviction for criminal offense of insult (Art. 170 CC).

In support of this view, it should be added that a person's reputation, even in a public hearing, is part of his or her identity derived from private life (ECtHR, *Pfeifer v. Austria*, 12556/03, 15 November 2007; *Petrina v. Romania*, 78060/01, 14 October 2008). In other words, it is a question of the right to privacy from Art. 8 ECHR.[5]

5) The reputation of a university professor can also be damaged by publishing an article in which, after describing the details of an event (which took place 19 years ago) from his sexual life, he is accused of exploiting a minor and sexual perversion. The Court in Strasbourg found a violation of Art. 8 ECHR, because Romanian courts have failed to strike a fair balance between the freedom of expression of journalists and the right of university professors to respect for private life. There is no doubt that the publication of the disputed article and photographs posed a serious threat to

FINAL REMARKS

An analysis of the relationship between freedom of expression and the right to respect for one's honour and reputation is of particular importance in the times in which we live. The presence of media content in the life of modern man, a social network whose importance is growing every day, the availability of information and the easiness with which certain content can be made public, are just some of the factors that confirm that freedom of expression reaches proportions that were difficult to predict. This undoubtedly has its good sides, but it also opens up some questions that require answers. One of them refers to the right to privacy, more precisely to the honour and reputation of a certain person.

That these are values to which special importance is attached is also testified by the fact that honour and reputation are stated in Art. 10 para. 2 ECHR as one of the reasons why freedom of expression may be restricted. In addition, the right to respect for privacy from Art. 8 the ECHR includes, according to the ECtHR, both the honour and the reputation of a particular person. This duality of the mentioned values confirms their exceptionality. They are, unlike in Roman law, which initially connected them only to illustres, ie the highest officials of the empire and their families (Katančević 2020, 338), recognized to every person, with a higher tolerance threshold for public figures than for individuals who do not participate in public life. Politicians are also the most exposed within the category of public figures, and the degree of tolerance for statements and attitudes that can be considered offensive is variable and depends on certain factors, as well as the circumstances of the specific case. In a word, there is no perfect solution, ie. there is not just one road that, following the example of the former roads, would lead to Rome.

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honour and reputation and an attack on psychological integrity and private life. In addition, the Court is not convinced that national courts have attached due importance to the question of whether the article contributed to the debate of general interest and whether the university professor represents a public figure (ECtHR, *Ion Cârstea v. Romania*, 20531/06, 28 October 2014).

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Book review

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METAPHOR IN POLITICAL CONFLICT. POPULISM AND DISCOURSE**



Ruth Breeze, Carmen Llamas Saíz (eds.), *Metaphor in political conflict. Populism and discourse*, Ediciones Universidad de Navarra (EUNSA), Pamplona, 2020, 212 p.

The study of metaphors is one of the most dynamic study areas in the field of linguistics, discourse analysis, communication broadly (Perrez, Reuchamps, Thibodeau, 2019: 5). The importance of metaphors is foremost due to their power to define and shape our way of thinking and speaking, i.e. the way we perceive and understand reality (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Metaphors are not simply an aspect of style and language, they are also pervasive in everyday life, they structure what we perceive, i.e. they create realities for us (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). However, besides their cognitive nature, metaphors are also a discursive device. They also have a communicative purpose. Accordingly, discourse approaches to metaphor pay special attention to communicative strategies that make it possible to think in a particular way about social phenomena or to perform specific actions. Moreover, they focus on social contexts in which metaphors

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occur, underlying the dynamic nature of metaphor, its capacity to shape the social reality of a specific topic or social domain. Thus, the metaphor represents a "pervasive linguistic phenomenon which is varied in its textual manifestations, versatile in the functions it may perform, and central to many different types of communication, from informal interaction through political speeches to scientific theorizing" (Semino, 2008: 1).

One of the books that enrich the existing body of literature related to discourse approaches to metaphor is *Metaphor in political conflict. Populism and discourse*, co-edited by Ruth Breeze and Carmen Llamas Saíz, and published by Ediciones Universidad de Navarra (EUNSA). Both co-editors are experienced scholars in the field of public discourse. Their works are mostly related to political, media and professional discourse and to corpus-assisted discourse analysis.

The book aims to reveal the power of the metaphor in political discourse and at the same time, to contribute to a better understanding of the political discourse itself. Furthermore, the book pays special attention to the role of metaphors in populist discourses. As Ruth Breeze indicates in the introduction, metaphors are a "powerful tool to understand how discourses work" (p. 15). According to Breeze, political uses of metaphors are often particularly unclear, ambiguous and even obscure (p. 16). Metaphors are variable, i.e. multifunctional, or in Breeze's words, they are "messy". The ambiguous nature of metaphors in political discourse is foremost due to the fact that metaphors have the capacity to operate on a variety of levels, that is, they are able to shape our basic assumptions about the way society should be but also to remodel them, thus offering a new interpretation of the status quo, or a new vision of the future (p. 15). The variability of metaphors in political discourse is also acknowledged by Andreas Musolff in the preface of this book. As he observes, metaphors in political discourse have a tendency to work "at the level of argumentation, emotional and moral evaluation and dramatic characterisation" (p. 10). In other words, the study of metaphor implies "a critical investigation of how metaphors can serve to convey ideologies and negotiate power relationships" and therefore, the multifunctionality of metaphors is of vital importance in situations of their use (Musolff, 2016: 4).

In order to analyse this multifunctionality of metaphors in political discourse, the book combines the approaches of the metaphors as thought-based (cognitive dimension) with the approaches of metaphors as discourse-based (discursive dimension), by showing that the deconstruction of source and target domains implies the identification of systemic patterns in the specific context of use. In this regard, the book pays special attention to "metaphor scenarios" for the analysis of the force of metaphor in a given discourse. Conceptualized by Andreas Musolff, metaphor scenarios show us the multifunctional nature of metaphors and their embeddedness in specific socio-political and historical contexts. Thus, metaphor scenarios go beyond the simple categorisation of metaphors based on conceptual domains. As noted by Musolff, the scenario-oriented approach enables us "to refine our understanding of the metaphors' degree of entrenchment in their sociocultural setting and the power to 'frame' its discourses" (Musolff, 2016: 133).

After its preface and introduction, the book examines the use of metaphors in the contemporary political contexts through six chapters. The chapters cover different genres, from speeches and parliamentary debates to social media, thus creating a thought-provoking combination of approaches without sacrificing the coherence of the book. Focusing on the analysis of speeches of prominent political figures from a variety of settings, the book aims to reveal the situations in which there is controversy or conflict and to analyse the role of metaphors in these situations. Thus, the book addresses different situations covering the relationship between the EU and the UK, the rise of contemporary populism in Italy, the 2017-18 US-Iranian conflict, the 2017 Catalan Independence crisis and post-2008 economic and financial crisis. Notably, different case studies in this book reveal the persuasive or manipulative function of the metaphor.

The first chapter explores metaphors used in British parliamentary debate related to the EU (2000-2016), aiming to reveal what kind of metaphors the pro-EU and anti-EU politicians use when talking about the EU and what kind of image of the EU they create by using them (p. 27). The second chapter discusses the concept of "peoplehood" in political discourse with the aim to identify peoplehood representations embeded in political action and leader-specific attitudes (p. 45). This chapter demonstrates the pervasive, latent conceptual nature of metaphors and metaphor scenarios as constructs in human language, their essential role in exemplifying knowledge and their ability to facilitate the understanding of context-embedded narratives of people, objects and actions by anchoring them to a specific frame of representation. The book also deals with the general question of how metaphors contribute to a populist political style and, more specifically, with the nature of metaphors used by populist politicians and the rhetorical advances of this use. Thus, the third chapter analyses populist, elitist and pluralist speeches by politicians in order to demonstrate how these three political styles are articulated in different metaphors. In so doing, it distinguishes three main functions of metaphors and metaphor scenarios: strategic, rational or an emotional function (p. 75). The fourth chapter starts from the understanding of populism as discursively articulated ideology and analyses the role of metaphors in the construction and spread of the populist ideology in order to identify a range of presentational elements and rhetorical devices which may be generalised to characterise populist social media communication. The chapter aims to highlight larger patterns in the way populist actors construct their social media messages. At the same time, the chapter contributes to the research on how populist ideologies are discursively articulated on social media. Chapter five deals with the general question of how foreign policy is represented through metaphor (cf. Chilton, Lakoff, 1989). More specifically, the aim of this chapter is to approach political conflict and foreign policy and to analyse the place of metaphors in the context of uncertainty (the 2017-18 US-Iranian conflict). It identifies patterns of metaphorical representation in the context of foreign policy. Finally, the last chapter moves away from politicians' speeches and focuses on the question of media communication on politics. It analyses the variations of metaphors in newspaper editorials with different political allegiances which they tend to use in order to legitimize or discredit controversial political movements. The argumentative force of the metaphor scenarios is analysed in this chapter.

By exploring and revealing the power of metaphors in political discourse, this book makes a significant contribution to the existing academic literature in the field of discourse analysis and cognitive linguistics at various levels. It sheds light to the central role that metaphors play in the construction of political reality by offering responses to various important questions, including how language, ideology and power are interlinked in political discourse, how relevant metaphors are in populist discourses in situations of political conflicts or uncertainty, how metaphors are used with specific political goals in these situations, how they have the ability to frame the debate and indirectly communicate hidden ideologies, in what way different discourse genres influence the use of metaphors in political discourse. Through its diverse chapters, and from different angles, the variability of metaphors in political discourse is revealed, leading to a deeper understanding of political and populist discourse. Furthermore, the book focuses on metaphor scenarios in order to capture the variability of metaphors in the contemporary political contexts. The book is therefore a valuable resource for all scholars interested in the study of metaphors and in understanding their power in political discourse.

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Book review

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COSMOPOLITAN DYSTOPIA: INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION AND THE FAILURE OF THE WEST**



Philip Cunliffe, *Cosmopolitan Dystopia: International Intervention and the Failure of the West*. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2020, 228 p.

International Relations (IR) at the end of the second decade of the XX century. Various aspects of international order creation or transformation, positions and policies of great powers, and the perspectives – or even mere existence – of the so called Liberal International Order remain, in an era marked by a perspective-shifting global pandemic, among the most vibrant IR topics. Philip Cunliffe, Senior Lecturer in International Conflict at the University of Kent, is among the authors whose works, such as P*olitics Without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations* (co-edited with Christopher Bickerton and Alexander Gourevitch, 2007) or *Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South* (2013), have already attracted a significant amount of attention for their sharp and innovative assessment of issues of sovereignty, intervention, and the nature of international political order. In 2020, Cunliffe published yet another

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monograph: *The New Twenty Years' Crisis: A Critique of International Relations, 1999-2019*, in which he confronts the classical text by Edward Hallett Carr with the challenges of contemporary global politics. Here we will briefly address some of the key contributions he has put forth in *Cosmopolitan Dystopia: International Intervention and the Failure of the West*, published by Manchester University Press.

The crux of Cunliffe's argument is centered on the underlying political forces shaping world ordering process brought about by globalization. When dealing with the issues of political order, Cunliffe is dominantly focused on war and the use of force; particularly their transformations – and rightly so. He states: "If wars had previously been defined in liberal terms of antitotalitarianism and anti-communism, they had also been justified in unabashedly national terms too – defending national rights and honour, self-defence and sometimes even plain unadorned national self-interest. In the post-Cold War era, the use of force was still defined in liberal terms but also terms that were at once more cosmopolitan (justified on behalf of others) and humanitarian (protection and alleviating suffering rather than defending liberty)" (p. 5). Unsurprisingly, he identifies human rights as the key component of contemporary forceful political reordering, espoused by a "cosmopolitan vision of politics": the "liberalism of fear", founded on the post-war liberalism of Berlin, Shklar, or Aron. These thinkers were "wary of grandiose attempts to counter totalitarianism that might risk mimetically replicating its crushing uniformity", which made their "political vision and hopes for liberalism […] restricted, with the most that could be hoped for being the cautious, prudent relief of extreme human suffering in a world that was irredeemably conflicted, plural and fallen […]" (p.8). This represented a seemingly small but crucial step from utopia to dystopia.

In the author's words, "After thirty years of perpetual warfare by Western states under the banner of human rights, human rights can no longer claim to be innocent either" (p. 9). His argument is obviously quite provocative: the position of human rights and policies based therein is almost villain-like in this narrative. These bold positions are convincingly supported throughout the book, which consists of four central chapters, apart from the Introduction and the Conclusion. Of course, the discussion about human rights in this context cannot be divorced from the discussion about intervention. Cunliffe identifies four focal problems with regard to the existing definitional problems of humanitarian intervention. He designates them as "four problematic 'c's": *cases*, *casuistry*, *causes* and *concept-stretching*, which have hampered the intervention debate in more ways than one, contributing to "rampant definitional gerrymandering in which the concepts are brazenly fixed in advance in such a way as to ensure desired outcomes" (p. 12).

Chapter 1, entitled *Inverted revisionism and the subversion of the liberal international order*. In it, Cunliffe sets forth the argument that "swaying pillars and crumbling masonry of the liberal international order are not the result of a siege by illiberal barbarians, but rather the temple is crumbling because its foundations were mined and the explosives were laid by liberals themselves" (p. 20). He finds that the aggressive use of force, which has recently been posing a revisionist challenge and subverting international status quo, although occasionally mimicked by authoritarian great powers such as Russia and China, is essentially a key feature of western democracies' international behavior. From Panama in 1989, to Kosovo/Yugoslavia in 1999, to Iraq in 2003 to Libya in 2011, the post-Cold War era is marked by military interventions unilateraly or multilateraly pursued by countries of the West. While both Western democracies and their authoritarian challengers have been known to break or circumvent global norms in their intervening endeavors, key difference between such attempts is the fact that, due to their superior international position, Western countries have been able to "reshape international institutions and concerns to better accommodate their interventionist impulses" (p. 36). Touching upon the long thread of theoretical accounts of revisionism (from Carr to Hedley Bull to Barry Buzan), Cunliffe then presents his own notion of contemporary great power revisionism, called *inverted revisionism*. It differs from all typologies offered heretofore, as it pertains to "historically unprecedented moment of status quo great powers pathologically gnawing away at the very order that they created – a revisionism that is ‘internal’ to the status quo (hence ‘inverted’)” (p. 48). Internalizing the concept of inverted revisionism makes following his arguments put forth in the subsequent chapters much more straightforward.

In the following chapter, under the title *Through the looking glass: the new critics of intervention* Cunliffe recognizes the problem within the existing notions of intervention – that all the emergencies and exceptions have been treated as essentially the same, and he considers this unacceptable. All this begs “an alternative understanding of intervention – one that attempts to systematically examine it as a politics of exceptionalism. What does the international order look like in which recurrent humanitarian emergencies are entirely normalised?” (p. 22). It is acknowledged that, “for the doctrine to function, there need to be states that are exempt from it” (p. 125), and an innovative theory of exceptionalism is offered and outlined in chapter 3, *What should we do? The politics of humanitarian exceptionalism*. The research challenge here is not only to define the particular sort of humanitarian exceptionalism which stems from contemporary cosmopolitan liberalism; one also has to try and locate it within a specific actor of global politics. In Cunliffe’s words, the exceptionalist sovereign is most clearly embodied in “the US imperial state, theoretically articulated by neoconservative political theorists, jealously and resentfully mimicked by the likes of Russia” (p. 144). As the *locus* of power which legitimizes all or most atrocity-preventing actions, while at the same time being (self) exempt, the US is in a paradoxical position of being both an enabler and spoiler of the order.

Chapter 4 bears the title *Failed states, failed empires and the new paternalism*, and deals with ways in which humanitarian exceptionalism has “neither superseded sovereignty nor the state, but rather reconstituted it, leading to a more hierarchical international order and inflecting a new kind of sovereignty, less defined and restrained by the demands of political representation and lacking any clear limits on its legal jurisdiction and power” (p. 23). In other words, perhaps the changing nature of sovereignty has led to the change in practice of intervention, but exceptionalist practices have, in turn, clearly changed the character of state sovereignty. This solicits treating responsibility to protect as a full-fledged theory. Conducting a policy based on the responsibility to protect does not, however, provide any guarantees that the actor – even as powerful as the US – will be able to fully determine political outcomes, since, as the examples of both Iraq and Kosovo have shown, "state-centred imperialism is unviable" (p. 147). This propelled the great powers to come up with "an alternative to formal empire that is much more viable, cost-effective and politically legitimate: neo-trusteeship, whereby formal legal independence is seen as compatible with international tutelage, supervision and even military occupation – a more thorough-going subversion of self-determination than bullets and bombs could ever achieve" (p. 147). Responsibility to protect, as the underlying theory of cosmopolitan humanitarianism, is thus revealed as a doctrine only functional within a context even darker than Hobbes's state of nature: "rooted in a grim disorder of mass murder and abuse, there is no political transformation onto a higher plane as with Hobbes's social contract" (p. 172).

The concluding chapter of the study is adequately entitled: *Waiting for the Americans*. The belief in US omnipotence is widespread and goes back at least to the onset of the Cold War. However, it peaked in the post-Cold War period and contributed to the proliferation of the liberalism of fear, which, according to the author made it abundantly clear that the very concept of human rights, and not its manipulation, is the problem. "The era of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect", claims Cunliffe, "helped to globalise the liberalism of fear, reorganising various civil wars, secessionist movements, revolutionary upsurges and insurgent movements around the prospect of support from a liberal international community ultimately centred on US power and exceptionalism" (p. 179). What is needed espouses Cunliffe's firm revolutionary and subversive take on contemporary global politics: to keep on trying to fix global grievances with tools such as humanitarian intervention as we know it is to keep normalizing those very grievances in the long run; "what is needed is not a more finely poised balance between ethical aspirations and political realities, but a re-posing of fundamental and ultimately political questions regarding the nature of rights and the structure of political authority and representation" (p. 184). To get a hint at what exactly such a revolutionary undertaking would entail, one would have to look into Cunliffe's other works, or look forward to his future reflections on the key issues of contemporary international order.

Cunliffe's book is probably one of the most important books on international political order published since the beginning of the 21st century. His discussions of crucial global issues, such as intervention, use of force, origin and nature of norms, diverging interests of great powers, and the position of lesser actors in the international arena, offer many valuable insights; the scope and intellectual consequences of the book, however, go much beyond all this, successfully providing historical and contemporary context and implying the conceptualization of the nature of international relations *as such*. At the same time, although it reads mostly as a theoretical treatise, its potential practical impact is tremendous. And here, in the author's uninhibited subversiveness, lies the potential danger of the study's socio-political impact: in the world in which academia is increasingly intertwined with political structures in numerous ways, a book that challenges conventional wisdom and suboptimal behavior of political elites might not be the most convenient a read. All those among policy practitioners, students and scholars of IR, however, who want intellectual as well as socio-political status quo shattered – or at least severely challenged – should have no dilemma: *Cosmopolitan Dystopia* will give them exactly that.

AUTHOR GUIDELINES

Academic journal *Serbian Political Thought* welcomes articles reporting the latest results of both theoretical and empirical research in all fields of political science. Authors should refer mainly to the results of research published in academic journals, primarily in political science journals.

The papers are published in Serbian (Cyrillic), English, Russian or French in the Serbian issues, and in English in the English issue of the journal.

The journal is published four times a year. The first three issues are published in Serbian, and the fourth issue is published in English. The deadlines for submitting the manuscripts for the Serbian issues are: February 1st, May 1st and August 1st, and the deadline for the English issue is October 1st.

Two consecutive issues cannot contain articles written by the same author, whether single-authored or co-authored.

Authors are obliged to submit a signed and scanned Statement alongside with the manuscript, declaring their manuscript hadn't previously been published, i.e. it's not plagiarism or auto-plagiarism. The Statement form can be downloaded from the web page of the journal: http://www.ips.ac.rs/en/magazines/politicka-misao/authors_directions/.

Manuscripts for the Serbian issues of the journal should be sent to the following e-mail address: spm@ips.ac.rs.

Manuscripts for the English issue of the journal should be sent to the following e-mail address: spt@ips.ac.rs.

Research article can have up to 40,000 characters with spaces, including footnotes. When counting the characters leave out the reference list.

Review can have up to 15,000 characters with spaces.

Book review can have up to 10,000 characters with spaces.

When counting the characters, use the option Review/Word Count/Character (with spaces) and check the box Include textboxes, footnotes and endnotes.

CITING AND REFERENCING

Academic journal *Serbian Political Thought* adopts a modified version of Chicago citation style (17th edition of the *Chicago Manual of Style*), the author–date system of in-text parenthetical citation, with the list of references with full bibliographic information being placed at the end of the paper.

The bibliographic data in both the parenthetical citation and reference list should be cited in the original language of the source. The English translation of the reference title should be enclosed in square brackets after the original title. The references originally written in Cyrillic script should be transliterated into Latin script.

Below are the rules and examples of citing the bibliographic information in the reference list and in the text. For each type of source, a citation rule is given first, followed by an example of citation in the reference list and bibliographic parenthesis.

The bibliographic parenthesis, as a rule, is set off at the end of the sentence, before the punctuation mark. It contains the author's surname, the year of publication and page numbers pointing to a specifically contextual page or range of pages, as in the following example: (Mearsheimer 2001, 15–17).

Books

Books with one author

Surname, Name. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

(Mearsheimer 2001)

Books with two or three authors

Surname, Name, and Name Surname. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Brady, Henry E., and David Collier. 2010. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

(Brady and Collier 2010)

Pollitt, Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

(Pollitt, Birchal and Putman 1998)

Books with four or more authors

Surname, Name, Name and Surname, Name and Surname, and Name and Surname. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Pollitt, Christopher, Colin Talbot, Janice Caulfield, and Amanda Smullen. 2005. *Agencies: How Governments do Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

(Pollitt et al. 2005)

Editor(s) or translator(s) in place of the author(s)

Surname, Name, Name and Surname, ed. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Kaltwasser, Cristobal Rovira, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostigoy, eds. 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

(Kaltwasser et al. 2017)

Chapter in an edited book

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the chapter." In *Title*, ed. Name Surname, pages range. Place of publication: Publisher.

Lošonc, Alpar. 2019. "Discursive dependence of politics with the confrontation between republicanism and neoliberalism." In *Discourse and Politics*, eds. Dejana M. Vukasović and Petar Matić, 23-46. Belgrade: Institute for Political Studies.

(Lošonc 2019)

Journal Articles

Regular issue

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the article." *Journal* Volume, if available (issue): page range. DOI.

Ellwood, David W. 2018. “Will Brexit Make or Break Great Britain?” *Serbian Political Thought* 18 (2): 5-14. doi: 10.22182/spt.18212018.1.

(Ellwood 2018)

Special issue

Surname, Name. Year of publication. “Title of the article.” In “Title of the special issue”, ed. Name Surname, Special issue, *Journal*: page range. DOI.

Chin, Warren. 2019. “Technology, war and the state: past, present and future.” In “Re-visioning war and the state in the twenty-first century.” Special issue, *International Affairs* 95 (4): 765–783. doi: 10.1093/ia/iiz106.

(Chin 2019)

Encyclopedias and dictionaries

When the author/editor is known

Surname, Name, Name Surname, ed. Year of publication. *Title*. Vol. Place of publication: Publisher.

Badie, Bertrand, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino, eds. 2011. *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*. Vol. 1. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

(Badie, Berg-Schlosser and Morlino 2011)

When the author/editor is unknown

Title. Year of publication. Place of publication: Publisher.

Webster's Dictionary of English Usage. 1989. Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Inc.

(*Webster's Dictionary of English Usage* 1989)

PhD dissertation

Surname, Name. Year of publication. “Title of the dissertation.” PhD diss. University.

Munger, Frank J. 1955. “Two-Party Politics in the State of Indiana.” PhD diss. Harvard University.

(Munger 1955, 17–19)

Newspapers and magazines

Signed articles

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the article." *Newspaper/Magazine* Date: page range.

Clark, Phil. 2018. "Rwanda's Recovery: When Remembrance is Official Policy." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2018: 35–41.

(Clark 2018)

Unsigned articles

Title of the newspaper/magazine. Year of publication. "Title of the article." Date: page range.

New York Times. 2002. "In Texas, Ad Heats Up Race for Governor." July 30, 2002.

(*New York Times* 2002)

Corporate author

Name of the corporate author [acronym if needed]. Year of publication. *Title of the publication*. Place of publication: Publisher.

International Organization for Standardization [ISO]. 2019. *Moving from ISO 9001:2008 to ISO 9001:2015*. Geneva: International Organization for Standardization.

(International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 2019) – *The first in-text citation*

(ISO 2019) – *Second and all subsequent citations*

Special cases of referencing

Citing edition other than the first

Surname, Name. Year of publication. *Title*, edition number. Place of publication: Publisher.

Bull, Hedley. 2012. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th edition. New York: Columbia University Press.

(Bull 2012)

Multiple sources of the same author

1) *Multiple sources by the same author* should be arranged chronologically by year of publication in ascending order.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2010. "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3 (4): 381–396. doi: 10.1093/cjip/poq016.

2) *Multiple sources by the same author from the same year* should be alphabetized by title, with lowercase letters attached to the year. Those letters should be used in parenthetical citation as well.

Walt, Stephen M. 2018a. *The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

(Walt 2018a)

Walt, Stephen M. 2018b. "Rising Powers and the Risk of War: A Realist View of Sino-American Relations." In *Will China's Rise be Peaceful: Security, Stability and Legitimacy*, ed. Asle Toje. 13–32. New York: Oxford University Press.

(Walt 2018b)

3) *Single-authored sources precede multiauthored sources beginning with the same surname* or written by the same person.

Pollitt, Christopher. 2001. "Clarifying convergence. Striking similarities and durable differences in public management reform." *Public Management Review* 3 (4): 471–492. doi: 10.1080/14616670110071847.

Pollit Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

4) *Multiauthored sources with the same name and surname* of the first author should continue to be alphabetized by the second author's surname.

Pollitt Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

Pollitt Christopher, Colin Talbot, Janice Caulfield, and Amanda Smullen. 2005. *Agencies: How Governments do Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Special cases of parenthetical citation

Exceptions to the rule of placing the parenthetical citation at the end of a sentence

1) If the *author is mentioned in the text*, even if used in a possessive form, the year must follow in parenthesis, and page numbers should be put in the brackets at the end of the sentence.

For the assessment, see Kaltwasser *et al*. (2017) ... (112).

According to Ellwood (2018) … (7).

2) When *quoting directly*, if the name of the author precedes the quotation, the year and page numbers must follow in parenthesis.

Mearsheimer (2001, 28) claims that: "..."

3) When *using the same source multiple times in one paragraph*, the parenthetical citation should be placed either after the last reference (or at the end of the paragraph, preceding the final period) if the same page (or page range) is cited more than once, or at the first reference, while the subsequent citations should only include page numbers.

Do not use *ibid* or *op. cit.* with repeated citations.

Using brief phrases such as "see", "compare" etc.

Those phrases should be enclosed within the parenthesis.

(see Ellwood 2018)

Using secondary source

When using a secondary source, the original source should be cited in parenthesis, followed by "quoted in" and the secondary source. The reference list should only include the secondary source.

"Its authority was greatly expanded by the constitutional revision of 1988, and the Court of Arbitration can now be regarded as a 'genuine constitutional court'" (De Winter and Dumont 2009, 109 cited in: Lijphart 2012, 39–40).

Lijphart, Arend. 2012. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, 2nd edition. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Multiple sources within the same parentheses

1) When *multiple sources* are cited, they should be separated by semicolons.

(Mearsheimer 2001, 34; Ellwood 2018, 7)

2) When *multiple sources by the same author*, but published in different years are cited, the name of the author is cited only the first time. The different years are separated by commas or by semicolon where page numbers are cited.

(Mearsheimer 2001, 2010) or (Mearsheimer 2001, 15–17; 2010, 390)

3) When *different authors share the same surname*, include the first initial in the parenthesis.

(M. Chiti 2004, 40), (E. Chiti 2004, 223)

Chiti, Edoardo. 2004. "Administrative Proceedings Involving European Agencies." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 68 (1): 219–236.

Chiti, Mario. 2004. "Forms of European Administrative Action." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 68 (1): 37–57.

Legal and Public Documents

Sections, articles or paragraphs can be cited in the parentheses. They should be appropriately abbreviated.

Constitutions and laws

The title of the legislative act [acronym if needed], "Official Gazette of the state" and the number of the official gazette, or the webpage and the date of last access.

The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, "Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia", No. 98/06.

(The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 33)

The Law on Foreign Affairs [LFA], "Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia", No. 116/2007, 126/2007, and 41/2009.

(LFA 2009, Art. 17)

Succession Act [SA], "Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia", No. 48/03, 163/03, 35/05, 127/13, and 33/15 and 14/19.

(SA 2019, Art. 3)

An Act to make provision for and in connection with offences relating to offensive weapons [Offensive Weapons Act], 16th May 2019, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/17/pdfs/ukpga_20190017_en.pdf, last accessed 20 December 2019.

(Offensive Weapons Act 2019)

Government decisions and decisions of the institutions

The name of the government body or institution [acronym or abbreviation], the title and number of the decision, date of the decision passing, or the webpage and the date of the last access.

Protector of Citizens of the Republic of Serbia [Protector of Citizens], Opinion No. 19–3635/11, 11 January 2012, https://www.ombudsman.org.rs/attachments/064_2104_Opinion%20HJC.pdf, last accessed 20 December 2019.

(Protector of Citizens, 19–3635/11)

U.S. Department of the Treasury [USDT], Treasury Directive No. 13–02, July 20, 1988, https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/orders-directives/Pages/td13-02.aspx, last accessed 20 December 2019.

(USDT, 13–02)

Legislative acts of the European Union

The title of the legislative act, the number of the official gazette, the publication date and the number of the page in the same format as on the *EUR-lex* website: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html.

Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers, OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13–18.

(Regulation 182/2011, Art. 3)

Treaties

European Union founding treaties

Title of the treaty or title of the consolidated version of the treaty [acronym], information on the treaty retrieved from the official gazette in the same format as on the *EUR-lex* website: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html.

Treaty on European Union [TEU], OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 1–112.

(TEU 1992, Art. J.1)

Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [TEU], OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p. 13–45.

(TEU 2008, Art. 11)

Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 1–388.

(TFEU 2016, Art. 144)

Other treaties

Title of the treaty [acronym or abbreviation], date of conclusion, UNTS volume number and registration number on the *United Nations Treaty Collection* website: https://treaties.un.org.

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [Marrakesh Agreement], 15 April 1994, UNTS 1867, I-31874.

(Marrakesh Agreement 1994)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], 19 December 1966, UNTS 999, I-14668.

(ICCPR 1966)

Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan [Israel Jordan Peace Treaty], 26 October 1994, UNTS 2042, I-35325.

(Israel Jordan Peace Treaty 1994)

Decisions of international organizations

The name of the international organization and its body [acronym], the decision number, the title of the decision, the date of the decision passing.

United Nations Security Council [UNSC], S/RES/1244 (1999), Resolution 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999.

(UNSC, S/RES/1244)

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE], Doc. 14326, Observation of the presidential election in Serbia (2 April 2017), 29 May 2017.

(PACE, Doc. 14326, para. 12)

Case law

Case law of the courts in the Republic of Serbia

The type of the act and the name of the court [acronym of the court], the case number with the date of the decision passing, the name and number of the official gazette where the decision is published – if available.

Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia [CCRS], IUa-2/2009 of 13 June 2012, "Official gazette of the Republic of Serbia", No. 68/2012.

(Decision of CCRS, IUa-2/2009)

Decision of the Appellate Court in Novi Sad [ACNS], Rzr–1/16 of 27 April 2016.

(Decision of ACNS, Rzr–1/16)

Case law of the International Court of Justice

The name of the court [acronym], *the case title*, type of the decision with the date of the decision passing, the name and number of I.C.J. Reports issue where the decision is published, page number.

International Court of Justice [ICJ], *Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* v. *Greece)*, Judgment of 5 December 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 644.

(ICJ Judgment 2011)

International Court of Justice [ICJ], *Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports, p. 403.

(ICJ Advisory Opinion 2010)

Case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

The case title, the case number, type of the case with the date of the decision passing, ECLI.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-270/12, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 January 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18.

(*United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union*, C-270/12) or

(CJEU, C-270/12)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-270/12, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered on 12 September 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:562.

(Opinion of AG Jääskinen, C-270/12)

Case law of the European Court of Human Rights

The case title, number of the application, type of the case with the date of the judgment passing, ECLI.

Pronina v. Ukraine, No. 63566/00, Judgment of the Court (Second Section) on Merits and Just Satisfaction of 18 July 2006, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2006:0718JUD006356600.

(*Pronina v. Ukraine* 63566/00, par. 20) or

(ECHR, 63566/00, par. 20)

Case law of other international courts and tribunals

The name of the court [acronym], the case number, *the case title*, type of the decision with the date passing.

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [ICTY], Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, *Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*. Appeal Judgement on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin. Judgment of 27 February 2001.

(*Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*, IT-94-1-A-AR77) or

(ICTY, IT-94-1-A-AR77)

Archive sources

Name of the repository [acronym], title or number of the fond [acronym], box number, folder number – if available, reference code, "title of the document" – or, if it is not available, provide a short description by answering the questions who? whom? what?, place and date – or n.d. if no date is provided.

Arhiv Srbije [AS], MID, K-T, f. 2, r93/1894, "Izveštaj Ministarstva inostranih dela o postavljanju konzula", Beograd, 19. april 1888.

(AS, MID, K-T, f. 2)

(AS, MID, f. 2) – *When the folder number is known only*

Dalhousie University Archives [DUA], Philip Girard fonds [PG], B-11, f. 3, MS-2-757.2006-024, "List of written judgements by Laskin," n.d.

(DUA, PG, B-11, f. 3)

Web sources

Surname, Name or name of the corporate author [acronym]. Year of publication or n.d. – if the year of publication cannot be determined. "The name of the web page." *The name of the web site*. Date of creation, modification or the last access to the web page, if the date cannot be determined from the source. URL.

Bilefsky, Dan, and Ian Austen. 2019. "Trudeau Re-election Reveals Intensified Divisions in Canada." *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/world/canada/trudeau-re-elected.html.

(Bilefsky and Austen 2019)

Institute for Political Studies [IPS]. n.d. "The 5th International Economic Forum on Reform, Transition and Growth." *Institute for Political Studies*. Last accessed 7 December 7 2019. http://www.ips.ac.rs/en/news/the-5th-international-economic-forum-on-reform-transition-and-growth/.

(Institute for Political Studies [IPS], n.d.) – *First in-text citation*

(IPS, n.d.) – *Second and every subsequent citation*

Associated Press [AP]. 2019. “AP to present VoteCast results at AAPOR pooling conference.” May 14, 2019. https://www.ap.org/press-releases/2019/ap-to-present-votecast-results-at-aapor-polling-conference.

(AP 2019)

TEXT FORMATTING

General guidelines in writing the manuscript

The manuscript should be written in Word, in the following manner:

Paper size: A4;

Margins: Normal 2.54 cm;

Use roman font (plain letters) to write the text, unless specified otherwise;

Line spacing: 1.5;

Footnote line spacing: 1;

Title font size: 14 pt;

Subtitles font size: 12 pt;

Text font size: 12 pt;

Footnote font size: 10 pt;

Tables, charts and figures font size: 10 pt;

Use Paragraph/Special/First line at 1.27 cm;

Text alignment: Justify;

Font color: Automatic;

Page numbering: Arabian numerals in lower right corner;

Do not break the words manually by inserting hyphens;

Save the manuscript in the .doc format.

Research article manuscript preparation

The manuscript should be prepared in the following manner:

Name and surname of the first author*

* In the footnote: E-mail address: The institutional e-mail address is strongly recommended.

Affiliation

Name and surname of the second author

Affiliation

TITLE OF THE PAPER**

** In the footnote: Optionally, include one of the following (or similar) information: 1) name and number of the project on which the paper was written: 2) the previous presentation of the paper on a scientific conference as an oral presentation under the same or similar name; or 3) the research presented in the paper was conducted while writing the PhD dissertation of the author.

Abstract

Abstract, within 100–250 words range, contains the subject, aim, theoretical and methodological approach, results and conclusions of the paper.

Keywords: Below the abstract, five to ten **key words** should be written. Key words should be written in roman font and separated by commas.

The paper can have maximum of three levels of subtitles. **Subtitles** should not be numbered. They should be used in the following manner:

FIRST LEVEL SUBTITLE

Second level subtitle

Third level subtitle

Tables, charts and figures should be inserted in the following manner:

- Above the table/chart/figure, center the name of Table, Chart or Figure, an Arabic numeral, and the title in roman font;

- Below the table/chart/figure, the source should be cited in the following manner: 1) if the table/chart/figure is taken from another source, write down *Source*: and include the parenthetical citation information of the source; or 2) if the table/chart/figure is not taken from another source, write down *Source*: Processed by the author.

Use in-text references according to Citing and referencing.

Use the footnotes solely to provide remarks or broader explanations.

REFERENCES

References should be listed after the text of the paper, prior to the Resume in the following manner:

- the first line of each reference should be left intended, and the remaining lines should be placed as hanging by 1.27 cm using the option Paragraph/Special/Hanging;

- all the references should be listed together, without separating legal acts of archives;

- the references should not be numbered;

- list only the references used in the text.

After the reference list, write the name and surname of the author, the tile of the paper and resume in Serbian in the following manner:

Име и презиме првог аутора*

* Фуснота: Имејл-адреса аутора: Препоручује се навођење институционалне имејл-адресе аутора.

Име и презиме другог аутора

НАСЛОВ

Резиме

Resume (Резиме) up to 1/10 length of the paper contains the results and conclusions of the paper which are presented in greater scope than in the abstract.

Keywords (Кључне речи): Key words should be written in roman font and separated by commas.

Authors who are not native Serbian speakers should contact the Editorial staff for assistance in translating the manuscript elements into Serbian.

Review preparation

A review should be prepared in the same manner as the research article, but leaving out abstract, keywords and resume.

Book review preparation

Book review should be prepared in the following manner:

Split the text into **two columns**.

Name and surname of the author*

* In the footnote: E-mail address: The institutional e-mail address is strongly recommended.

Affiliation

TITLE OF THE BOOK REVIEW

Below the title **place the image of the front cover**;

Below the image of the front cover list the book details according to the following rule:

Name and surname of the author. Year of publication. *Title of the book*. Place of publication: Publisher, total number of pages.

The text of the book review should be prepared following the guidelines of the research article preparation.

УПУТСТВО ЗА АУТОРЕ

У часопису *Српска политичка мисао* објављују се радови који представљају резултат најновијих теоријских и емпиријских научних истраживања у области политичких наука. Аутори би приликом писања радова требало да се позивају претежно на резултате научних истраживања који су објављени у научним часописима, првенствено у часописима политиколошке тематике.

Радови се објављују на српском језику и ћириличком писму или енглеском, руском и француском језику.

Часопис се објављује четири пута годишње. Прва три броја су на српском језику, а четврти на енглеском језику. Рокови за слање радова су: 1. фебруар, 1. мај и 1. август за издања на српском језику и 1. октобар за издање на енглеском језику.

Исти аутор не може да објави рад у два узастопна броја часописа, без обзира да ли је реч о самосталном или коауторском раду.

Аутори су у обавези да приликом слања радова доставе потписану и скенирану изјаву да рад није претходно објављен, односно да није реч о аутоплагијату или плагијату. Образац изјаве може се преузети са интернет странице часописа: http://www.ips.ac.rs/rs/magazines/srpska-politicka-misao/authors_directions/.

Радове за издања часописа на српском језику слати на имејл-адресу: spm@ips.ac.rs.

Радове за издање часописа на енглеском језику слати на имејл-адресу: spt@ips.ac.rs.

Научни чланак може имати највише 40.000 карактера са размацима, укључујући фусноте. Приликом бројања карактера изоставити списак референци. Изузетно, монографска студија може бити већег обима у складу са одредбама *Правилника о поступку, начину вредновања и квантитативном исказивању научноистраживачких резултата истраживања*.

Осврт може имати највише 15.000 карактера са размацима.

Приказ књиге може имати највише 10.000 карактера са размацима.

Приликом провере броја карактера користити опцију *Review/Word Count/Character (with spaces)* уз активирану опцију *Include textboxes, footnotes and endnotes*.

НАЧИН ЦИТИРАЊА

Часопис *Српска политичка мисао* користи делимично модификовани Чикаго стил цитирања (17. издање приручника *Chicago Manual of Style*), што подразумева навођење библиографске парентезе (заграде) по систему аутор–датум у тексту, као и списак референци са пуним библиографским подацима након текста рада.

Податке у библиографској парентези и списку референци навести на језику и писму на коме је референца објављена.

У наставку се налазе правила и примери навођења библиографских података у списку референци и у тексту. За сваку врсту референце прво је дато правило навођења, а затим пример навођења у списку референци и библиографској парентези.

Библиографска парентеза се по правилу наводи на крају реченице, пре интерпункцијског знака, и садржи презиме аутора, годину објављивања и одговарајући број страна, према следећем примеру: (Суботић 2010, 15–17).

Монографија

Један аутор

Презиме, име. Година издања. *Наслов*. Место издања: издавач.

Суботић, Момчило. 2010. *Политичка мисао србистике.* Београд: Институт за политичке студије.

(Суботић 2010)

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.* New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

(Mearsheimer 2001)

Два или три аутора

Презиме, име, и име презиме. Година издања. *Наслов*. Место издања: издавач.

Стојановић, Ђорђе, и Живојин Ђурић. 2012. *Анатомија савремене државе.* Београд: Институт за политичке студије.

(Стојановић и Ђурић 2012)

Pollitt Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

(Pollitt, Birchall, and Putman 1998)

Четири и више аутора

Презиме, име, име и презиме, име и презиме, и име презиме. Година издања. *Наслов*. Место издања: издавач.

Милисављевић, Бојан, Саша Варинац, Александра Литричин, Андријана Јовановић, и Бранимир Благојевић. 2017. *Коментар Закона о јавно-приватном партнерству и концесијама: према стању законодавства од 7. јануара 2017. године*. Београд: Службени гласник; Правни факултет.

(Милисављевић и др. 2017)

Уредник/приређивач/преводилац уместо аутора

Након навођења имена, ставити зарез, па након тога одговарајућу скраћеницу на језику и писму референце, нпр. „ур.”, „прев.” „prir.”, „ed.”, „eds.”

Kaltwasser, Cristobal Rovira, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostigoy, eds. 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

(Kaltwasser et al. 2017)

Поглавље у зборнику

Презиме, име. Година издања. „Наслов поглавља.” У *Наслов*, ур. име презиме, број страна на којима се налази поглавље. Место издања: издавач.

Степић, Миломир. 2015. „Позиција Србије пред почетак Великог рата са становишта Првог и Другог закона геополитике.” У *Србија и геополитичке прилике у Европи 1914. године*, ур. Миломир Степић и Љубодраг П. Ристић, 55–78. Лајковац: Градска библиотека; Београд: Институт за политичке студије.

(Степић 2015)

Lošonc, Alpar. 2019. “Discursive dependence of politics with the confrontation between republicanism and neoliberalism.” In *Discourse and Politics*, eds. Dejana M. Vukasović and Petar Matić, 23-46. Belgrade: Institute for Political Studies.

(Lošonc 2019)

Чланак у научном часопису

Чланак у редовном броју

Презиме, име. Година издања. „Наслов чланка." *Наслов часописа* волумен (број): број страна на којима се налази чланак. DOI број.

Ђурић, Живојин, и Миша Стојадиновић. 2018. „Држава и неолиберални модели урушавања националних политичких институција." *Српска политичка мисао* 62 (4): 41–57. doi: 10.22182/spm.6242018.2.

(Ђурић и Стојадиновић 2018, 46–48)

Ellwood, David W. 2018. "Will Brexit Make or Break Great Britain?" *Serbian Political Thought* 18 (2): 5–14. doi: 10.22182/spt.18212018.1.

(Ellwood 2018, 11)

Чланак у посебном броју

Презиме, име. Година издања. „Наслов чланка." У „Наслов посебног броја", ур. име презиме уредника, напомена о посебном издању, *Наслов часописа*: број страна на којима се налази чланак. DOI број.

Стојановић, Ђорђе. 2016. „Постмодернизам у друштвеним наукама: стање парадигме." У „Постмодернизација српске науке: политика постмодерне / политика после постмодерне", ур. Ђорђе Стојановић и Мишко Шуваковић, посебно издање, *Српска политичка мисао*: 5–35. doi: 10.22182/spm.specijal2016.1.

(Стојановић 2016, 27)

Енциклопедије и речници

Наведен је аутор/уредник

Презиме, име, име и презиме, ур. Година издања. *Наслов*. Том. Место издања: издавач.

Jerkov, Aleksandar, ur. 2010. *Velika opšta ilustrovana enciklopedija Larrouse: dopunjeno srpsko izdanje*. Tom V (S–Ž). Beograd:

Mono i Manjana.

(Jerkov 2010)

Није наведен аутор/уредник

Наслов. Година издања. Место издања: издавач.

Webster's Dictionary of English Usage. 1989. Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Inc.

(*Webster's Dictionary of English Usage* 1989)

Докторска дисертација

Презиме, име. Година издања. „Наслов докторске дисертације." Докторска дисертација. Назив универзитета: назив факултета.

Бурсаћ, Дејан. 2019. „Утицај идеологије политичких партија на јавну потрошњу у бившим социјалистичким државама." Докторска дисертација. Универзитет у Београду: Факултет политичких наука.

(Бурсаћ 2019, 145–147)

Wallace, Desmond D. 2019. "The diffusion of representation." PhD diss. University of Iowa.

(Wallace 2019, 27, 81–83)

Чланак у дневним новинама или периодичним часописима

Наведен је аутор

Презиме, име. Година издања. „Наслов чланка." *Назив новине или часописа* годиште: број стране на којој се налази чланак.

Авакумовић, Маријана. 2019. „Платни разреди – 2021. године." *Политика*, 8. децембар: 9.

(Авакумовић 2019)

Није наведен аутор

Назив новине или часописа. Година издања. „Наслов чланка." Годиште: број стране на којој се налази чланак.

New York Times. 2002. "In Texas, Ad Heats Up Race for Governor." July 30, 2002.

(*New York Times* 2002)

Референца са корпоративним аутором

Назив аутора [акроним, по потреби]. Година издања. *Наслов издања*. Место издања: издавач.

Министарство за европске интеграције Републике Србије [МЕИРС]. 2018. *Водич за коришћење ЕУ фондова у Србији*. Београд: Министарство за европске интеграције Републике Србије.

(Министарство за европске интеграције Републике Србије [МЕИРС] 2018) – *прво навођење*

(МЕИРС 2018) – *свако следеће навођење*

International Organization for Standardization [ISO]. 2019. *Moving from ISO 9001:2008 to ISO 9001:2015*. Geneva: International Organization for Standardization.

(International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 2019) – *прво навођење*

(ISO 2019) – *свако следеће навођење*

Репринт издања

Презиме, име. [Година првог издања] Година репринт издања. *Наслов*. Место првог издања: издавач првог издања. Напомена „Репринт“ на језику и писму референце, место издања репринт издања: издавач. Напомена одакле су цитати у тексту преузети.

Михалџић, Стеван. [1937] 1992. *Барања: од најстаријих времена до данас*, треће издање. Нови Сад: Фототипско издање. Репринт, Београд: Библиотека града Београда. Цитати се односе на фототипско издање.

(Михалџић [1937] 1992)

Посебни случајеви навођења референци

Навођење другог и сваког следећег издања

Презиме, име. Година издања. *Наслов*, напомена о издању. Место издања: издавач.

Гаћиновић, Радослав. 2018. *Млада Босна*, друго допуњено и измењено издање. Београд: Evro Book.

Више референци истог аутора

1) *Исти аутор, различите године* – Ређати према години издања, почевши од најраније.

Степић, Миломир. 2012. „Србија као регионална држава: реинтеграциони геополитички приступ." *Национални интерес* 14 (2): 9–39. doi: 10.22182/ni.1422012.1.

Степић, Миломир. 2015. „Позиција Србије пред почетак Великог рата са становишта Првог и Другог закона геополитике." У *Србија и геополитичке прилике у Европи 1914. године*, ур. Миломир Степић и Љубодраг П. Ристић, 55–78. Лајковац: Градска библиотека; Београд: Институт за политичке студије.

2) *Исти аутор, иста година* – Ређати према азбучном или абецедном редоследу почетног слова назива референце. Поред године објављивања ставити почетна слова азбуке или абецеде која се користе и у библиографској парентези.

Гаћиновић, Радослав. 2018а. „Војна неутралност и будућност Србије." *Политика националне безбедности* 14 (1): 23–38. doi: 10.22182/pnb.1412018.2.

Гаћиновић, Радослав. 2018б. *Млада Босна*, друго допуњено и измењено издање. Београд: Evro Book.

(Гаћиновић 2018а, 25), (Гаћиновић 2018б)

3) *Исти аутор као самостални аутор и као коаутор* – Прво навести референце у којима је самостални аутор, а затим оне у којима је коаутор.

Стојановић, Ђорђе. 2016. „Постмодернизам у друштвеним наукама: стање парадигме." У „Постмодернизација српске науке: политика постмодерне / политика после постмодерне", ур. Ђорђе Стојановић и Мишко Шуваковић, посебно издање, *Српска политичка мисао*: 5–35. doi: 10.22182/spm.specijal2016.1.

Стојановић, Ђорђе, и Живојин Ђурић. 2012. *Анатомија савремене државе.* Београд: Институт за политичке студије.

4) *Исти аутор као први коаутор у више различитих референци* – Ређати према азбучном или абецедном редоследу презимена другог коаутора.

Pollitt Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

Pollitt Christopher, Colin Talbot, Janice Caulfield, and Amanda Smullen. 2005. *Agencies: How Governments do Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Посебни случајеви навођења библиографске парентезе

Изузеци од навођења библиографске парентезе на крају реченице

1) *Навођење презимена аутора у оквиру реченице* – Годину издања ставити у заграду након навођења презимена, а број стране на крају реченице у заграду. За референцу на латиници или страном језику у загради навести и презиме аутора.

„Према мишљењу Суботића (2010), …” (30).

„Бокслер (Bochsler 2018) у својој књизи тврди…”

2) *Навођење презимена аутора у оквиру реченице пре цитата из референце* – Након навођења презимена, у библиографској парентези навести годину и број стране, а затим навести цитат.

Као што Суботић (2010, 45) наводи: „ … ”

Миршајмер (Mearsheimer 2001, 57) изричито тврди: „ … ”

3) *Навођење исте референце више пута у једном пасусу* – Ако се наводи иста страна или опсег страна, унети библиографску парентезу приликом последњег навођења или на крају пасуса пре интерпункцијског знака. Ако се наводе различите стране, референцу навести приликом првог позивања на одређену страну, а затим до краја пасуса у заграду стављати само различите бројеве страна.

Не користити „исто”, „*ibid*”, или „*op. cit.*” за вишеструко навођење референце.

Навођење израза „видети”, „упоредити” и сл.

Изразе унети у библиографску парентезу.

(видети Кнежевић 2014, 153)

(Степић 2015; упоредити Кнежевић 2014)

Секундарна референца

У библиографској парентези прво навести презиме аутора, годину и број стране примарне референце, затим „цитирано у:” и презиме аутора, годину и број стране секундарне референце. У списку референци навести само секундарну референцу.

„Том приликом неолиберализам се од стране највећег броја његових протагониста најчешће одређује као политика слободног тржишта која охрабрује приватне фирме и побољшава избор потрошачима, разарајући при том ’неспособну, бирократску и паразитску владу која никада не може урадити ништа добро, без обзира на њене добре намере’” (Chomsky 1999, 7 цитирано у: Ђурић и Стојадиновић 2018, 47).

Ђурић, Живојин, и Миша Стојадиновић. 2018. „Држава и неолиберални модели урушавања националних политичких институција.” *Српска политичка мисао* 62 (4): 41–57. doi:10.22182/spm.6242018.2.

Иста библиографска парентеза, више референци

1) *Различити аутори* – Референце одвојити тачком и зарезом.

(Степић 2015, 61; Кнежевић 2014, 158)

2) *Исти аутор, различите године* – Навести презиме аутора, а затим године издања различитих референци по редоследу од најраније до најновије и одвојити их зарезом, односно тачком и зарезом када се наводи број страна.

(Степић 2012, 2015) или (Степић 2012, 30; 2015, 69)

3) *Различити аутори, исто презиме* – Иницијал имена. Презиме аутора. Година издања.

(Д. Суботић 2010, 97), (М. Суботић 2010, 302)

Суботић, Драган. 2010. „Нови јавни менаџмент у политичком систему Србије.” *Политичка ревија* 23 (1): 91–114. doi: 10.22182/pr.2312010.5.

Суботић, Момчило. 2010. „Војводина у политичком систему Србије.” *Политичка ревија* 23 (1): 289–310. doi: 10.22182/pr.2312010.15.

Правни акти

У библиографској парентези навести члан, став и тачку или параграф коришћењем скраћеница „чл.”, „ст.”, „тач.”, „Art.” „para.” и сл.

Устави и закони

Назив акта [акроним, по потреби], „Назив службеног гласила” и број, или интернет адреса и датум последњег приступа.

Устав Републике Србије, „Службени гласник Републике Србије”, бр. 98/06.

(Устав Републике Србије 2006, чл. 33)

Закон о основама система образовања и васпитања [ЗОСОВ], „Службени гласник Републике Србије”, бр. 88/2017, 27/2018 – др. закон, 10/2019 и 27/2018 – др. закон.

(ЗОСОВ 2019, чл. 17, ст. 4)

Zakon o nasljeđivanju [ZN], „Narodne novine“, br. 48/03, 163/03, 35/05, 127/13, i 33/15 i 14/19.

(ZN 2019, čl. 3)

An Act to make provision for and in connection with offences relating to offensive weapons [Offensive Weapons Act], 16th May 2019, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/17/pdfs/ukpga_20190017_en.pdf, последњи приступ 20. децембра 2019.

(Offensive Weapons Act 2019)

Одлуке државних органа и институција

Назив органа [акроним или скраћени назив], Назив акта и број предмета, датум доношења акта, или интернет адреса и датум последњег приступа.

Заштитник грађана Републике Србије [Заштитник грађана], Мишљење бр. 15–3314/12, 22. октобар 2012, https://www.osobesainvaliditetom.rs/attachments/083_misljenje%20ZG%20DZ.pdf, последњи приступ 20. децембра 2019.

(Заштитник грађана, 15–3314/12)

U.S. Department of the Treasury [USDT], Treasury Directive No. 13–02, July 20, 1988, https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/orders-directives/Pages/td13-02.aspx, last accessed 20 December 2019.

(USDT, 13–02)

Законодавни акти Европске уније

Назив акта, подаци из службеног гласила у формату наведеном на сајту *EUR-lex*: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html.

Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13–18.

(Regulation 182/2011, Art. 3)

Међународни уговори

Оснивачки уговори Европске уније

Назив уговора или консолидоване верзије [акроним], подаци о коришћеној верзији уговора из службеног гласила у формату наведеном на сајту *EUR-lex*: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html.

Treaty on European Union [TEU], OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 1–112.

(TEU 1992, Art. J.1)

Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [TEU], OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p. 13–45.

(TEU 2008, Art. 11)

Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 1–388.

(TFEU 2016, Art. 144)

Остали међународни уговори

Назив уговора [акроним или скраћени назив], датум закључивања, регистрација у Уједињеним нацијама – UNTS број, регистрациони број са сајта *United Nations Treaty Collection*: https://treaties.un.org.

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [Marrakesh Agreement], 15 April 1994, UNTS 1867, I-31874.

(Marrakesh Agreement 1994)

Convention on Cluster Munitions [CCM], 30 May 2008, UNTS 2688, I-47713.

(CCM 2008)

Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan [Israel Jordan Peace Treaty], 26 October 1994, UNTS 2042, I-35325.

(Israel Jordan Peace Treaty 1994)

Одлуке међународних организација

Назив међународне организације и надлежног органа [акроним], број одлуке, Назив одлуке, датум усвајања.

United Nations Security Council [UNSC], S/RES/1244 (1999), Resolution 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999.

(UNSC, S/RES/1244)

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE], Doc. 14326, Observation of the presidential election in Serbia (2 April 2017), 29 May 2017.

(PACE, Doc. 14326, para. 12)

Судска пракса

Судска пракса у Републици Србији

Врста акта и назив суда [акроним суда], број предмета са датумом доношења, назив и број службеног гласника или друге публикације у коме је пресуда објављена – ако је доступно.

Одлука Уставног суда Републике Србије [УСРС], IУа-2/2009 од 13. јуна 2012. године, „Службени гласник РС", бр. 68/2012.

(Одлука УСРС, IУа-2/2009)

Решење Апелационог суда у Новом Саду [АСНС], Ржр–1/16 од 27. априла 2016. године.

(Решење АСНС, Ржр–1/16)

Судска пракса Међународног суда правде

Назив суда [акроним суда], *Назив случаја*, врста одлуке са датумом доношења, назив и број гласила у коме је пресуда објављена, број стране.

International Court of Justice [ICJ], *Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* v. *Greece)*, Judgment of 5 December 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 644.

(ICJ Judgment, 2011)

International Court of Justice [ICJ], *Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports, p. 403.

(ICJ Advisory Opinion, 2010)

Судска пракса Суда правде Европске уније

Назив случаја, број случаја, врста случаја са датумом доношења, Европска идентификациона ознака судске праксе (*ECLI*).

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-270/12, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 January 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18.

(*United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union*, C-270/12) или

(CJEU, C-270/12)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-270/12, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered on 12 September 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:562.

(Opinion of AG Jääskinen, C-270/12)

Судска пракса Европског суда за људска права

Назив случаја, број представке, врста случаја са датумом доношења, Европска идентификациона ознака судске праксе (*ECLI*).

Pronina v. Ukraine, No. 63566/00, Judgment of the Court (Second Section) on Merits and Just Satisfaction of 18 July 2006, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2006:0718JUD006356600.

(*Pronina v. Ukraine*, 63566/00, par. 20) или

(ECHR, 63566/00, par. 20)

Судска пракса других међународних судова и трибунала

Назив суда [акроним суда], *Назив случаја*, број случаја, врста случаја са датумом доношења.

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [ICTY], *Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Appeal Judgement on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, Judgment of 27 February 2001.

(*Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*, IT-94-1-A-AR77) или

(ICTY, IT-94-1-A-AR77)

Архивски извори

Назив установе [акроним или скраћени назив], назив или број фонда [акроним или скраћени назив], кутија, фасцикла (уколико постоји), сигнатура, „Назив документа" (ако нема назива, дати кратак опис одговарањем на питања: ко? коме? шта?), место и датум документа или н.д. ако није наведен датум.

Архив Србије [АС], МИД, К-Т, ф. 2, r93/1894, „Извештај Министарства иностраних дела о постављању конзула", Београд, 19. април 1888.

(АС, МИД, К-Т, ф. 2)

(АС, МИД, ф. 2) – *ако је позната само фасцикла, а не и кутија*

Dalhousie University Archives [DUA], Philip Girard fonds [PG], B-11, f. 3, MS-2-757.2006-024, "List of written judgements by Laskin," n.d.

(DUA, PG, B-11, f. 3)

Извори са интернета

Презиме, име или назив корпоративног аутора [акроним]. Година објављивања или н.д. – ако не може да се утврди година објављивања. „Наслов секције или стране унутар сајта." *Назив сајта*. Датум креирања, модификовања или последњег приступа страници, ако не може да се утврди на основу извора. Интернет адреса.

Bilefsky, Dan, and Ian Austen. 2019. "Trudeau Re-election Reveals Intensified Divisions in Canada." *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/world/canada/trudeau-re-elected.html.

(Bilefsky and Austen 2019)

Институт за политичке студије [ИПС]. н.д. „Предавање др Фридриха Ромига." *Институт за политичке студије.* Последњи приступ 10. октобар 2018. http://www.ips.ac.rs/rs/news/predavanje-dr-fridriha-romiga/.

(Институт за политичке студије [ИПС], н.д.) – *прво навођење*

(ИПС, н.д.) – *свако следеће навођење*

Тањуг. 2019. „Европска свемирска агенција повећава фондове.” 28. новембар 2019. http://www.tanjug.rs/full-view1.aspx?izb=522182.

(Тањуг 2019)

ФОРМАТИРАЊЕ ТЕКСТА

Опште смернице о обради текста

Текст рада обрадити у програму *Word*, на следећи начин:

величина странице: А4;

маргине: *Normal* 2,54 cm;

текст писати курентом (обичним словима), осим ако није другачије предвиђено;

проред између редова у тексту: 1,5;

проред између редова у фуснотама: 1;

величина слова у наслову: 14 pt;

величина слова у поднасловима: 12 pt;

величина слова у тексту: 12 pt;

величина слова у фуснотама: 10 pt;

величина слова за табеле, графиконе и слике: 10 pt;

увлачење првог реда пасуса: 1,27 cm (опција: *Paragraph/Special/First line*);

поравнање текста: *Justify*;

боја текста: *Automatic*;

нумерација страна: арапски бројеви у доњем десном углу;

не преламати речи ручно уношењем цртица за наставак речи у наредном реду;

сачувати рад у формату .doc.

Примена правописних правила

Радове ускладити са *Правописом српског језика* у издању Матице српске из 2010. године или из каснијих издања.

Посебну пажњу обратити на следеће:

Приликом првог навођења **транскрибованих страних имена и израза** у облој загради поред навести и њихове облике на изворном језику у курзиву (*italic*), нпр: Франкфуртер алгемајне цајтунг (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*), Џон Ролс (*John Rawls*), Алексеј Тупољев (*Алексей Туполев*).

Поједине **општепознате стране изразе** писати само на изворном језику у курзиву, нпр. *de iure*, *de facto*, *a priori*, *a posteriori*, *sui generis* итд.

Реченицу не почињати акронимом, скраћеницом или бројем.

Текст у фуснотама увек завршавати тачком.

За навођење израза или **цитирања на српском језику** користити наводнике који су својствени српском језику према важећем правопису **(„ ”)**, а за навођење или **цитирање на енглеском или другом страном језику** користити наводнике који су својствени том језику (**“ ”**, **« »**).

Угластом заградом [] означавати: 1) сопствени текст који се умеће у туђи текст; или 2) текст који се умеће у текст који је већ омеђен облом заградом.

Црту писати са размаком пре и после или без размака, никако са размаком само пре или само после. Између бројева, укључујући бројеве страна, користити примакнуту црту **(–)**, а не цртицу **(-)**.

За **наглашавање појединих речи** не користити подебљана слова (**bold**), нити подвучена слова (underline) већ искључиво курзив (*italic*) или наводнике и полунаводнике (**’ ’** на српском језику или **‘ ’** на енглеском језику).

Форматирање научног чланка

Научни чланак форматирати на следећи начин:

Име и презиме првог аутора*

[*] Фуснота: Имејл-адреса аутора: Препоручује се навођење институционалне имејл-адресе аутора.

Установа запослења

Име и презиме другог аутора

Установа запослења

НАСЛОВ РАДА[**]

[**] Фуснота: по потреби, навести један од следећих (или сличних) података: 1) назив и број пројекта у оквиру кога је чланак написан; 2) да је рад претходно изложен на научном скупу у виду усменог саопштења под истим или сличним називом; или 3) да је истраживање које је представљено у раду спроведено за потребе израде докторске дисертације аутора.

Сажетак

Сажетак, обима од 100 до 250 речи, садржи предмет, циљ, коришћени теоријско-методолошки приступ, резултате и закључке рада.

Кључне речи: Испод текста сажетка навести од пет до десет **кључних речи**. Кључне речи писати курентом и једну од друге одвојити зарезом.

У тексту је могуће користити највише три нивоа поднаслова. **Поднаслове** навести без нумерације, на следећи начин:

ПОДНАСЛОВ ПРВОГ НИВОА

Поднаслов другог нивоа

Поднаслов трећег нивоа

Табеле, графиконе и слике уносити на следећи начин:

- изнад табеле/графикона/слике центрирано написати: Табела/Графикон/Слика, редни број и назив;

- испод табеле/графикона/слике навести извор на следећи начин: 1) уколико су табела/графикон/слика преузети, написати *Извор*: и навести референцу на исти начин као што се наводи у библиографској парентези; 2) уколико нису преузети, написати *Извор*: Обрада аутора.

Референце наводити у тексту према Начину цитирања.

Фусноте користити искључиво за давање напомена или ширих објашњења.

РЕФЕРЕНЦЕ

Списак референци навести након текста рада, а пре резимеа, на следећи начин:

- прво навести референце на ћирилици по азбучном реду;
- затим навести референце на латиници и страним језицима по абецедном реду;
- прву линију сваке референце поравнати на левој маргини, а остале увући за 1,27 cm, користећи опцију *Paragraph/Special/Hanging*;
- све референце наводити заједно, без издвојених делова за правне акте или архивску грађу;
- референце не нумерисати;
- наводити искључиво оне референце које су коришћене у тексту.

Након списка референци навести име и презиме аутора, наслов рада и резиме на енглеском језику на следећи начин:

First Author*

* In the footnote: E-mail address: The institutional e-mail address is strongly recommended.

Affiliation

Second Author

Affiliation

TITLE

Resume

Резиме, обима до 1/10 дужине чланка, садржи резултате и закључке рада који су образложени опширније него у сажетку.

Keywords: Кључне речи писати курентом и једну од друге одвојити зарезом.

Уколико је **рад написан на страном језику,** након списка референци, име и презиме аутора, наслов, резиме и кључне речи навести на српском језику.

Форматирање осврта

Осврт форматирати на исти начин као научни чланак, без навођења сажетка, кључних речи и резимеа.

Форматирање приказа

Приказ књиге форматирати на следећи начин:

Текст поделити у **две колоне**.

Име и презиме аутора*

* Фуснота: Имејл-адреса аутора: Препоручује се навођење институционалне имејл-адресе аутора.

Установа запослења

НАСЛОВ ПРИКАЗА

Испод наслова **поставити слику предње корице**;

Испод слике предње корице навести податке о књизи према следећем правилу:

Име и презиме. Година издања. *Наслов*. Место издања: издавач, број страна.

Текст приказа обрадити у складу са општим смерницама о обради текста.

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